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ABSTRACT
GO¨KC¸E ESENDURAN: Role of Environmental Legislations and Firm-Level
Strategies on Product Take Back
(Under the direction of Dr. Jayashankar M. Swaminathan and Dr. Eda
Kemahlıog˘lu-Ziya)
In the last two decades, an increasing number of companies provide take-back pro-
grams. It is therefore essential to understand the drivers and influencers of take-back
strategies. In the second chapter, we examine an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
under take-back legislation that holds manufacturers financially responsible for collecting
and treating products discarded by customers. We characterize the manufacturer’s opti-
mal collection and remanufacturing policies when she has in-house remanufacturing and
when she faces competition from an independent remanufacturer. We show that legisla-
tion on collection levels never decreases remanufacturing levels if the OEM remanufac-
tures; however, it might cause remanufacturing level to decrease if the third-party reman-
ufactures. We also find that legislation creates incentives for designing environmentally-
friendly products regardless of the existence of competition. Our research has also im-
plications for policy makers. We find that in order to achieve higher remanufacturing
levels policy makers might consider subsidizing third-party remanufacturers rather than
imposing take-back legislations. While we consider take-back legislation that stipulates
individual responsibility in the second chapter, some implementations of legislation al-
low manufacturers to fulfill their obligation either individually or by joining a collective
scheme. In the third chapter, we explore a company’s optimal strategy in complying
with take-back legislations and compare the individual versus collective schemes in terms
of cost effectiveness and environmental benefits they achieve. We show that which com-
pliance scheme yields the lowest cost depends on the collection rate maintained by the
government and the market shares of partner firms. Apart from legislations, there might
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be a number of different economic and/or marketing concerns driving product take-back.
In the fourth chapter, we consider a manufacturer with a dual distribution channel,
i.e. rental and sales channel, and study the profitability of buyback program, a form
of product take-back motivated by the goal of managing distribution channels better.
We characterize how the profitability of the buyback program changes depending on the
uncertainty in demand and the terms of buyback contract. We show that committing to
the buyback price at the time of initial sales always leads to lower manufacturer profits;
however, it enhances a buyback program’s ability in resolving channel conflicts under
uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Traditionally, a producer’s role in the supply chain ended with the sale of the product.
However, today an increasing number of firms are making product take-back an important
part of their business strategy. Product take-back, which is a form of extended producer
responsibility, requires firms to organize strategies to take their used products back from
customers. In this dissertation, we aim to develop theoretical insights to help firms
effectively manage their take-back strategies.
One of the main drivers of product take-back is environmental legislation. Several
countries now impose product take-back legislation with the objectives of both reduc-
ing amounts and the environmental impacts of waste as well as creating incentives for
environmentally-friendly business decisions by shifting the cost of waste product man-
agement from society to producers. Although fundamental legislative requirements vary
from one country to another, take-back legislations basically hold companies financially
responsible for taking back their used products and treating them properly. Assessing
the profitability and efficiency of operations/strategies launched in order to comply with
environmental legislations is one of the main objectives of this dissertation. In particular,
we intend to understand how different implementations of product take-back legislations
affect the optimal strategies of companies. In addition, we provide insights for policy
makers on how to design effective take-back legislations.
Some companies (e.g., Xerox, Motorola) launch product take-back programs even in
the absence of legislations. Apart from legislations, there might be a number of different
economic and/or marketing concerns driving product take-back. For instance, companies
with dual distribution channels, i.e. rental and sales channels, set up channel structures
that facilitate product buyback, which is a form of take-back, in order to manage their
distribution channels better. One of the key goals of this dissertation is examining the
profitability of the buyback channel structure in comparison to other possible channel
structures.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we examine how
product take-back legislations affect a firm’s collection and remanufacturing decisions
when she has in-house remanufacturing and when she faces competition from an in-
dependent remanufacturer. In Chapter 3, we study a firm’s compliance decision and
identify the situations where complying collectively is more cost efficient than complying
individually. In Chapter 4, we consider a manufacturer with dual distribution channels
and intend to shed light on how the buyback program should be designed to mitigate the
conflicts between the rental and sales channel. We conclude and provide a brief overview
of each chapter of the dissertation in Chapter 5.
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1.2 Dissertation Overview
1.2.1 Chapter 2
As more countries are imposing increasingly stricter product take-back legislations that
hold producers responsible for financing collection and proper treatment of their prod-
ucts (e.g. tires, batteries, electronic products such as computers, etc.) discarded by
customers, product take-back for environmental reasons becomes even more important.
Even though take-back legislations exist in many countries, the form of legislation as
well as the specific targets that are set on collection/recycling levels might differ. It is
clear that the legislation’s requirements affect companies’ responses, which in turn, de-
termine the success of the legislation in terms of achieving two main objectives: reducing
the amount of waste by increasing product take-back levels and creating incentives for
environmentally-friendly product designs.
Some argue that existing legislations may in fact hinder remanufacturing, which is
a more efficient way of capturing the value in discarded products than recycling, by
granting original equipment manufacturers (OEM) first access to discarded products
through collection/recycling targets and thus limiting the availability of those products to
third-party remanufacturers. Hence it is not clear whether existing take-back legislations
will be a driving force for remanufacturing or not (Gray and Charter, 2007). In the
second chapter, we investigate how existing forms of take-back legislations with different
collection/recycling targets affect remanufacturing decisions and if there is any additional
benefit in imposing remanufacturing targets in terms of meeting the objectives of such
legislations.
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Using a stylized model of take-back legislation in a two-period setting, we study how
existing forms of legislations as well as extended forms with additional remanufacturing
targets affect optimal production, take-back and remanufacturing decisions. First, we
study the decision of a monopolist OEM with in-house remanufacturing capabilities. We
then consider an OEM with no in-house remanufacturing but facing competition from
a third-party remanufacturer, and formulate a Cournot competition where the OEM is
Stackelberg leader. As take-back legislations grant the OEM first access to cores (dis-
carded products) we assume that first the OEM collects cores and then the independent
remanufacturer collects among the remaining cores left in the market. We also assume
that cores that are collected but not remanufactured must be disposed of properly or re-
cycled at a cost. We solve the game by backward induction and characterize the optimal
policies analytically.
Among others, our results show that legislation that imposes the same targets across
a wide range of products might induce very different behavior for each of the differ-
ent products it covers. While it induces no further increase in remanufacturing levels
for products with high production costs, a positive level of remanufacturing might be
achieved for products with low manufacturing costs. As for the concern regarding the
effect of take-back legislations on remanufacturing levels, we prove that legislation never
causes a decrease in remanufacturing levels under monopoly. In the presence of compe-
tition, we show that legislation may indeed cause a decrease in remanufacturing levels
and hence the concerns raised by environmentalists are not groundless. But surprisingly,
while comparing the effect of take-back legislation in a monopolistic versus competitive
4
environment, we find that remanufacturing levels may be higher in the latter when faced
with the same level of legislation. In addition, we provide examples where the remanu-
facturing level achieved by a third-party remanufacturer, who is in competition with an
OEM and facing no take-back legislation, may be higher than that achieved by an OEM
with in-house remanufacturing facing legislation. This suggests that, in order to achieve
higher remanufacturing levels policy makers might indeed want to consider subsidizing
third-party remanufacturers rather than imposing take-back legislations.
One of the main objectives of take-back legislations is to create incentives for designing
environmentally-friendly products. When we analyze the ability of legislation to create
incentives for designing products that are cheaper to remanufacture at the expense of in-
creasing manufacturing cost, we find that such incentives exists not only for a monopolist
OEM but also for an OEM facing competition from a third-party remanufacturer.
Finally, we study the impact of take-back legislation on consumers and find that,
in general, legislation reduces the consumer surplus. Surprisingly, we also show that,
except in rare cases, consumer surplus is larger when the OEM remanufactures than
when a third-party does.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
In an industry regulated with product take-back legislations, each firm meets her obli-
gations through a compliance scheme. Choosing a compliance scheme entails decisions
regarding the choice of collection channel, treatment processes, and partner firms. Firms
need to choose a compliance scheme that ensures environmentally-conscious manage-
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ment of discarded products in the most cost effective way. In most implementations
of take-back legislation one or more of the following three compliance schemes are avail-
able/allowed: (i) Individual scheme, where the company collects and treats only discarded
products of her brand-name and pays for the actual collection and treatment cost of her
own products; (ii) Collective scheme with cost allocation by market share (MS), where a
subset of companies collectively take care of collection and treatment of their discarded
products without making a distinction between the brands and the total compliance
cost is allocated among the companies with respect to their market shares; (iii) Collec-
tive scheme with individual financial responsibility (IFR), where a subset of companies
collectively take care of collection and treatment of their discarded products but each
company pays for the treatment and collection of her brand-name products.
Among the three compliance schemes, individual compliance is likely to be the most
expensive choice because the firm pays hundred percent of the collection and treatment
costs. Collective scheme with MS, on the other hand, is claimed to be less costly due
to economies of scale in the collection and treatment activities. To this end, one of our
main goals in the third chapter is to identify the key market and operating parameters
that make one scheme preferable to the others from the firm’s point of view.
We compare the three compliance schemes by using a stylized model of each com-
pliance structure. We model the total compliance cost in detail and the two decision
variables in our stylized models are the percentage of sold products collected and the
product’s treatability level where higher treatability level implies an environmentally-
friendly product design and a lower treatment cost. When we compare the compliance
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schemes, we find that collective compliance with IFR is in general the most cost effec-
tive alternative. Although IFR within a collective compliance is clearly the best form of
compliance, it is not easy to implement in practice because it requires sorting discarded
products by brand and tracking them through the treatment process in order to record
the true cost of treatment. For that reason, individual scheme and collective scheme
with MS are the two prevalent forms of compliance that we encounter in practice. We
find that which scheme (of these two) gives lower compliance cost depends on the base
collection rate maintained by government and non-profits as well as the market shares
of partner firms. Some implementations of take-back legislations mandates a minimum
amount of collection as a percentage of the firm’s previous period sales. When we explore
the implications of collection targets on a firm’s compliance scheme choice, we find that
imposing high collection targets might alter firms’ compliance scheme choice in favor of
collective scheme.
Even though we analyze firms’ responses to take-back legislation, our research has
implications for policy makers as well. While it is easy to show that the collective
scheme with IFR achieves superior environmental benefits in terms of higher collection
rates and treatment levels, as mentioned previously it is hard to implement in practice.
When we compare the other two compliance schemes, we find that high collection rates
and treatability levels may be hard to achieve simultaneously unless governments are
willing to partially incur the collection costs. Our research also suggests that before
imposing stricter legislation, policy makers should be aware of the trade-offs involved.
High collection targets imposed by policy makers push more firms to choose the collective
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compliance scheme with MS and result in a degradation of treatability levels.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
The fourth chapter deals with product take-back motivated by the goal of managing dis-
tribution channels better. Growing number of firms with dual distribution channels, i.e.,
rental and sales channel, set up buyback programs, a form of product take-back, to buy
used rental products back from rental agencies and sell them through their sales channel.
For example, through most of the 1980s U.S. auto manufacturers were managing two
separate channels where rental agencies were permitted only to rent while dealers were
permitted only to sell cars. After experiencing a drastic decrease in the sales, manufac-
turers started to experiment with different channel structures. First, they adopted an
overlapping channel structure, under which rental agencies sell used rental cars in the
sales market. However this structure triggered a competition between rental agencies
and dealers. As dealers opposed the overlapping channel structure, some manufacturers
launched an alternative channel structure, called buyback, and started buying back pro-
gram cars, i.e., used rental cars, from rental agencies at a guaranteed price and selling
them through dealers.
While a buyback channel evidently alleviates channel conflicts, its profitability de-
pends on two characteristics of the buyback program: (i) timing of the announcement of
buyback prices; and (ii) quality standards for the products repurchased by manufactur-
ers. In this chapter we investigate how a buyback channel’s profitability -for both the
manufacturer and the intermediaries- as well as its ability in resolving channel conflicts
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change depending on the uncertainty in consumer demand and the two aforementioned
characteristics of the buyback program. We develop a two-period model to analyze the
relationship not only between the manufacturer and the intermediaries but also among
the intermediaries. Under each channel structure, in each period the manufacturer de-
cides on the wholesale prices and then the intermediaries simultaneously decide on the
quantities. We study the problem under deterministic demand as a benchmark.
Among other results, we find that compared to setting the buyback price at the time
of repurchase (which we call no price commitment), as in (Purohit, 1997), early com-
mitment of buyback price at the time of initial sales (which we call price commitment)
always reduces the manufacturer’s profit under no demand uncertainty. That brings up
the question of why buyback price commitment is still being implemented in practice by
automobile manufacturers. Our main aim in this chapter is not characterizing the most
profitable channel structure for the manufacturer but rationalizing manufacturer’s deci-
sion in launching a buyback program with price commitment. To this end, we explore
different effects that rationalize the choice of price commitment under buyback channel
structure. First, our results suggest that price commitment enhances a buyback channel’s
ability in resolving channel conflicts in the presence of demand uncertainty. Moreover,
when faced with demand uncertainty, buyback price commitment may lead to higher
total sales for the manufacturer than no price commitment. In contrast, in the absence
of uncertainty, buyback price commitment always leads to the smallest total sales among
the possible channel structures. Therefore, with demand uncertainty, we identify suffi-
ciently different effects that support the attractiveness of price commitment strategy for
9
a buyback program. Finally, we characterize how the firm can use the quality standard
as an operational lever to improve profits and show that her profit generally increases in
the quality standard under demand uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 2
The Impact of Take-Back Legislation
on Remanufacturing
2.1 Introduction
An increasing number of countries are enacting take-back legislations that hold manu-
facturers responsible for collecting and properly disposing of their products when their
useful lives end. The best-known such legislation is the Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment (WEEE) Directive by the European Union. Similarly, Japan has the Speci-
fied Home Appliances Recycling Law and in the U.S. twenty states and New York City
have passed legislation imposing take-back and recycling of e-waste (ETC, 2010). The
requirements as well as the implementations of take-back legislations can be quite differ-
ent, but a common characteristic of these legislations is the target levels on the amount of
end-of-life products that should be collected/recycled (e.g. the WEEE Directive) where
recycling is defined as the reprocessing of waste materials -reprocessed waste materials
could be used in manufacturer’s own production process or could be sold into recycling
market-. Another treatment option for end-of-life products that are taken back is reuse,
under which whole appliances or components are used for the same purpose for which
they were conceived. In this chapter without losing generality we confine ourselves to the
context of remanufacturing, a form of reuse which brings the whole appliance to “as new”
condition. Hence, we analyze certain types of products for which remanufacturing is a
viable option. Although not all used products can be remanufactured, remanufacturing
-where viable- is usually perceived as being environmentally-friendlier than recycling be-
cause it extends product’s life time and curtails its potential ecological impact (Rose and
Stevels, 2001). However, some argue that existing legislations may in fact hinder reman-
ufacturing by granting original equipment manufacturers (OEM) first access to discarded
products through collection/recycling targets and thus limiting the availability of those
products to third-party remanufacturers. Hence it is not clear whether existing take-back
legislations will be a driving force for remanufacturing or not (Gray and Charter, 2007),
and our main goal in this chapter is to clarify the impact of take-back legislations on
companies’ remanufacturing decisions.
Even in the absence of take-back legislation, companies have very different product
take-back and treatment strategies. There are companies like Xerox and IBM who volun-
tarily take their products back and remanufacture them. They sell refurbished products
under their brand-names and remanufacturing is a profitable part of their business. Other
companies like Motorola take their products back even though they do not remanufacture
in-house and not even sell refurbished products; instead Motorola sends collected phones
to ReCellular Inc, a for-profit buyer and seller of cell phones. ReCellular pays for these
phones based on their estimated value, refurbishes and sells them (Most, 2003). It is
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also a common policy to use refurbished items as warranty replacements or maintenance
parts (e.g. Dell). And there are still others (e.g. JVC) who have no voluntary take back
programs in the absence of legislation. These examples illustrate that, depending on
product and market characteristics, companies follow different strategies when it comes
to establishing take-back programs. In this chapter we aim to understand how take-back
legislation impacts the way companies handle their end-of-life product management and
identify the situations where legislation is not adequate by itself to promote remanu-
facturing. Motivated by the industry examples, we group producers into two categories
with respect to their ability to remanufacture in-house. We first consider an OEM who
remanufactures in-house (a company like Xerox) and characterize her optimal response
to different levels of take-back legislation. Next we analyze the case where the OEM
does not/cannot remanufacture and faces competition from a third party remanufac-
turer. With this second model we want to identify if take-back legislation makes the
third-party remanufacturer more or less competitive vis-a-vis the OEM. Since take-back
legislations grant the OEM first access to cores we assume that the OEM collects cores
first and then the third party remanufacturer collects among the remaining cores left in
the market. We also assume that cores that are collected but not remanufactured must
be disposed of properly or recycled at a cost.
Another question we are interested in concerns policy makers. Most take-back leg-
islations impose the same requirements across a group of products with different cost
structures. For example, Minnesota specifies a single collection and recycling rate of
80% for all the products covered by law (Revisor of Statutes, 2007). We question if
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this approach achieves the same environmental benefits in terms of higher collection and
remanufacturing levels for all products covered by legislation, and when the extra ad-
ministrative burden and cost of imposing different levels of legislation for different types
of products is justified. In addition, we investigate if there is any benefit of introducing
remanufacturing targets.
Among other results, we find that the same level of legislation may induce very dif-
ferent behavior depending on the underlying cost structure of the product. For products
with higher manufacturing costs and favorable remanufacturing environment, legislation
may be redundant; while for products with low manufacturing costs, there is no reman-
ufacturing even under legislation. These suggest that take-back legislation that imposes
the same take-back levels across a wide range of products in an industry may be ineffi-
cient. How legislation affects remanufacturing levels depends also on whether legislation
is being imposed in a market where OEMs remanufacture versus one where third parties
remanufacture. We show that legislation never causes a decrease in remanufacturing
levels in a market where OEMs remanufacture. However in a market where third parties
remanufacture, we find that legislation may indeed cause a decrease in remanufacturing
levels and hence the concern raised regarding the effect of legislation on remanufacturing
levels is not groundless.
When we compare the effect of legislation on an OEM with in-house remanufactur-
ing versus one that faces competition from a third party, we find some counterintuitive
results. One might expect that optimal remanufacturing level achieved by an OEM who
remanufactures in-house would be higher than that achieved by a third-party remanu-
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facturer. In fact, we identify situations where this is not necessarily true. In addition,
we provide examples where the remanufacturing level achieved by a third-party reman-
ufacturer, who is in competition with an OEM and facing no take-back legislation, may
be higher than that achieved by an OEM with in-house remanufacturing facing legisla-
tion. Therefore, for some products, simply the competition between an OEM and an
independent remanufacturer may be more effective than take-back legislation. This sug-
gests that, in order to achieve higher remanufacturing levels government might indeed
want to consider subsidizing third party remanufacturers rather than imposing take-back
legislations.
An underlying motivation for take-back legislation is to create incentives for envi-
ronmentally friendly business decisions such as designing products that are easier and
cheaper to recyle/remanufacture. We find that an OEM with in-house remanufacturing
and, surprisingly, even an OEM who faces competition from a third-party remanufacturer
have incentive to decrease remanufacturing cost at the expense of increasing manufactur-
ing cost unless the latter is too low to begin with. Especially under take-back legislation,
reducing the remanufacturing cost may benefit the OEM facing competition because then
the remanufacturer will be willing to buy more cores, which effectively reduces the cost
of the legislation for the OEM.
We also study the impact of take-back legislation on consumers and find that, in
general, legislation reduces the consumer surplus. As legislation increases the effective
cost for the producers, some of that cost is passed onto consumers and consumer surplus
goes down. Surprisingly, we also find that, except in rare cases, consumer surplus is
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larger when the OEM remanufactures than when a third party does.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In §2.2 we review the relevant lit-
erature, in §2.3 we define our assumptions and introduce our model. In §2.4 and §2.5
we respectively analyze the case where the OEM remanufactures in-house and the one
where third-party does the remanufacturing and we compare our insights regarding these
two cases in §2.7. We study the impact of take-back legislation on the consumer surplus
in §2.8. In §2.8.1 we discuss our insights from a numerical study where we model life
cycles longer than two periods and allow the potential demand for the product to change
over its life cycle. We conclude in §2.9. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A1. We
provide a separate appendix, Appendix B1.2, where we derive the optimal regions and
their respective bounds for the two models we analyze.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter connects two important streams of research in operations management lit-
erature, namely remanufacturing under competition and environmental legislations. The
competition between an OEM and another OEM or a third-party remanufacturer is stud-
ied in a number of papers. Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) and Ferrer and Swaminathan
(2006) study the competition between an OEM and an independent remanufacturer while
Heese et al. (2005) investigate the competition between two OEMs. Ferrer and Swami-
nathan (2010) also model the competition between new and remanufactured products
but the same firm sells both. Debo et al. (2005) model competition between an OEM
and N independent remanufacturers. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) show that an OEM
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may deter the entry of an independent remanufacturer by either introducing a reman-
ufactured product or collecting cores but not remanufacturing. Finally Groenevelt and
Majumder (2001) model the competition between an OEM and a remanufacturer on the
procurement of cores. Our research builds on the models developed in this literature and
explores the effects of take-back legislation on an OEM in a competitive environment.
A number of recent papers model new environmental legislation, especially the WEEE
(e.g. Zuidwijk and Krikke (2007)), and study their environmental impact and effects on
supply chain strategies. Atasu et al. (2009a) explore the efficiency of the WEEE legis-
lation and argue that industry-wide, weight-based WEEE legislation must be adjusted
to meet the particular circumstances of each industry and sector. In this chapter, we
do not specifically model weight-based legislation; rather we study minimum collection
targets that are set in term’s of percentages of the previous period’s sales (motivated
by take-back laws in Minnesota and NYC). Unlike Atasu et al. who consider a benefit
model but do not explicitly model remanufacturing, we model that and the operational
decisions of the OEM and the remanufacturer in greater detail.
While Webster and Mitra (2007) also aim to generate insights about take-back legisla-
tion, our modeling assumptions (among other differences we model quantity competition
rather than price competition and the OEM is the Stackelberg leader in the competition
with the remanufacturer), research questions, and the resulting insights are significantly
different. In the absence of take-back legislation, Webster and Mitra solve the price
competition problem between a remanufacturer and an OEM with no in-house reman-
ufacturing capability and characterize the Nash equilibrium. Under legislation, they do
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not model collection/reuse targets explicitly and generate insights numerically by chang-
ing the values of cost parameters to mimic different types of legislation. By modeling
the collection/reuse targets explicitly we are able to generate insights regarding the un-
desirable consequences (e.g. reduced remanufacturing levels) of ad hoc targets levels.
Through their numerical experiments Webster and Mitra find that both the OEM and
the remanufacturer may benefit from legislation (higher profits when compared to the no
take-back scenario) if the government is responsible for collecting the returns. However
this observation is made under the assumption that OEMs do not have access to cores
in the absence of take-back legislation and overlooks the possibility that the OEM may
preemptively collect cores to prevent the remanufacturer’s entry (we indeed find that pre-
emptive collection may be optimal). Another underlying assumption is that the OEM
does not incur a cost on the cores bought by the remanufacturer if the government is
doing the collection. However under many take-back legislations the OEM is responsible
for the collection cost even when the collection is done by a government agency (e.g as in
Connecticut) or the OEM pays a flat fee to finance such collection (e.g. as in Maryland).
Finally another important research question is how the competition between an OEM
and a third-party remanufacturer affects the outcomes of legislation. To that end we
separately model an OEM with in-house remanufacturing and compare our insights (in-
house remanufacturing is not considered in Webster and Mitra). To our knowledge ours
is the first research to make such a comparison. Hammond and Beullens (2007) model the
competition between m manufacturers with in-house remanufacturing under take-back
legislation. Through numerical examples they make observations on whether increasing
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landfill costs and collection targets induces recycling.
In many implementations of take-back legislation, the producer is the only supply
chain party that incurs legislation-related costs and we study such an implementation;
see Jacobs and Subramanian (2007) for an analysis where costs are split between a
supplier and a producer. Plambeck and Wang (2010) and Plambeck and Taylor (2007)
also examine the consequences of environmental legislation on supply-chain decisions,
but their research questions are significantly different. Plambeck and Wang address new
product introduction under e-waste laws while Plambeck and Taylor model RoHS, which
regulates the use of hazardous substances in electronics products.
2.3 Modeling Framework
2.3.1 Legislative Scenarios
In this chapter we focus on the form of legislation that entails individual financial respon-
sibility and assume that the producers also have physical responsibility of their returned
products either because they have set up their own take-back schemes or because the
collective scheme they have joined sorts returns with respect to brand names (such as
Maine’s e-waste law (http://www.maine.gov/dep/rwm/ewaste/)). We consider three dif-
ferent levels of this form of legislation:
1. No regulation: No legislation is imposed.
2. Partial regulation: The legislation specifies a lower bound (specified as a percentage
of the sales of the company) on the cores to be collected and disposed of properly
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(proper disposal also entails recycling). We denote this percentage by β. For
example, in Minnesota the target β is set at 80%. In addition, proponents of take-
back legislations specify that collection/recycling targets are needed under every
implementation (http://www.rreuse.org/t3/).
3. Full regulation: In addition to β, there is a lower bound βR (again specified as
a percentage) on the amount of cores to be remanufactured (βR ≤ β). Cores
collected but not remanufactured must be disposed of properly or recycled. Re-
manufacturing/reuse targets are not imposed in current implementations of take-
back legislations but proponents advocate for their inclusion in future revisions
(http://www.rreuse.org/t3/).
2.3.2 Assumptions
We analyze the effects of these three different legislative scenarios on two different types
of producers. In the first case (which we call the monopoly model) we consider an OEM
who remanufactures in-house and controls the sales of both the new and remanufactured
products1. In the second case (which we call the competition model), the OEM is a
monopolist in the new product market, but does not have remanufacturing capability
and there is an independent remanufacturer in the market. Hence the new products by
the OEM face competition from the remanufacturer’s products.
Following the common assumption in the literature (e.g. Majumder and Groenevelt
(2001), Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), Ferguson and Toktay (2006)), we use a two-
1The same model could be used to analyze outsourced remanufacturing where the OEM sells the
remanufactured products under her own brand name.
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period formulation (In section 2.8.1 we relax this assumption). We assume that every
item sold in the first period is available for collection and suitable for remanufacturing
in the second period. This assumption could easily be relaxed by modeling the available
amount of cores as a percentage of items sold in the first period. In addition, we assume
that the items sold in the second period cannot be remanufactured. This is reasonable if
the product changes so significantly (i.e. new technology) over the course of two periods
that the old cores cannot be remanufactured.
Cores that are collected but not remanufactured must be disposed of properly at a
disposal cost. We model cost of manufacturing (cM), cost of remanufacturing (cR), cost of
disposal/recycling (cD), cost of collection to the manufacturer (cC), and cost of collection
to the third-party remanufacturer (cRC). Note that recycling might be an option instead of
a cost. In our model there is no restriction on the sign of cD but in order for our analysis
to hold cD + cC ≥ 0 should be satisfied. Like Ferguson and Toktay (2006), we assume
that cRC > cC , where cC is the collection cost of the OEM. This is reasonable because the
OEM can utilize her well-established forward logistics channel for collection and incur a
lower cost. Note that all costs are linear with no economies of scale. In addition, costs
are constant with no learning curve or process improvement effect. Although we do not
include fixed set-up cost (e.g. costs incurred to initiate remanufacturing process), impact
of such costs on our findings would easily be identified.
If there is take-back legislation, the producer is responsible for the collection and
proper disposal of 100β percent of the items sold in the second period. In the competition
model, we assume that the remanufacturer does not face collection/disposal costs on the
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remanufactured products sold in the second period. This is consistent, for example with
the WEEE directive where only the producers who put the product on the market for
the first time are liable under legislation (Gray and Charter, 2007).
2.3.3 Demand Model
We utilize a deterministic demand model with different consumer valuations for new
and remanufactured products. We assume that there are Q potential customers whose
valuations for the new product, v is distributed uniformly in the interval [0, Q] and each
customer’s valuation for the remanufactured product is a fraction (α) of his valuation for
the new product. When a customer with valuation v purchases a new (remanufactured)
product, his utility is UiM (v) = v− piM (UiR (v) = αv− piR) where piM (piR) is the price
of the new (remanufactured) product in period i. In any period each customer purchases
the product, if any, that provides him with the highest utility. In the first period, the
linear inverse demand function for the first period is p1M = Q − q1M where q1M is the
quantity of the new product and for the second period, the inverse demand functions for
the new product is p2M = Q − q2M − αq2R and that for the remanufactured product is
p2R = α(Q−q2M −q2R) where p2M and p2R are the prices of the new and remanufactured
products respectively (For derivations interested reader might see Ferguson and Toktay
(2006) or Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006)).
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2.4 The OEM as a Monopolist
2.4.1 Formulation and Analysis
In this section we consider the OEM as the sole decision maker. In the first period,
she determines how many units of the new product to produce (q1M ). In the second
period, the OEM decides how many cores to collect (q2C), of the collected cores, how
many to remanufacture (q2R), and how many units of the new product to produce (q2M ).
Throughout the chapter we use the superscript (∗) to denote the optimal value of the
corresponding decision variable. We provide only the formulation for the full regulation
case and the formulations for the other two legislative scenarios are obtained by setting
the relevant parameter(s) to zero (i.e. β = 0 in case of partial regulation and both β = 0
and βR = 0 in case of no regulation). The monopolist OEM’s problem is formulated as
follows:
(P1) Max
q1M≥0, q2M≥0, q2R, q2C
ΠM = q1M (Q− q1M − cM) + φ [q2M ((Q− q2M − αq2R)− cM)
+q2R (α (Q− q2M − q2R)− cR)− q2CcC − (q2C − q2R) cD
− (cC + cD)φβq2M ]
s.t. βq1M ≤ q2C ≤ q1M (2.1)
βRq1M ≤ q2R ≤ q2C (2.2)
where φ is the discount factor.
Constraint (2.1) ensures that the amount of collected cores is at least as much as
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required by legislation and less than what is produced in the first period while (2.2)
imposes that the amount of remanufacturing is at least as much as required by legislation
but no more than the amount of collected cores. To avoid the trivial situations where
neither manufacturing nor remanufacturing is profitable in the second period, we assume
that Q− cM −φβ(cC + cD) ≥ 0 and αQ− cR− cC ≥ 0. One can show that the first-order
conditions are necessary and sufficient. In Theorem 1 we characterize the optimal regions
for the OEM under different legislative settings.
Theorem 1 In the absence of take-back legislation, the optimal strategy of the OEM
corresponds to one of the four regions in Table 2.1, where the boundaries of the regions
are defined with respect to the values of cM and cR (See Figure 2.1a). Under partial (full)
regulation, the optimal strategy of the OEM corresponds to one of the eight regions in
Table 2.2, where the boundaries of regions are defined with respect to the values of cM
and cR (See Figures 2.1b and 2.1c).
Under each legislative setting, the regions of optimal strategies are characterized by
cM and cR; and therefore, the optimal strategy is specific to each product and each
firm. When there is no take-back legislation, regions 1-4 in Figure 2.1a are defined as
in Table 2.1. The different regions in which the OEM’s optimal strategy may lie are
differentiated with respect to the optimal amount of second-period manufacturing and
remanufacturing. The optimal values of q1M , q2C and q2R in each region and the bounds
on cM that characterize the regions are in Table A1 in Appendix A1. The characterization
is similar to that of Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010).
Under take-back legislation (partial or full), regions 1-8 in Figure 2.1b-c are defined
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Region 1 2 3 4
q∗2R 0 > 0 q
∗
1M q
∗
1M
q∗2M > 0 > 0 > 0 0
TABLE 2.1: The regions that characterize the feasible strategies for the OEM under no
regulation
cM
4
1
32
cR
(a)
4 8
7
6
1
3
5
2
cM
cR
(b)
cM
cR
(c)
4 8
7
6
1
3
5
2
FIGURE 2.1: A possible characterization of the optimal policies for the monopolist
OEM (a)in the absence of regulations and (b)under partial regulation and (c) under full
regulation
as in Table 2.2. Note that under partial legislation βR in Table 2.2 is set to zero. The
optimal values of q1M , q2C and q2R in each region and the bounds on cM that characterize
the regions for partial and full regulation are given in Tables A2 and A3 respectively in
Appendix A1.
Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
q∗2R βRq
∗
1M > βRq
∗
1M βq
∗
1M > βq
∗
1M q
∗
1M βq
∗
1M > βq
∗
1M q
∗
1M
q∗2M > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
TABLE 2.2: The regions that characterize the feasible strategies for the OEM under
regulation
Comparing Figures 2.1a-c, one might identify the regions that would be optimal
for a firm when partial regulation is imposed, if initially region i is optimal under no
regulation. However this comparison does not provide the complete picture of how the
levels of manufacturing and remanufacturing change as legislation is imposed. In the
next section we explore these questions.
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2.4.2 The Effect of Legislation on a Monopolist OEM
We study how legislation affects optimal prices and quantities of new and remanufactured
products. First, we analyze the case of going from no regulation to partial regulation.
Theorem 2 As the legislation structure changes from no regulation to partial regula-
tion, the directions of change in q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R depend on the value of cM . If
cM ≥ Q(1−α)(1+αφ)+αφ(cR+cC)1−α+αφ partial legislation does not cause a change in the optimal
values of q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R. Otherwise,
1. There exist two threshold levels κ1 and κ2 (κ1 < κ2, full expressions provided in the
proof of the theorem) such that q∗1M and p
∗
2R go down if cM < κ1, remain the same
if κ1 < cM < κ2, and go up if κ2 < cM ,
2. q∗2R remains the same if cM < κ3 =
−αβφ(cC+cD)+cR−cD
α
and goes up if cM > κ3.
An immediate observation from Theorem 2 is that legislation on collection levels never
causes the amount of remanufacturing to go down. This is intuitive, because as the OEM
is forced to incur the collection cost, remanufacturing becomes more attractive and the
amount of remanufacturing level remains the same or goes up. However, even though the
remanufacturing level goes up, this does not imply that the price of the remanufactured
product goes down. While surprising this result can be explained as follows: Due to the
competition between the new and remanufactured products in the second period, if the
new product manufacturing goes down too much in the second period, the price of the
remanufactured product may go up due to dampened competition.
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Another interesting observation is that first-period manufacturing levels might go up
as a response to legislation. If the cost of manufacturing is low relative to the cost of
remanufacturing, manufacturing is very profitable due to low cost and the additional
cost due to legislation dampens the production level in the first period. As the cost of
manufacturing increases, there is a region where the first-period manufacturing levels are
the same regardless of the legislative scenario. Then for higher values of manufacturing
cost, first-period manufacturing is higher under partial regulation. In this region, re-
manufacturing is comparatively more profitable than manufacturing from scratch and in
order to make money on the remanufactured products in the second period, the OEM
increases first-period production.
Theorem 2 says that if it is very cheap to manufacture new products then partial
regulation alone is not sufficient to induce any additional remanufacturing. On the other
hand, for products that are costly to manufacture -relative to remanufacture-, the opti-
mal decisions of the OEM do not depend on the legislative scenario, because in that case
economic incentives alone induce product take-back and remanufacturing, i.e., the legis-
lation is “redundant”. Therefore our results clearly show that imposing legislation with
target levels chosen in an ad hoc fashion without taking the underlying cost structures
into account can lead to inefficiencies.
When partial regulation alone is unable to induce remanufacturing, a lower bound on
the level of remanufacturing may be required, i.e., full regulation may be imposed. The
following theorem identifies how first-period manufacturing and remanufacturing levels
as well as the price of the remanufactured product change as full regulation is imposed.
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Theorem 3 As the legislation structure changes from partial to full the directions of
change in q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R depend on the value of cM . If cM ≥ κ4, where
κ4 =
α (1− α)βRQ− (1 + βR (1− α))αβφ (cC + cD) + cR − cD
(1 + βR (1− α))α ,
full legislation does not cause a change in q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R. For lower cM values, q
∗
1M
and p∗2R go down while q
∗
2R goes up.
The above theorem shows that the OEM responds to legislation by decreasing the
first-period new-product manufacturing level and increasing the remanufacturing level
only if cM is low. Therefore we conclude that full regulation may only be necessary to
induce remanufacturing of those products that are very cheap to produce new.
Our results in this section clearly shows that, if the aim is to increase remanufac-
turing levels, the same level of β may lead to very different outcomes depending on the
underlying cost structures. Next we analyze how β and βR should be set in order to
refrain from introducing redundant legislations.
2.4.3 How Should the Target Levels in Legislation Be Set?
The way the legislation is structured it is clear that increasing β will (weakly) increase
collection levels while increasing βR will (weakly) increase remanufacturing levels. The
more interesting question is since legislation aims to increase reuse/remanufacturing levels
(because remanufacturing is perceived as environmentally friendlier than manufacturing),
how high should β be? If prior to legislation, it is optimal for an OEM not to remanufac-
ture at all, how should β be set to induce some remanufacturing? Next theorem answers
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this question.
Proposition 1 If the optimal level of remanufacturing is zero prior to legislation then
imposing partial regulation with β ≥ −αcM+cR−cD
αφ(cC+cD)
induces some level of remanufacturing.
If β ≥ α(1−α)Q+cR+cC−(2−α)αcM
αφ(cC+cD)
and αcM − cR − cC ≥ 0 then all first period cores are
remanufactured under partial regulation.
How the threshold on β changes with the other parameters is intuitive. If the cR is
high, a higher β is needed to induce remanufacturing. Similarly if cD, cC , cM and/or the
customers’ acceptance of the remanufactured product α is high then remanufacturing
is induced even at lower levels of β. For the second threshold in Proposition 1 to be
meaningful we need it to be less than 1, which is likely to hold when α and φ are close
to 1 and cD ≫ cC . This implies that when the consumers value the remanufactured
product highly and cD is very high, imposing large enough β may induce a high level of
remanufacturing.
One reason to impose full regulation is to increase the level of remanufacturing by
appropriately setting βR. So how high should βR be? From Proposition 1 we know that
below a threshold value of β, partial regulation is not sufficient to induce remanufacturing,
hence the remanufacturing target level, βR, is always binding when β is low. For higher
values of β, our next proposition states that unless βR can be set high enough (how
“high” depends on the other parameters), full regulation (i.e. βR) is redundant.
Proposition 2 If β ≥ β∗ = −αcM+cR−cD
αφ(cC+cD)
then imposing full regulation does not increase
the level of remanufacturing unless βR >
φ(cC+cD)(β−β
∗)
(1−α)(Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD))
.
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Proposition 2 is important because it shows that βR should be set at an appropriate
level in relation to β and the higher β is, the higher βR should be. Otherwise implementing
full regulation simply increases administrative burden without resulting in any additional
benefit.
2.4.4 Does Legislation Incentivize Cheaper to Remanufacture
Products?
Gray and Charter (2007) argue that the remanufacturing cost of a product is a product
characteristic that is mainly locked at the design stage and how the product is manu-
factured affects the remanufacturing cost. From an environmental benefit point of view,
an interesting question is whether take-back legislation that only imposes collection tar-
gets induces better design for remanufacturing, i.e., easier- and cheaper-to-remanufacture
products. Such reduction in the remanufacturing cost, cR, may increase the manufac-
turing cost because of use of more durable materials, more modular design, or designing
easy to assemble products as opposed to using an integrated design etc. Proposition 3
explores if the OEM has incentive to reduce cR at the expense of increasing cM .
Proposition 3 Consider two (cM , cR) cost pairs A =
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
and B =
(
cBM , c
B
R
)
such
that cBM > c
A
M , c
B
R < c
A
R and at optimality there is no remanufacturing at A and some
remanufacturing at B. Then there exists a threshold θ(cC , cD, c
B
M , c
B
R, α, β) such that if
cAM > θ then Π
∗
M
(
cBM , c
B
R
)
> Π∗M
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
and θ is decreasing in β.
Proposition 3 states that if cM is very low, decreasing cR is not profitable, but if cM is
higher than a threshold, it is profitable to increase cM and decrease cR. The fact that the
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threshold is decreasing in β implies that the OEM indeed has more incentive for better
design under legislation.
2.5 Competition Between the OEM and a Third-
Party Remanufacturer
2.5.1 Formulation and Analysis
In order to understand the effects of different take-back legislations on markets where
the OEM does not remanufacture, we model an OEM, who does not remanufacture in-
house but faces competition from a third-party remanufacturer. The OEM is the only
player offering a single product in the first period. In the second period the OEM and
the remanufacturer compete for cores and we allow the OEM to move first (i.e. the
OEM is the Stackelberg leader). Modeling the OEM as the first-mover captures the fact
that OEMs have first access to collected cores under take-back legislation. We want
to explicitly analyze how this affects the remanufacturer because some remanufacturers
worry that the amount of cores available to them will decrease as a result of take-back laws
due to cores going directly to collection centers where it is easier for the OEMs to pick
them up (http://www.techworld.com/green-it/news/index.cfm?newsid=9595). Since the
OEM does not have in-house remanufacturing, she can either dispose of the cores and/or
sell them to the remanufacturer. In the case of the latter, the OEM decides on the
price she will charge for the cores. Then the remanufacturer decides on the quantity of
cores to buy from the OEM and/or collect from the market. While it is common for
remanufacturers to collect cores themselves or buy from collectors, an example where the
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remanufacturers get cores from the OEMs is the case of toner cartridge remanufactures
in Sweden: in order to comply with Swedish take-back laws predating WEEE, the OEMs
handed over end-of-life products to remanufacturers (Sundin, 2004). Finally the OEM
decides on the production level while the remanufacturer decides on the remanufacturing
level.
The two-period competition is formulated as a Cournot model as is common in the
closed loop supply chain literature (e.g. Atasu et al. (2009a), Ferguson and Toktay (2006)
and Majumder and Groenevelt (2001)). We first define the remanufacturer’s problem.
Let q2S denote the amount of cores purchased from the OEM, q
R
2C the amount of cores
collected by the remanufacturer, p2S the price at which the OEM sells the cores to the
remanufacturer. Since there is no incentive to acquire cores unless remanufacturing is
profitable, the remanufacturer remanufactures all the cores on hand, namely the total
amount remanufactured is given by q2R = q2S + q
R
2C . Then regardless of the take-back
scenario under which the problem is analyzed the remanufacturer’s problem is
(P2) Max
qR
2C
, q2S≥0
Π2R =
(
qR2C + q2S
) (
α
(
Q− q2M −
(
qR2C + q2S
))− cR)− q2Sp2S − qR2CcRC
s.t. 0 ≤ qR2C ≤ q1M − q2C
The only constraint on the remanufacturer’s problem is that the quantity collected by
the remanufacturer cannot exceed the amount left in the market after the OEM collects.
Next we define the OEM’s second period problem. While we separately solve the
OEM’s problem under no regulation, partial regulation and full regulation, here we only
present the problem formulation under full regulation. The formulations for the other
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two scenarios follow by setting βR and β to zero respectively.
(P3) Max
q2M≥0,q2C ,p2S
Π2OEM = q2M
((
Q− q2M − α
(
qR∗2C + q
∗
2S
))− cM)− q2CcC + q∗2Sp2S
− (q2C − q∗2S) cD − (cC + cD)φβq2M
s.t. βRq1M ≤ qR∗2C + q∗2S , βq1M ≤ qR∗2C + q2C , q∗2S ≤ q2C ≤ q1M
The OEM decides on the amount of cores to collect, q2C , the price to charge per core,
p2S, and the amount of new products to manufacture, q2M . The constraints guarantee
that at least 100βR percent of first-period sales is being remanufactured, at least 100β
percent of first-period sales is collected, the amount of collected cores does not exceed
first-period production and is no less than the amount sold to the remanufacturer. Note
that there is no nonnegativity constraint on p2S, so our model allows the case where the
OEM pays the remanufacturer to take the cores. In the first period the OEM is the only
player and chooses the amount to manufacture, q1M , to maximize her two-period profit.
(P4) Max
q1M≥0
ΠOEM = q1M ((Q− q1M)− cM) + φΠ∗2OEM
The Stackelberg game is solved by backward induction and standard application of
first order conditions on the Lagrangian. Before we fully characterize the possible optimal
strategies of the players, we provide two propositions that help us eliminate some policies.
Proposition 4 It is never optimal for the OEM to allow the remanufacturer to collect
from the market. The OEM either collects some cores and sells them to the remanufac-
turer at a price lower than or equal to the remanufacturer’s cost of collection or collects
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all cores.
The first strategy in Proposition 4, namely collecting some cores and selling them to
the remanufacturer at a price lower than the remanufacturer’s collection cost, is optimal
when remanufacturing is not very profitable. However if remanufacturing is so profitable
that the remanufacturer is willing to collect cores in addition to those he can buy from
the OEM, to prevent the remanufacturer’s access, the OEM collects all the available cores
and sells only a fraction to him. We call this “preemptive collection” as do Ferguson and
Toktay (2006). When preemptive collection is optimal for the OEM, she may still sell
cores to the remanufacturer, but as the next proposition shows, she charges a price that
is strictly higher than the remanufacturer’s cost of collection.
Proposition 5 If the OEM follows the preemptive collection strategy then she prices the
cores strictly higher than the remanufacturer’s cost of collection, i.e. p∗2S > c
R
C.
Due to Propositions 4 and 5, the remaining possible policies that the OEM may want
to play as the Stackelberg leader are listed in Table 2.3.
Policy A p∗2S < c
R
C , q
∗
2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S
2α
, qR∗2C = 0
Policy B p∗2S = c
R
C , q
∗
2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S
2α
, qR∗2C = 0
Policy C p∗2S > c
R
C , q
∗
2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S
2α
, qR∗2C = q1M − q2C = 0
TABLE 2.3: Possible optimal policies for the competition problem
The policies in Table 2.3 are differentiated with respect to the optimal price the OEM
charges for the cores. Due to Proposition 4, the remanufacturer only buys cores from
the OEM and it is clearly optimal for him to remanufacture all the cores he buys; hence
Table 2.3 (which also lists the optimal quantities the remanufacturer buys from the OEM)
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completely characterizes the possible actions the remanufacturer may take. For the OEM
we still need to characterize the optimal actions she may take on the remaining decision
variables, i.e., first and second period manufacturing levels and second period collection
level. In Theorem 1 we identified the regions that the monopolist OEM’s optimal actions
may lie in and numbered them with respect to the percentage of first-period cores that
are remanufactured – there are 4 such regions in the absence of legislation (listed in
Table 2.1) and there are 8 under legislation (listed in Table 2.2). For Policies A-C, each
such region constitutes a possible (but not necessarily feasible) region where the OEM’s
optimal actions in q1M , q2M and q2C may lie in. If there is no legislation, for Policies A
and C all 4 regions are feasible, for Policy B the feasible regions are 1 and 2. If there is
take-back legislation, the feasible regions are: For A, 1-8; for B, 1-4,6 and 7; for C, 1, 2,
5, and 8. To complete the analysis we check if the feasible regions defined by Policies A-C
may overlap. The complete details of the analysis through which we derive the possible
optimal regions and the bounds on cM that characterize these regions are provided in
Appendix B1.2.
We next provide an example to illustrate the possible orderings of the policies in
different parameter regions. Figure 2.2 depicts how the optimal policy changes as the
cost of manufacturing and the cost of remanufacturing change. For example, in area
A1 of Figure 2.2b, Policy A from Table 2.3 and Region 1 from Table 2.2 characterize
the optimal actions of the OEM and the remanufacturer. Figure 2.2 shows that, as in
the case of monopoly, as the cost of manufacturing increases percentage of first-period
products that are remanufactured goes up. As the cost of remanufacturing increases, the
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FIGURE 2.2: A possible characterization of the optimal policies under competition where
t1 = αQ+cC−2cRC and t2 = αQ−cD−2cRC (a)in the absence of regulations and (b)under
partial regulation and (c) under full regulation
OEM starts to price the cores lower (when compared to the remanufacturer’s collection
cost).
Figure 2.2 demonstrates that preemptive collection to restrict remanufacturing (char-
acterized by regions C1 and C2 in which the OEM collects all the available cores but sells
only a fraction to the remanufacturer) may be optimal for the OEM both before and
after legislation. In Figure 2.2 we observe that preemptive collection is never optimal
when the cost of remanufacturing is high and in Proposition 6 we derive a threshold on
cR, above which preemptive collection is never optimal.
Proposition 6 Regardless of the level of legislation, preemptive collection is not optimal
when cR ≥ αQ− cD − 2cRC.
When the remanufacturing cost is high, the competitive power of the remanufacturer
is low. In that case, the OEM does not need to preemptively collect cores in order
to restrict the remanufacturer’s actions. Also observe that preemptive collection is less
likely to be optimal under low customer valuation for the remanufactured product (low
α) – another situation where the remanufacturer’s competitive power is low. The OEM
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follows the Preemptive collection strategy to make it harder for the remanufacturer to
get cores. So does take-back legislation make the OEM more or less likely to follow this
strategy?
Proposition 7 Preemptive collection strategy is optimal for a larger range of cost pa-
rameters under partial regulation than it is under no regulation.
Earlier we mentioned that some remanufacturers are concerned that fewer cores will
be available to them under take-back legislation. Proposition 7 shows that this fear may
not be unfounded as the OEM is indeed more likely to follow the preemptive collection
strategy. But how does this impact the level of remanufacturing? We next analyze this
question.
2.5.2 The Effect of Legislation on an OEM Facing Competition
A concern raised regarding take-back legislation (especially when there are third-party re-
manufacturers in the market) is whether legislation hinders remanufacturing by granting
the OEM first access to cores through the collection targets. We find that the remanufac-
turing level may indeed go down after legislation is imposed, but, first, with the following
proposition we identify a condition under which the amount of remanufacturing cannot
decrease with the introduction of take-back regulation.
Proposition 8 When partial (full) regulation is imposed, if it is still optimal to play the
policy (as given in Table 2.3) that was optimal under no (partial) regulation, the amount
of remanufactured products remains the same or goes up.
37
Corollary 1 provides a condition under which Proposition 8 holds: when the re-
manufacturing cost is high, take-back legislation never causes a decrease in the level of
remanufacturing.
Corollary 1 When cR > αQ+cC−2cRC the amount of remanufactured products remains
the same or goes up when take-back legislation is imposed.
While Proposition 8 and Corollary 1 provide sufficient conditions under which partial
regulation does not cause the remanufacturing level to go down, they do not rule out the
possibility. Next we provide an example where the remanufacturing level goes down as
a result of legislation.
Example 1 Let Q = 800, φ = 0.95, cM = 210, cC = 10, cD = 10, and c
R
C = 15.
The cost of remanufacturing is 30% of the cost of manufacturing, i.e., cR = 63. The
customer valuation for the remanufactured product is α = 0.2. In the absence of regula-
tions, the remanufacturing level is 53.2 whereas under partial regulation with β = 0.7 the
remanufacturing level is 0.
For this specific example when there is no regulation, it is optimal to collect some cores
and sell all to the remanufacturer at a price that is equal to his collection cost. When
take-back legislation with a high collection target (in this example 70%) is imposed,
the collection and disposal costs increase significantly for the OEM and the relative
competitiveness of the branded products vis-a-vis the remanufactured products decreases.
When the high collection target is coupled with a low remanufacturing-level target (in
this example βR = 0), the OEM switches to the preemptive collection strategy where
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she collects all the cores, and sells just as much as required by law at a very high price.
Since the cores are priced high, the amount of remanufacturing goes down. This example
demonstrates that government should especially be careful about imposing legislation
and setting collection targets in markets where OEMs and third-party remanufacturers
are competing.
2.5.3 How Should the Target Levels in Legislation Be Set?
In this section, by Proposition 9 we show that imposing partial regulation with the correct
bounds can induce remanufacturing.
Proposition 9 If policy A or C is optimal both before and after partial regulation is
imposed, imposing partial regulation with β ≥ β∗ = −αcM+cR−cD
αφ(cC+cD)
induces some level of
remanufacturing. On the other hand, if policy B is optimal both before and after par-
tial regulation is imposed, imposing partial regulation with β ≥ β∗ − (2−α)(αQ−cR−cD−2cRC)
2αφ(cC+cD)
induces some level of remanufacturing.
Note that the first threshold on β given in Proposition 9 is the same as the one given
in Proposition 1 for the case of monopoly. Hence if either policy A or C is optimal both
before and after partial regulation, imposing the same legislation level in the monopoly
and competition environments is enough to ensure some level of remanufacturing. How-
ever, note that even when the same β is imposed, the amount of remanufacturing is lower
under competition when compared to monopoly. The second condition is interesting in
that policy B is optimal for low to moderate values of cR (see Figure 2.2) which suggests
a relatively strong remanufacturer and thus a smaller β is enough to ensure some level
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of remanufacturing.
2.6 Does Legislation Incentivize Cheaper to Reman-
ufacture Products?
As we stated before, according to Gray and Charter (2007) the remanufacturing cost of a
product is mainly locked at the design stage and hence is mostly determined by the OEM.
Recall that under the monopoly model we showed that unless the manufacturing cost is
too low, it may be profitable to invest in the product (at additional cost to the OEM)
and decrease the cost of remanufacturing such that remanufacturing becomes feasible.
Under competition, intuition suggests that the OEM is better off if the remanufacturing
cost is high and the OEM does not have any incentive to reduce it. Here we assume
that if the OEM engages in activity to reduce the remanufacturing cost such as through
Design for Remanufacturing (DfR), the cost of manufacturing increases. Surprisingly,
the OEM’s profits may increase due to a reduction in remanufacturing cost even if such
a reduction comes at the expense of higher manufacturing cost.
Proposition 10 Consider two (cM , cR) cost pairs A =
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
and B =
(
cBM , c
B
R
)
such
that cBM > c
A
M , αQ−cD−2cRC < cBR < cAR and at optimality there is no remanufacturing at
A and some remanufacturing at B. There exists a threshold θC(cC , cD, c
B
M , c
B
R, α, β) such
that if cAM > θC then Π
∗
OEM
(
cBM , c
B
R
)
> Π∗OEM
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
. In addition, θC is decreasing in
β and is higher than the corresponding θ derived in Proposition 3 under monopoly.
Proposition 10 states that the OEM can make more profit as cM increases and cR
decreases as long as the initial cost of manufacturing is not too low. Since the threshold
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on cM is decreasing in β, the proposition implies that the incentive to decrease cR is
higher under legislation. The following example illustrates that unless there is take-back
legislation, the OEM may not have any incentive to reduce the remanufacturing cost.
Example 2 Consider the competition model for the case where Q = 2000, φ = 0.95,
α = 0.4, cC = 90, cD = 80, c
R
C = 100, β = 0.8 and βR = 0. We consider two
scenarios: under the base scenario cM = 1470 and cR = 720 and under the DfR Scenario
cM = 1500 and cR = 550. Under base scenario, q
∗
2S = 0, p
∗
2S = −0.16, Π∗OEM = 78312.3.
Under DfR Scenario q2C = q
∗
2S = 141.9, p
∗
2S = 85, Π
∗
OEM = 79276.6. In the absence of
take-back legislation under base scenario Π∗OEM = 136, 938.8 while under DfR scenario
Π∗OEM = 116, 650.0.
Under partial regulation, the OEM’s profit is higher under the DfR scenario, where cR
is lower while cM is higher than that under the base scenario. When there is no regulation,
the profit is higher under the base scenario. This implies that unless take-back legislation
is imposed, the OEM will not redesign the product to reduce the remanufacturing cost.
Under legislation the OEM is responsible for the collection and proper disposal of cores
unless they are remanufactured and thus the effective cost of manufacturing is higher.
Therefore the OEM has more incentive to sell the cores to the remanufacturer, which is an
alternative way to increase her profits. Under reduced cost of remanufacturing the OEM
can sell more cores and this creates additional incentive to reduce the remanufacturing
cost. This tendency is more pronounced when the OEM does not face intense competition
from the remanufacturer as is the case in this example (Note that the valuation for the
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remanufactured products (α) is low).
2.7 Comparison between Monopoly and Competi-
tion Scenarios
In this section we compare the effects of legislation on a monopolist OEM versus one that
faces third-party competition. We are especially interested in identifying whether the en-
vironmental benefits (e.g. amount of product remanufactured) of take-back legislation
are more significant under one versus the other. We first compare the remanufacturing
levels. Intuition suggests that regardless of the legislation level, the amount of remanu-
facturing should be higher when the OEM has in-house remanufacturing. We find that
this is indeed true under some conditions.
Proposition 11 When faced with the same level of legislation, the remanufacturing level
achieved by a monopolist OEM is higher than that achieved by a third-party remanufac-
turer as long as the optimal price of the cores is less than the remanufacturer’s cost of
collection.
Another way of phrasing Proposition 11 is that the remanufacturing level under com-
petition can only exceed that under monopoly if policy B or C is optimal. Under policy
A, the OEM sells the cores to the third-party remanufacturer in order to save from the
disposal cost and/or to comply with the legislation. Otherwise, selling cores to the third-
party creates a competition and thus she prefers to keep the competition under control.
On the other hand, policy B is optimal when the remanufacturer’s competitive power is
higher. In that case, if the remanufacturer had no access to cores, the OEM would have
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priced the cores higher than the remanufacturer’s cost of collection. However, knowing
that the remanufacturer can access, the OEM sets the price equal to the remanufacturer’s
cost of collection. As the OEM prices the cores lower than that she would have priced in
the case of no remanufacturer access, the remanufacturer purchases more cores. There-
fore remanufacturing level might increase even beyond the level of remanufacturing level
achieved by a monopolist OEM. Similarly remanufacturing level under policy C might
be higher than that under monopoly. In that case, the OEM collects all the cores in
order to preempt remanufacturer’s access and makes profit out of selling the cores at a
very high price. When manufacturing is costly while remanufacturing is profitable but
not strictly enforced by the legislation, i.e., cM is high but cR and β are low, OEM facing
competition makes profit out of selling a significant amount of cores to a third-party
remanufacturer and thus remanufacturing level achieved under competition exceeds that
under monopoly.
To illustrate that the remanufacturing level may be higher under competition, we
provide an example. Consider Example 1 with the following regulation levels: βR = 0.1
and β ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. The detailed solutions for the monopoly and the competition
scenarios are given in Table 2.4. Note that the amount of remanufactured products
Monopoly Competition
β Π∗M q
∗
2R q
∗
2C q
∗
1M p
∗
1M Π
∗
OEM q
∗
2R q
∗
2C q
∗
1M p
∗
1M
0 169,698.7 0 0 295.0 505 166,812.4 53.2 53.2 295.0 505
0.25 166,568.6 29.2 72.9 291.7 508.3 165,114.9 57.3 73.2 292.6 507.4
0.5 163,899.7 28.9 144.7 289.4 510.6 162,403.4 58.6 145.1 290.3 509.7
0.75 161,252.3 28.7 215.3 287.1 512.9 159,740.7 28.4 284.1 284.1 515.9
TABLE 2.4: Optimal solution for the OEM under different β values (when β > 0,
βR = 0.1 and when β = 0, βR = 0)
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is higher under competition when β ∈ {0.25, 0.5}. The regulations on both collection
and remanufacturing levels are tight under monopoly, whereas under competition, the
optimal policy is to collect as much as the regulation requires and sell more than what
the regulation requires at a price equal to the remanufacturer’s cost of collection. The
difference in policies stems from the following: Since α is small, the remanufactured
product is perceived as low quality and the monopolist remanufactures only as much as
the regulation requires. In the competition model, low α implies that the competitive
power of the remanufacturer is not high. Therefore the OEM finds it optimal to sell more
than what the regulation requires to the remanufacturer and make a profit out of selling
cores.
The preceding result shows that when facing the same level of legislation, a third-party
remanufacturer may produce more remanufactured products than a monopolist OEM
does. Can the level of remanufacturing under competition and no legislation be higher
than the remanufacturing level achieved by the monopolist OEM under full regulation?
Surprisingly the answer is yes.
We compare the first row of Table 2.4 under Competition column with the results
under Monopoly column. Observe that under competition the amount of collected and
remanufactured products is 53.2 in the absence of regulations while the amount of re-
manufactured products is much lower for a monopolist even under regulation. Hence the
government can attain even higher amounts of remanufacturing and collection just by
introducing competition rather than by imposing legislation.
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As a result of a more extensive numerical study, we find that competition alone is
likely to increase the level of remanufacturing for moderate values of remanufacturing
cost. When cost of remanufacturing is low, under competition, the OEM follows pre-
emptive collection and sells some or none to the remanufacturer. On the other hand for
moderate values of cR the OEM makes more profit out of collecting and selling the cores
at a price equal to the cost of collection of the remanufacturer rather than following
preemptive collection. Because of competition, the prices of new and remanufactured
products decrease while the remanufacturing level goes up. Finally as the potential prof-
itability of remanufacturing decreases with higher cR values, there is no remanufacturing
under competition and no regulation.
It is good news that competition alone can induce remanufacturing. We also observe
that the increase in the new product price due to legislation may be lower under com-
petition: When there is no legislation, the price of the new product in the first period is
505 under both monopoly and competition. After legislation is imposed, the price goes
up in both cases indicating that legislation-related cost is inevitably passed on to the
consumers, however the increase is more pronounced under monopoly. Although the in-
crease in the new product prices can be interpreted as a negative impact of legislation on
the consumers, in order to fully understand how legislation affects customers, in the next
section we analyze how the total consumer surplus changes under take-back legislation
for both the monopoly and competition scenarios.
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2.8 Impact of Take-back Legislation on Consumer
Surplus
The total consumer surplus S is the surplus of consumers who buy the new product in
periods 1 and 2 plus the surplus of those who buy the remanufactured product in period
2:
S =
∫ Q
p1M
(v − p1M)dv + φ
(∫ Q
p2M−p2R
1−α
(v − p2M)dv +
∫ p2M−p2R
1−α
p2R
α
(αv − p2R)dv
)
=
q21M
2
+ φ
(
αq22R + q
2
2M + 2αq2Rq2M
2
)
.
Our next proposition states that when a monopolist OEM remanufactures, the total
consumer surplus decreases as the collection and/or the remanufacturing target in the
legislation increases.
Proposition 12 In the monopoly model, as the collection and/or the remanufacturing
target increases, consumer surplus decreases.
Proposition 12 shows that under both partial and full regulation, a monopolist OEM
will always pass some of the compliance cost to the consumers, resulting in a reduction
in consumer welfare. From a numerical study, we observe that this is also the case in
the competition model under partial regulation, i.e., when there is competition between
an OEM and a third-party remanufacturer, the total consumer surplus decreases as β
increases. However, surprisingly, under full regulation, the total consumer surplus may
increase as βR increases when there is competition between an OEM and an independent
remanufacturer. This happens when stricter legislation forces the OEM to give up the
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preemptive collection strategy. The following example illustrates how total consumer
surplus may change as βR increases.
Example 3 Let Q = 1600, φ = 0.95, α = 0.20, cM = 105, cC = 10, cD = 10, and
cRC = 15. We consider two levels of cost of remanufacturing: cR = 42 (low) and cR = 84
(high). Figure 2.3 depicts total consumer surplus under monopoly and competition versus
different βR values.
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FIGURE 2.3: Total consumer surplus versus βR when cost of remanufacturing is (a) low
and (b) high
In Figure 2.3 we observe that there exists a βR (e.g., 0.4 for cR = 42) at which to-
tal consumer surplus under competition increases significantly. For lower βR values, the
OEM follows the preemptive collection strategy and as βR increases, consumer surplus
decreases. However when βR reaches the threshold, preemptive collection is no longer
profitable and the OEM switches to the policy of pricing the cores at the level of reman-
ufacturer’s collection cost. As preemptive collection is abandoned, remanufacturing and
manufacturing levels increase and thus the total consumer surplus increases significantly.
As βR increases beyond the threshold, the OEM continues to price the cores equal to the
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remanufacturer’s collection cost and as βR increases further, she prices them below the
remanufacturer’s collection cost. However, in either case, consumer surplus decreases as
βR increases. As proven in Proposition 12, Figure 2.3 also shows that consumer surplus
under monopoly decreases as βR increases. Hence, while consumers of a monopolist OEM
are always worse off as take-back legislation gets stricter, consumers in an industry where
there is competition between an OEM and a third-party remanufacturer may benefit from
higher remanufacturing targets.
As a result of a more extensive numerical study (also see Figure 2.3a and b), we
find that the threshold βR, at which the consumer surplus jumps up to a higher level,
is lower for higher values of cR. Recall that high remanufacturing cost is an indication
of low competitive power for the third-party remanufacturer. When the third-party
remanufacturer is not competitive vis-a-vis the OEM, even a low remanufacturing target
makes the OEM abandon the preemptive collection strategy and benefits the consumers
in terms of higher consumer surplus.
Finally, when we compare the total consumer surplus under the monopoly and com-
petition models, we find that consumers of a monopolist OEM generally generate higher
surplus.
Proposition 13 When faced with the same level of legislation (partial or full), the total
consumer surplus under monopoly is higher than that under competition as long as the
optimal price of the cores is less than the remanufacturer’s cost of collection.
Proposition 13 shows that if the OEM prices the cores lower than the remanufacturer’s
collection cost (i.e., policy A is optimal) then total consumer surplus under competition is
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always lower than that under monopoly. In Proposition 11 we show that when policy A is
optimal, the remanufacturing level is lower under competition than under monopoly. In
addition, the new product prices are always higher than the monopoly prices in the first
period (because the OEM manufactures fewer products due to expected competition).
As a result, the total consumer surplus under competition is lower than that under
monopoly. Our numerical study shows that the total consumer surplus is higher under
monopoly under both partial and full regulation also when the optimal price of the cores
is more than the remanufacturer’s collection cost (i.e., policy C is optimal). In this case,
the OEM collects all the cores to preempt the remanufacturer’s access to the cores, and
the first period prices are significantly higher than the monopoly prices because the cost
of collecting all the cores is passed onto the customers. As a result, the total consumer
surplus is lower than that under monopoly. Finally, our numerical study indicates that
total consumer surplus might be higher under competition when the OEM prices the cores
at the remanufacturer’s collection cost (i.e., policy B is optimal). In Figure 2.3a the region
where βR ∈ {0.4 . . . 0.44} and in Figure 2.3b the region where βR ∈ {0.23 . . . 0.27} are
examples under full regulation and we can find similar examples under partial regulation.
When policy B is optimal, the remanufacturing level under competition may be higher
than that under monopoly (see the example in Section 2.7) because the OEM is forced to
sell the cores at a price lower than what is optimal for her (otherwise, the remanufacturer
would collect cores himself and would not buy from the OEM) and tries to increase her
profits by manufacturing more in the first period and selling a larger quantity of cores
to the remanufacturer. Hence, under policy B, it is not feasible for the OEM to severely
49
restrict the remanufacturer’s access to cores. As a result, a higher level of competition
occurs between the OEM and the remanufacturer and the consumer benefits in the form
of higher consumer surplus.
2.8.1 Life-Cycle Effects and the Length of the Planning Horizon
Up to this section, we have assumed that the demand for the product lasts only two
periods, after which the product becomes obsolete, and that the potential market size is
the same in each period. In this section we relax these assumptions, which makes the
model intractable and we base our insights on an extensive numerical study. We consider
a multi-period planning horizon with remanufacturing in the second and subsequent
periods. We assume that each product sold can be remanufactured only once, which is a
common assumption in the literature (Debo et al., 2005; Lebreton, 2007) as most products
are not remanufactured more than once (e.g. mobile phones, computers, diesel motors,
etc.) and that consumers keep the product for only one period, i.e., a product sold in
period t becomes available for remanufacturing in period t+1 (Relaxing this assumption
does not generate any additional insights.). Among others, Geyer et al. (2007) and Debo
et al. (2006) study remanufacturing in the presence of life cycle effects. Different from
these papers, we aim to understand the interaction between take-back legislations and
product life cycle effects.
To facilitate comparison with our earlier results, we choose the cost parameters to
be consistent with Example 1 and such that we observe all possible feasible solutions
. We pick values for (cM , cR) such that cM ∈ {105, 210, 315, 420, 525, 630} and cR ∈
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{42, 63, 84, 105, 126}. For each (cM , cR) pair, we solve the problem for life-cycle lengths
of three and four periods under both the monopoly and competition scenarios. We
vary the potential market size in each period by multiples of 100 while keeping the
total market size over the product’s life constant at 2400 (this is similar to how Geyer
et al. (2007) model life cycle effects). For a product with a life of three periods, we use
[Q1, Q2, Q3] ∈ {[800, 800, 800], [700, 1000, 700], ..., [100, 2200, 100]} and for four periods we
use [Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4] ∈ {[600, 600, 600, 600], [500, 700, 700, 500], ..., [100, 1100, 1100, 100]}.
We call products with stable demand throughout their life cycles mature products and
those that exhibit more distinct life cycle effects, innovative products.
2.8.2 Monopolist OEM under Life Cycle Effects
For the multi-period problem, we find that Theorem 1 characterizes the optimal strategy
of the OEM in any period with respect to the previous period’s production. The only
exception is that for innovative products, if cM is relatively high and Qt−1 ≫ Qt then the
remanufacturing level in period t can be lower than the collection level even when there
is no manufacturing in period t, which is never the case for mature products.
In Section 2.4 we show that when remanufacturing is carried out by the OEM, if β
is higher than a threshold level β∗, imposing partial regulation by itself induces some
level of remanufacturing and stricter take-back legislation (achieved by increasing β)
never causes a decrease in the level of remanufacturing (Theorem 2). Our numerical
results indicate that the same insights hold true for the three- and four-period problems.
However, while the same β∗ induces some remanufacturing for a range of products as
long as their cost structures are similar, the amount of remanufacturing depends on the
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life cycle length and the potential demand pattern as seen in Figure 2.4. On the figure,
the levels of remanufacturing induced by partial regulation alone (at β = 0.7) are the
data points corresponding to βR = 0. When the product’s demand is stable or close to
stable (e.g., Q2=Q3=600 or 700) throughout its life, the collection target alone induces
a relatively high level of remanufacturing. However, for products where demand starts
low, peaks steeply and then drops again (e.g. Q2=Q3=900), the total remanufacturing
levels are low. This is because a high level of remanufacturing is not profitable either in
the period when the demand first peaks (due to low availability of cores since demand is
low prior to the peak) or towards the end of the product life cycle (plenty of cores are
available but the potential market size is small). As a result, the total remanufacturing
levels are lower when compared to a product with stable demand.
A separate remanufacturing target, βR, will secure a minimum level of remanufac-
turing and by Proposition 2 we show that such βR should be set appropriately when
compared to β (the higher β is, the higher βR should be). When we take longer prod-
uct life cycles and changing demand patterns into account, our numerical study shows
that βR should also depend on how fast the diffusion is, i.e., when and by how much
the demand peaks over the product’s life. As seen in Figure 2.4, for a product, whose
demand first increases and then decreases very steeply (e.g. Q2=Q3=900), even a very
low βR may trigger a large increase in the remanufacturing level while for a product with
completely stable demand (i.e. Q2=Q3=600), βR of any value does not change the re-
manufacturing level at all. For products whose demands first increase and then decrease
very steeply, remanufacturing is not profitable in either the period where demand peaks
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FIGURE 2.4: Total remanufacturing level over the product’s 4-period life cycle as βR
changes for different levels of demand diffusion identified by the values of Q2 = Q3
(cM = 315, cR = 42 and β = 0.7)
or the last period where the potential market size is very small. Even a small βR forces
the OEM to do some remanufacturing in these periods, which results in a huge increase
in the total remanufacturing level. But this finding also indicates that βR should be
chosen carefully, especially for products whose demands exhibit clear life cycle effects.
If the potential market size declines significantly in the last period, unrealistically high
remanufacturing targets might be impossible to meet because remanufacturing is unprof-
itable and will upset the manufacturers. Figure 2.4 also illustrates that when we take life
cycle effects into account, it is difficult to find a single βR that can increase remanufac-
turing levels beyond what is already achieved by partial regulation for a wide range of
products. Hence, imposing the same target level across one or more product categories
may not increase remanufacturing by an amount high enough to justify the additional
administrative burden associated with implementing more complex legislation.
Finally, we investigate how the incentive to decrease the remanufacturing cost (at the
expense of higher manufacturing cost) changes with life cycle effects with the following
example.
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Π∗M under Base Scenario Π
∗
M under DfR Scenario
[Q1, Q2, Q3] β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75
[1200,1200,1200] 159,799.8 148,772.5 138,139.5 158,783.7 152,272.2 145,067.2
[1000,1600,1000] 216,706.5 205,683.4 195,054.4 216,355.4 209,434.3 201,129.5
[800,2000,800] 387,663.1 376,644.2 366,019.4 387,234.4 377,963.3 368,137.0
[700,2100,700] 448,222.6 437,204.7 426,534.6 447,335.4 436,810.4 426,236.2
TABLE 2.5: The OEM’s profits under base and DfR scenarios for different levels of
potential market sizes and β values
Example 4 Consider the monopoly model for the case where φ = 0.95, α = 0.15, cC =
15, cD = 55, and βR = 0. We consider two scenarios: under the base scenario cM = 710
and cR = 185 and under the DfR scenario cM = 720 and cR = 55. Table 2.5 summarizes
the OEM’s profits for different levels of potential market sizes and β values.
Results from Example 4 presented in Table 2.5 is representative of our insights. As
in the two-period scenario, the incentive to decrease the remanufacturing cost increases
as β increases. In addition, for high levels of β (e.g., β = 0.75), the incentive is highest
for mature products with stable demand throughout the product’s life cycle because
the OEM can recoup the benefits of lower remanufacturing cost by satisfying a larger
percentage of demand using remanufactured products. For moderate levels of β (e.g.,
β = 0.50), the incentive is highest for innovative products with a moderate diffusion rate,
i.e., moderate levels of Q2. For the same β (and assuming that β is binding, which is the
case in this example), the amount of cores collected up to the last period is higher in the
presence of life cycle effects than under a stable demand pattern. As long as the demand
for the product does not go down steeply towards the end of its life cycle, the OEM can
reap the benefits of lower remanufacturing cost by remanufacturing and selling a large
percentage of the cores collected. If the market size goes down steeply in the last period
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(e.g., 700 in the example), the OEM has no incentive to reduce the remanufacturing cost.
2.8.3 An OEM Facing Competition under Life Cycle Effects
We can show that Propositions 4 and 5 still characterize the optimal policies for an OEM
facing competition under life cycle effects. In this section, using this analytical charac-
terization and a numerical study, we test the robustness of our results from Section 2.5.
When remanufacturing is carried out by a third party, the OEM may preemptively
collect cores to prevent high levels of remanufacturing, but in Section 2.5, we show that
OEM does not do this if cR is high. Similarly, for life cycles longer than two periods,
preemptive collection is not optimal in any period t if cR > αQt−cD−2cRC . When Qt = Q
∀t, this implies that preemptive collection is never optimal throughout the product’s life
if the remanufacturing cost cR is high enough. However, when the potential market size
changes over the product’s life, even if cR is high, the OEM may preemptively collect
in a period with a large enough potential market in order to be the exclusive seller and
make a large profit.
As in the two-period model, through our numerical study we find that preemptive
collection is optimal for the OEM for a wider range of cost parameters under partial
regulation— in other words, the OEM may switch to the preemptive collection strategy
after partial regulation is imposed. The only exception is products whose demands exhibit
a very steep increase in the second period, remain high one or more periods, and finally
exhibit a very steep decrease. In periods of high demand, the OEM follows preemptive
collection for a wide range of cost parameters even in the absence of legislation. Hence
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imposing legislation does not change the behavior of the OEM. And in the last period,
the OEM does not follow preemptive collection with or without legislation because the
demand is low and the remanufacturer is not a strong competitive threat.
That preemptive collection is optimal for a wider range of parameters under legisla-
tion suggests that legislation may negatively impact the total remanufacturing levels. To
investigate that, we directly look at how the remanufacturing levels change as legislation
becomes stricter (i.e. as β increases from β = 0) and observe that the total remanufactur-
ing level may go down if β exceeds a threshold. Legislation’s effect on remanufacturing
levels is the most negative for innovative products where the potential market is mod-
erately large in the second and third periods. In this case, the remanufacturer is a
competitive threat in the third period due to ample availability of cores accompanied by
a high market potential and the threshold β above which the OEM collects preemptively
is low.
2.9 Conclusions
This chapter contributes to the important and growing literature on supply chain oper-
ations under environmental legislation. Manufacturers are likely to face take-back legis-
lation in an increasing number of industries as the amount of waste grows in developed
and developing countries alike. Even though such legislation in general receives enthu-
siasm from environmentalists, there is debate on implementation details and it is not
clear exactly what type of legislation will achieve the ultimate goals of reducing waste,
inducing better design and reuse. By analyzing a stylized model of take-back legislation
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we provide insights on how such legislation affects an OEM’s decisions on manufacturing
and remanufacturing2 levels and the corresponding prices.
Considering an OEM with in-house remanufacturing capability, a question of inter-
est is whether forcing the manufacturer to take her products back at end-of-life induces
higher levels of remanufacturing. If the cost of manufacturing is very low, not only is
the answer no, but legislation does not create incentives to reduce remanufacturing costs
either. However we find that targets on collection levels may induce the remanufacturing
of a high percentage of the collected cores if the collection targets are correctly chosen
given the product’s cost characteristics and the customers’ valuation of remanufactured
products. In that case, legislation also gives incentive to the OEM to reduce the re-
manufacturing cost unless the cost of manufacturing is too low. On the other hand,
when remanufacturing is profitable as is (low cost, high customer valuation), legislation
is redundant.
When the OEM is competing with a third-party remanufacturer, legislation may
be more successful than expected. We find examples where remanufacturing levels are
higher under competition than under monopoly. Hence introducing competition rather
than imposing legislation can result in higher remanufacturing levels. In other words, in
order to increase the level of remanufacturing policy makers might subsidize the third-
party remanufacturers rather than imposing take-back legislation on the OEMs. In terms
of legislation’s ability to induce the OEM to reduce remanufacturing cost, similar to the
case of monopoly, we find that such an incentive exists unless the cost of manufacturing
2In our model we focus on a specific form of reuse which is remanufacturing. In addition, our model
does not explain the situations where recycling is a very profitable option.
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is too low. While, in general, take-back legislation can be implemented with positive
outcomes in industries where third parties remanufacture, our results also indicate that
in these types of industries, legislators should be especially cautious about setting the
collection and/or remanufacturing targets—ad hoc legislation may lead to undesirable
results such as a drop in remanufacturing levels.
While take-back legislation diverts end-of-life products from landfills and may increase
remanufacturing levels, in general, it hurts consumer welfare. We find that legislation
costs are passed onto the consumers and the consumer surplus goes down as a result of
legislation. Except in rare cases, consumers are more negatively impacted in industries
where there is competition between an OEM and a third-party remanufacturer; their sur-
plus is lower than that of the consumers in an industry where an OEM both manufactures
and remanufactures.
When the product’s life cycle is longer than two periods and the potential market
size changes over the product’s life, remanufacturing is not a very profitable business and
legislation that only stipulates product take-back and disposal (for the most part) fails
to induce higher levels of remanufacturing or reduction in remanufacturing costs. Espe-
cially if there is competition between an OEM and a remanufacturer, legislation might
incentivize the OEM to push the remanufacturer out of the market through preemptive
collection in an effort to sell as many new products as possible while the demand for the
product lasts.
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CHAPTER 3
Complying with Take-Back
Legislation: A Cost Comparison and
Benefit Analysis of Three
Compliance Schemes
3.1 Introduction
Several countries around the world now impose take-back legislations that hold produc-
ers responsible for financing the collection, proper treatment/recycling and recovery of
their products (e.g., tires, batteries, electronic products such as computers) discarded by
customers at the end of their useful lives. Although the implementations of take-back
legislations vary from one country to another, the common fundamental objectives are
reducing the amounts as well as the environmental impact of end-of-life (EOL) prod-
ucts. The best-known such legislation is the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
(WEEE) directive by the European Union. Similarly, Japan and twenty states (plus New
York City) in the U.S. have passed laws creating e-waste take-back programs.
In an industry regulated with product take-back legislations, each producer meets her
obligations through a compliance scheme. Choosing a compliance scheme entails decisions
regarding the choice of collection channel, treatment processes, and partner firms. Both
policy makers and producers see compliance as a valid cost of business, and since the true
cost of EOL product management is internalized by producers under legislation, they seek
ways to reduce the cost of compliance (FES, 2003; WEEEForum, 2008). Therefore, a
producer’s goal is to choose a compliance scheme that ensures environmentally-conscious
management of discarded products in the most cost effective way.
In most implementations of take-back legislation, one or more of the following three
compliance schemes are available/allowed: First, the producer may set up an individual
scheme by collecting and treating only his brand-name products either himself or by
contracting with a third party. Larger companies such as Cisco operate individual com-
pliance schemes and thus only pay for their own collection and treatment costs. Second,
a subset of producers may form a collaboration and set up their collective scheme that
collectively takes care of discarded products on behalf of its producer members. In 2002,
Braun, Electrolux, HP and Sony, set up the European Recycling Platform (ERP) as a
compliance scheme in response to the WEEE Directive. A special case of the collec-
tive scheme is the national collective scheme, where all producers who are covered by
legislation are members. National collective schemes usually operate in small countries
(Bohr, 2007). For instance, Recupel is the national collective body for the collection and
treatment of WEEE in Belgium. Similar national schemes also exist in the Netherlands
and Sweden. Under a collective scheme, the total compliance cost of the collaboration is
recorded by a non-profit central authority without distinguishing brand names and then
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allocated among the members with respect to a previously agreed-on rule. Finally, a sub-
set of producers may set up their collective scheme with individual financial responsibility
where discarded products are collected and treated collectively; however, each producer
member pays for the actual treatment and collection costs of her brand-name products.
This compliance scheme requires an elaborate sorting of EOL products with respect to
brands and models as well as keeping track of the treatment processes each model goes
through. The Dutch take-back program for information and communication technology
(ICT) equipments that was run until 2002 is an example (Tojo, 2003). Similarly, un-
der Japan’s Specified Home Appliances Recycling Law (SHARL), brands treated in each
plant are separately recorded and thus, it possible to calculate the exact treatment cost
for individual products (Tojo, 2003).
Among the three compliance schemes, individual compliance is likely to be the most
expensive choice as some components of compliance cost may be proportionately higher.
Still, some companies (e.g., Cisco) prefer individual compliance because it gives them
greater control over EOL product management and they are in a better position to re-
coup the benefits of their environmentally-friendlier products, for example, in the form
of lower treatment costs. On the other hand, it is well documented that recycling and
treatment activities become economically feasible only when a certain volume of items
is processed collectively (Tojo, 2003). When a firm sets up her own compliance scheme
and collects/treats her own brand-name products alone (either herself or through a third-
party), total volume might be small and thus recycling/treatment may not be economi-
cally viable. For that reason, collective schemes are established to take advantage of the
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economies of scale inherent in the treatment activities and the total compliance costs of
producers, who participate in such schemes, may be lower.
In this chapter, we address the question of (given the choice) which compliance scheme
should a producer follow in order to minimize the total cost of compliance. For example,
in Maine, producers are given two options: (i) If the total return share is more than 5%,
they can start an individual/collective scheme, (ii) otherwise they must join the collective
scheme to manage the collection and treatment of their discarded electronic products. In
response to the alternative compliance schemes allowed by legislations, companies may
choose different ones at different locations. For example, Dell opted to be a member of
collective program in Maine while reserving the right to update her decision. Dell’s senior
compliance manager explains that the reason behind this decision is Maine’s relatively
small population (Toto, 2007). However, elsewhere (e.g., in Maryland) Dell established
her own individual take-back program.
One of our goals is to identify the key market and operating parameters (e.g., relative
market shares of the producers, different components of compliance cost such as cost
of collection, treatment, etc.) that make one scheme preferable to the others from the
producer’s point of view. Take-back legislations aim to divert as many EOL products
as possible from landfills to environmentally sound treatment options. For that reason,
some implementations of take-back legislations, such as the WEEE Directive, impose
target levels on the amount of EOL products that should be collected and treated prop-
erly. While this seems reasonable from an environmental point of view, meeting the
collection targets specified by the legislation might affect the total compliance cost as
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well as a compliance scheme’s relative cost effectiveness. Hence, collection targets may
force a producer to switch to a different compliance scheme and indirectly impact other
environmental outcomes of legislation in addition to collection levels. To address this
question, we also analyze if and how a producer’s compliance scheme preference changes
in the presence of collection targets.
Even though we specifically model and analyze producers’ responses to take-back
legislation, our research has implications for policy makers as well. Given the choice, the
producers will pick the compliance scheme that minimizes their total compliance costs and
may fall short on the environmental benefits that the legislation is trying to achieve. By
identifying the conditions under which producers are likely to choose a specific compliance
scheme, our research provides insights on when governments should impose or provide
incentives for a scheme with higher environmental benefits. Specifically we answer the
following question that concerns policy makers: Depending on the market size and initial
return rate of EOL products which compliance scheme achieves the highest collection
rates?
By shifting the cost of EOL product management from society to producers, an under-
lying motivation for take-back legislations is to create incentives for designing products
that are easier and cheaper to treat/recycle. However, it is argued that since produc-
ers do not directly bear the true costs of their own products, collective schemes do not
give incentives for designing products that are easier and cheaper to treat at the end of
their lives. Hence, the choice of compliance scheme has a direct impact on how well the
objectives of legislation will be met in terms of creating incentives for designing greener
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products. We compare the three compliance schemes we analyze with respect to the
treatment levels achieved under each and specifically address the following question: De-
pending on the market size and initial return rate of EOL products which compliance
scheme induces higher treatment levels through creating incentives for products that are
easier and cheaper to treat?
Among other results, we find that collective scheme with individual financial respon-
sibility in general yields lower cost than the other two alternatives. Since individual
financial responsibility under a collective scheme is not easy to implement in practice,
we also compare collective scheme -where the total cost is allocated with respect to a
previously agreed rule- and individual scheme in terms of cost effectiveness and conclude
that which scheme performs better depends on the initial collection rate maintained by
government and the market shares of other partner firms. If the partner firms have large
market shares then the collective scheme, in general, yields lower cost. Thus, when de-
ciding which compliance scheme yields lower compliance cost a producer should consider
the individual market shares of the partner firms in addition to the total market share
of the collective scheme.
An underlying motivation for take-back legislation is to achieve higher environmental
benefits in terms of achieving higher collection rates and creating more incentives for
designing environmentally-friendlier products. We find that collective scheme with indi-
vidual financial responsibility achieves superior environmental outcomes than the other
two possible compliance schemes. When we compare the other schemes we find that,
in general, the incentive for designing environmentally-friendlier products is higher but
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the collection rate is lower under individual scheme. Finally, if policymakers impose very
high collection targets, collective scheme might become more cost effective and the incen-
tive to design environmentally-friendlier products might decrease. Our findings suggests
that, policymakers should be careful while imposing collection targets or a particular
compliance scheme as these might result in conflicting environmental benefits.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In §3.2 we review the relevant lit-
erature, in §3.3 we introduce our model as well as our assumptions. We characterize
the optimal policy under the individual scheme, the collective scheme and the collective
scheme with individual financial responsibility (IFR) in §3.4, §3.5, and §3.6, respectively.
In §3.7, we compare the three compliance schemes with respect to cost effectiveness and
the environmental benefits achieved. We conclude in §3.8. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix C1.
3.2 Literature Review
The literature on the impact of different environmental legislations/standards on oper-
ational decisions is growing. Some examples are Atasu et al. (2009a) who explore the
efficiency of the WEEE legislation, Plambeck and Taylor (2007) who model RoHS which
regulates the use of hazardous substances in electronics products, Subramanian et al.
(2007) who study compliance strategies under emission trading programs, and Corbett
and Kirsch (2001) who identify the drivers behind the diffusion of ISO 14000.
Of this body of work, our research is related to the research stream on product take-
back legislations, especially those papers that study product design decisions, collection
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channel choice, and compliance decisions. Whether legislations can provide incentives
for environmentally-safer products has been studied in a number of papers. Zuidwijk
and Krikke (2007) study two strategic responses to product returns under take-back
legislations, namely product eco-design versus new recovery process technologies, and
conclude that the former performs better. They also find that under the WEEE Di-
rective, more incentives are needed to reward product eco-design. Subramanian et al.
(2009) study a manufacturer who invests in two design attributes (performance and re-
manufacturability) that affect the product’s cost. They analyze the impact of extended
producer responsibility (EPR) and supply chain coordination on product design decisions
and propose contracts that can be used to achieve coordination. In other work, Jacobs
and Subramanian (2009) study a two-period two-echelon model to identify the effects of
EPR programs on design incentives. They show that when the cost of EPR programs
is shared between the two echelons, the performance of the supply chain improves in
terms of approaching the coordinated profit benchmark. Esenduran et al. (2010) explore
the impact of take-back legislations on remanufacturing decisions and find that a manu-
facturer has incentive to decrease the remanufacturing cost at the expense of increasing
the manufacturing cost both when she remanufactures in-house as well as when a com-
peting third-party remanufacturer does. Finally, Plambeck and Wang (2010) study new
product introduction under take-back legislation and find that legislations enforcing fee-
upon-disposal such as individual EPR creates incentives for design for recyclability, while
legislations enforcing fee-upon-sale fail to do so. Until now, researchers have identified
and studied various settings and situations where design incentives exist under take-back
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legislations. Our research builds on the assumptions/models developed in these papers
and explores how the compliance scheme choice affects the optimal treatment level of
products.
Our research is also related to the literature on the procurement of EOL products
(e.g., Guide et al. (2003), Savaskan et al. (2004), Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006),
Atasu et al. (2009b)). In particular, Savaskan et al. (2004) consider a manufacturer’s
choice between three collection channel options, i.e., collecting directly from customers,
collecting through an existing retailer, or subcontracting to a third party. Savaskan and
Van Wassenhove (2006), on the other hand, extends the previous research by incorpo-
rating competing retailers. We build our collection model on this literature; however, in
contrast to these papers, we are not concerned about who is collecting the EOL products,
because in the presence of take-back legislations it is the producers’ responsibility to pay
for the collection of EOL products regardless of who is collecting.
Compliance scheme choice under take-back legislations is one of the issues that has
not been explored in depth in the literature. A notable exception is Boyaci et al. (2007)
who study the compliance scheme choice in the presence of competing recyclers. In order
to identify the impact of consolidation of the recycling industry as well as the intensity
of competition in the recycling market, they model a two-stage game with two manufac-
turers and two recyclers and compare two different settings: one where the recyclers are
independent (competitive scheme) versus one where a non-profit body allocates the waste
products to the recyclers (monopolistic scheme). They conclude that the former often
performs better as it achieves lower product prices as well as higher recycler and manu-
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facturer profits. Although Boyaci et al. study compliance-related issues assuming that
EOL products are treated at an additional cost to the producers, we take much different
perspectives in generating insights about the compliance scheme choice. In contrast to
Boyaci et al., we do not model the profit maximizing recycling industry but we allow
the producers to choose the treatment level and collection rate of EOL products as well
as with whom to collaborate in order to minimize the compliance cost. Another paper
that studies compliance scheme choice is Atasu and Subramanian (2009). Modeling two
profit maximizing manufacturers differentiated in terms of consumer preferences for their
brands, the authors explore how individual and collective systems affect manufacturers’
recyclability choices. While Atasu and Subramanian (2009) also aim to generate insights
about individual and collective compliance, our assumptions, research questions and the
resulting insights are notably different. In addition to modeling only two manufacturers,
they assume that these manufacturers have no effect on the collection rate but they pay
a treatment cost for every product sold in the market which implies that the collection
rate is 100%. Another distinguishing assumption they use is that there is no economies
of scale in treatment cost. Therefore, their model does not account for the fact that
manufacturers might aim to increase the collection rates, which are generally less than
100%, and thus benefit from the economies of scale in treatment costs (an example is
Nokia). They do not specifically model cost allocation by market share or individual fi-
nancial responsibility but assume that each manufacturer pays a unit weighted treatment
cost (using an exogenous weight). They compare the manufacturer profits under individ-
ual versus collective compliance and find that the low-end manufacturer always prefers
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individual compliance whereas the high-end manufacturer might benefit from collective
compliance if the brand differentiation is high and its influence on treatment cost is low.
In our study, by explicitly modeling n producers with different market shares, we generate
insights on which compliance scheme is more cost effective depending on the collection
rates and how market shares of the firms affect the results. By allowing the collection
rates to be endogenous in the model, we are also able to generate insights regarding when
collective compliance may generate superior incentives for environmentally-safer product
design.
3.3 The Model
In order to compare the three compliance schemes, we model total compliance cost in
detail. The major cost components are collection cost, treatment cost, recycling and
disposal costs of EOL products. Stevels (2004) states that collection and sorting comprise
30% of total cost while treatment (treatment includes recycling and environmentally-
sound disposal) accounts for 50-55%. In addition to the collection and treatment costs, we
also model a “cost of increasing the treatability level” to capture the fact that producers
can lower the treatment costs of their EOL products by making costly changes in design,
materials, manufacturing methods, etc. In what follows we introduce the notation and
the different components of compliance cost in detail.
1. Costs Related to Collection Activities: Here we capture the cost components that
are common to collection activities regardless of legislation structure, firm level policies,
and the size of the collected product, etc..
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1.a. Cost of Maintaining a Collection Rate: Collection rate is the amount of EOL
products collected (as a percentage of the products sold in the market in the previous sales
period) and it depends on how the collection network and facilities are set up (Kokkinaki
et al., 2004). Since the rate of collection depends on how convenient collection is to
consumers, how well the producer facilitates product returns, etc., the producer needs
to incur a cost to achieve and maintain a collection rate. In the literature it is argued
that there is diminishing returns to investment to increase collection rates (Savaskan
and Van Wassenhove, 2006) and the total investment to achieve a collection rate of τ is
modeled as I = ητ 2 where η is a scaling parameter that indicates how difficult/costly it
is to increase the collection rate. The scaling parameter η depends, among other things,
on population size, geographic region of interest, and how willing the consumers are to
return the product.
Under product take-back legislations, typically it is the producer’s responsibility to
finance and/or provide accessible and efficient collection facilities as well as to publicize
adequate information to the customers. In order to maintain a collection rate of τ ,
producers invest in running collection/sorting centers and raising customers awareness
of the collection programs. For example, Nokia who recycles old cell phones, invests to
increase their collection rate by expanding the accessibility of their take-back channels,
developing awareness-building programs and putting up more take-back bins (Nokia,
2006). Similarly, LG has increased the number of mobile phone drop-off points in order to
increase the accessibility to her take-back channels (www.lg.com/global/sustainability/
environment/take-back-recycling/mobile-phones.jsp).
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However, in many developed countries, some level of product take-back already exists
even before the legislation comes into force, being facilitated by non-profits, municipali-
ties, and local organizations, and therefore the producers do not need to incur additional
costs to achieve and maintain this initial return rate, which we call the base collection
rate, τ0 (which can be set to zero). For example, before the Norwegian WEEE legislation
came into force in 1999, the collection rate was around 8.2% in Norway (Ronningen,
2005). Similarly, when the Japanese SHARL1 was introduced in 2001, the collection
rate was 2.5 kg/capita (Van Rossem, 2008). After accounting for the cost of the base
collection rate τ0 (on which the producer does not incur a cost), the producer incurs a
total cost of
TCC1(τ) = η (τ0 + τ)
2 − ητ 20 = 2ητ0τ + ητ 2
to maintain a final collection rate of τ0 + τ . The reason we assume incremental cost
structure as opposed to marginal cost structure is the fact that if the base collection rate
is higher, it is more difficult and thus costlier to increase the collection rate further.
1.b. Cost of Collection and Sorting: In addition to the cost of maintaining a collection
rate, the producers also incur a unit cost of collection and sorting for each EOL product
collected. Collection and sorting activities include the transportation from customers
to collection facilities (unless customers drop off the products at a collection facility),
the transportation from collection facilities to treatment/processing centers as well as
the sorting of collected items at the collection facilities. As a result, the cost of collec-
1Japanese SHARL has fines for consumers who do not place the products in the collection bins and
this increases the collection rate
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tion/sorting is a function of the total volume collected. If the total collection rate is τT
and the total number of items sold by producer i is αiQ where αi is the market share
of producer i and Q is the total market size, the producer pays for the collection and
sorting of αiQτT units of EOL product at a per-unit collection cost of cC . Therefore,
when the total collection rate is τT the total collection and sorting cost is cCαiQτT .
However, even when the producer targets achieving a total collection rate of τ0 + τ ,
the realized collection rate may be lower due to the uncertainty in customer return rates.
While the base collection rate τ0 is the well-established return rate in the market, it is not
certain how the customers will react to the producer’s efforts to increase the collection
rate by τ . When the producer makes an investment to reach τ percent more customers,
not every target customer responds to these efforts and eventually the producer may
realize an additional collection rate of τx (and a total collection rate of τT = τ0 + τx).
We assume that x is a random variable distributed between xL and xH with pdf f(x),
and mean µ and standard deviation σ. The random variable x is interpreted as the
customer’s likelihood of returning the EOL product. This also explains the rationale
behind the multiplicative uncertainty model. For the very same reason it is also plausible
to assume µ ≤ 1. Among others, Toktay et al. (2000) and Wojanowski et al. (2007) have
also explicitly modeled the probability that a customer will eventually return his EOL
product.
To sum up, when producer i targets a collection rate of τ0 + τ the cost of collection
and sorting she incurs is TCC2(τ, x) = cCαiQ(τ0 + τx) while the total collection-related
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cost is
TCC(τ, x) = TCC1(τ) + TCC2(τ, x) = 2ητ0τ + ητ
2 + (τ0 + xτ)αiQcC .
2. Cost of Treatment: The cost of treatment mainly comprises of the cost of disas-
sembly, the cost of environmentally sound disposal of toxic and hazardous substances or
components, and the cost of shredding/processing of remaining metals, plastics, glass,
and circuitry. We assume that the unit cost of treatment is cR and the total cost of treat-
ment is a function of the total amount treated, i.e. αiQ(τ0 + τx). Since some treatment
processes such as smelting/shredding are capital intensive, it is argued that the cost of
treatment decreases due to economies of scale (GAO, 2005; Hageluken, 2006). To capture
this in our cost model, similar to Boyaci et al. (2007), we subtract θ(αiQ(τ0+ τx))
2 from
the total cost of treatment, i.e. cRαiQ(τ0+ τx), where θ is the economies of scale factor.
One way to reduce the cost of treatment activities is designing products that are easier
to dismantle and treat. For that reason, some producers make costly design changes to
facilitate dismantling. Nokia, for example, puts effort in improving the treatability level
of mobile phones in order to facilitate the extraction of valuable materials in an efficient
manner (Nokia, 2006). Similarly, producers might remove the toxic substances from
their product designs and thus decrease the cost associated with disposal. For example,
HP eliminated mercury fluorescent tubes and made the treatment of the display screens
easier and cheaper (HP, 2008). Since the cost of treatment processes depend on the
treatability level of the product (Stevels, 2003) and the associated costs might be brought
down by increasing the product’s treatability level, we model the unit treatment cost as
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cR − βξ where β is the savings achieved per treatability level. Note that, products
treatability level ξ is an index where higher treatability level implies an environmentally-
friendly product design and a lower treatment cost. Similar to Subramanian et al. (2009)
our formulation implies that unit cost of treatment decreases linearly with the level of
treatability ξ.
Putting everything together, given the realized number of units collected is αiQ(τ0+
τx), the total cost of treatment is
TCT (τ, ξ, x) = (cR − βξ)αiQ(τ0 + τx)− θα2iQ2(τ0 + τx)2.
Even though we call cR “a cost”, depending on product characteristics, the revenue
generated from selling recycled materials may outweigh the total cost associated with
treatment. That is why we allow cR to be negative, implying that treatment of the
product may be profitable. For example, the revenue received from the precious metals
concentrated in electronics products such as cell phones, CPUs, and laptops2 might indeed
exceed the cost of treatment, while for televisions the revenue does not offset the cost of
treatment (HECC, 2005; Sodhi and Reimer, 2001).
Generally, regardless of the compliance scheme choice, treatment processes are carried
out by third-party companies. When treatment is carried out by third-parties our cost
structure captures the price charged for treatment by the these companies. In this chap-
ter, neither the pricing decision of third-party companies nor the possible competition
between the these companies are modeled. Since we want to focus on how different com-
2For example, 1 metric ton of electronic scrap from obsolete computers contains more gold than 17
metric ton of gold ore (Bleiwas and Kelly, 2001).
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pliance schemes affects the collection and treatability decisions of a firm, we do not model
the treatment industry in detail. While a company who contracts with a third-party on
her own might be quoted a higher price, in order to facilitate the comparison between
the compliance schemes we assume that the treatment cost structure/parameters does
not differ with the compliance scheme choice.
3. Cost of increasing product’s treatability level: Take-back legislations aim to make
easily-treatable products more cost effective by establishing feedback loops from down-
stream (EOL product management level) to the upstream producer. If a producer prefers
to, she can increase the treatability level of her products and incurs an additional cost
to achieve that level. We call this cost component the cost of increasing the treatability
level and it depends on product design, the materials, the processes followed to manu-
facture the product, etc. For example, HP uses common fasteners and snap-in features
and avoids screws, adhesives and welds to make the dismantling of products easier (HP,
2008). When HP spends $1 more on the design cost to reduce the number of different
screws in each computer, she saves Noranda Recycling Inc., who recycles used electronics
for HP, approximately $4 in disassembly costs (GAO, 2005).
We assume that the cost to achieve treatability level ξ for producer i is convex and
increasing in ξ. Therefore for a producer who produces αiQ units of product, the total
cost of manufacturing products at treatability level ξ is TCG(ξ) = kξ2αiQ where k is the
cost scaling factor. Increasing marginal cost for achieving higher levels of environmental-
friendliness is a common assumption both in the operations (e.g., Subramanian et al.
(2009)) and economics (e.g., Gonzalez and Fumero (2002), Nordhaus (1991)) literatures.
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The rationale is that each additional unit of effort put in reducing the product’s en-
vironmental impact is more difficult and thus costlier to execute. In addition, beyond
a threshold, the cost of achieving lower environmental impact might exceed the price
that customers are willing to pay for the product and therefore, decreasing the product’s
environmental impact below some threshold level may be infeasible; our cost structure
captures this effect.
For the remainder of this chapter, we use subscripts S, C, F to denote firm i’s cost,
decisions or problem parameters under the individual scheme, the collective scheme, and
the collective scheme with IFR, respectively. In addition, we use superscripts UB and
LB to denote the upper and lower bounds on the problem parameters. First, we analyze
the problem of minimizing the total compliance cost under the individual compliance
scheme.
3.4 Individual Scheme
When producer i sets up her own individual compliance scheme, the total compliance
cost is
TCS(τS, ξS, x) = TCCS(τS, x) + TCTS(τS, ξS, x) + TCGS(ξS)
= 2ητ0τS + ητ
2
S + cCαiQ (τ0 + xτS) + (cR − βξS)αiQ(τ0 + τSx)
−θα2iQ2(τ0 + τSx)2 + αiQkξ2S
= 2ητ0τS + ητ
2
S + (cC + cR − βξS)αiQ(τ0 + τSx)− θα2iQ2(τ0 + τSx)2
+αiQkξ
2
S.
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Under the individual scheme, the producer chooses both the optimal treatability level
ξS and the collection rate τS for her products. As the uncertainty in terms of product
returns is not resolved at the time of decision, the producer minimizes her expected total
cost of compliance:
(P1) Min
1−τ0≥τS≥0, ξS≥0
Ex(TCS)
where
Ex(TCS) =
∫ xH
xL
TCS(τS, ξS, x)f(x) dx
= 2ητ0τS + ητ
2
S + αiQ(cC + cR − βξS)
(
τ0 + τS
∫ xH
xL
xf(x) dx
)
−θα2iQ2
(
τ 20 + 2τ0τS
∫ xH
xL
xf(x) dx+ τ 2S
∫ xH
xL
x2f(x) dx
)
+ αiQkξ
2
S
= 2ητ0τS + ητ
2
S + αiQ(cC + cR − βξS) (τ0 + τSµ)
−θα2iQ2
(
τ 20 + 2τ0τSµ+ τ
2
S(µ
2 + σ2)
)
+ αiQkξ
2
S.
3.4.1 Characterization of Optimal Policy
In order to guarantee positive semidefiniteness of the Hessian corresponding to the La-
grangian function of the problem (P1), we assume that condition (A1) holds.
4k(η − θα2iQ2(µ2 + σ2))− αiQµ2β2 ≥ 0 (A1)
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Condition (A1) characterizes a lower bound on η such that η ≥ ηLBS where ηLBS =
αiQ(4kθαiQ(µ2+σ2)+β2µ2)
4k
and implies that when it is very cheap to increase the collection
rate further (η ≤ ηLBS ) then the Hessian is negative semidefinite and the optimum solution
is observed at the corner points, i.e., either τ ∗S = 0 or τ
∗
S = 1−τ0. Therefore, by assuming
(A1), we restrict attention to the region where η ≥ ηLBS and avoid the trivial solutions.
In Proposition 14 we characterize producer i’s optimal solution under the individual
compliance scheme.
Proposition 14 If η ≥ αiQµ(4kθαiQ+β2−2k(cR+cC))
4k
= ηUBS then τ
∗
S = 0 regardless of τ0. If
ηUBS ≥ η ≥ ηLBS then there exist two threshold levels κIS and κIIS on τ0 (expressions for κIS
and κIIS are provided in the proof in Appendix C1) such that
1. if 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ κIS then τ ∗S = 0
2. if κIS ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS then 0 < τ ∗S = τ0(4kθα
2
iQ
2µ+αiQµβ2−4kη)−2kαiQµ(cC+cR)
4k(η−θα2iQ
2(µ2+σ2))−αiQµ2β2
< 1− τ0, and
3. if κIIS ≤ τ0 then τ ∗S = 1− τ0
The optimal treatability level in terms of τ ∗S is ξ
∗
S =
β(τ0+µτ∗S)
2k
. For a possible characteri-
zation of τ ∗S and ξ
∗
S with respect to τ0 see Figure 3.1.
Proposition 14 shows that the optimal level of treatability is higher when the collection
rate and the savings (β) achieved through higher treatability levels are higher. For
example, one characteristic that increases β is high metal content because using metal
parts instead of their plastic counterparts facilitates recycling and reduces treatment
cost (Tojo, 2003). Although it is difficult to measure a product’s treatability level, one
possible measure is its recycling level, i.e., the percentage of product’s total weight that
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FIGURE 3.1: A possible characterization of optimal (a) collection rate and (b) treata-
bility level with respect to the base collection rate τ0 under individual compliance
can be recycled. In the member EU states, it is estimated that the recycling level is
only 4% for coffee machines while it is as high as 43% and 63% for vacuum cleaners and
white goods respectively (Abele et al., 2005). It is also known that both the collection
rate and the metal content are low for coffee machines and high for vacuum cleaners and,
especially, for white goods. Therefore, Proposition 14 may explain why recycling level is
low for coffee machines but much higher for white goods.
As for the optimal collection rate, Proposition 14 implies that when the unit cost of
collection and treatment (cR+ cC) is higher, optimal collection rate is lower. In addition,
if it is expensive to maintain a collection rate, i.e., η ≥ ηUBS , then regardless of the base
collection rate maintained by government and non-profits, the producer never invests in
increasing the collection rate further. On the other hand, when it is not costly to maintain
a collection rate, i.e., η is low, the producer may choose any feasible collection rate, i.e.,
0 ≤ τ ∗S(τ0) ≤ 1 − τ0, depending on the base collection rate. Next, with Corollary 2, we
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summarize how optimal collection rate τ ∗S changes with respect to the base collection rate
τ0.
Corollary 2 If η ≥ ηUBS then τ ∗S = 0 regardless of τ0. Otherwise (i) if τ0 ≤ κIS then
τ ∗S = 0 and does not depend on τ0, (ii) if κ
I
S ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS then τ ∗S is increasing in τ0 and
(iii) if τ0 ≥ κIIS then τ ∗S is decreasing in τ0.
Corollary 2 together with Proposition 14 implies that the expected optimal collection
rate (τ0+µτ
∗
S) is increasing in the base collection rate, τ0. This implies that the optimal
treatability level is increasing in the base collection rate, too. Although policy makers
may choose τ0 low and delegate all the cost and responsibility of increasing the collec-
tion rate to producers in order to decrease the costs incurred by the society, they need
to consider the tradeoff between incentivizing higher treatability levels and the cost of
maintaining a collection rate.
With Corollary 3, we summarize how optimal collection rate changes with η (the
parameter that measures how costly it is to maintain a collection rate), σ (variability in
the collection rate), and αi (firm i’s market share ).
Corollary 3 If η ≥ ηUBS then τ ∗S = 0 regardless of η, σ, or αi. Otherwise,
• as η increases, κIS and κIIS increase and τ ∗S weakly decreases,
• as αi increases, κIS and κIIS decrease and τ ∗S weakly increases,
• as µ increases, κIS and κIIS decrease and τ ∗S weakly increases,
• as σ increases, κIS remains the same while κIIS decreases and τ ∗S weakly increases.
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Corollary 3 shows that when it is not costly to maintain a collection rate and the
firm’s market share is high, the optimal collection rate is higher. For example, Nokia,
the market leader in mobile phones in the UK and a follower of the individual compliance
scheme, promotes higher collection rates by raising consumer awareness and helping the
customers find the nearest site for product returns (Canning, 2006). Since Nokia phones
are portable, they are easily dropped-off at the nearest store and the cost of maintain-
ing a collection rate is quite low (http://artsresearch.brighton.ac.uk/research/projects/if-
lab/rubbish). Thus, Corollary 3 explains why Nokia aims to achieve higher collection
rates.
Finally, Corollary 3 shows that variability does not affect the threshold on τ0 above
which τ ∗S is positive. Hence, the minimum base collection rate that would incentivize
investing in higher collection rates does not depend on the variability of customer returns.
However, once the optimal additional collection rate τ ∗S is positive then higher variability
results in a higher collection rate. When τ ∗S is positive, the firm aims to exploit the
economies of scale. Therefore, when the variability in customer returns is high, she targets
a higher collection rate knowing that, due to high variability, the realized collection rate
may be much lower than the target rate and thus she may fail to benefit from the scale
economies in treatment activities.
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3.5 Collective Scheme with Cost Allocation by Mar-
ket Share
In order to comply with take-back legislations, producers may act collectively and set
up collective compliance schemes. Collective schemes are usually run by a non-profit
producer responsibility organization (PRO) that manages the collection and treatment
activities collectively on behalf of its producer members (Toffel, 2003). For example, The
European Recycling Platform (ERP) set up by Braun, Electrolux, HP and Sony ensures
that its members are in compliance with the WEEE directive.
Under collective schemes, when the collective collection and treatment cost is realized,
it is allocated among the members according to a previously-agreed-on rule. In practice,
the most frequently used rule is allocating the total cost among the members with respect
to their current market shares (Van Rossem, 2008). Therefore, in the rest of this section
we focus our discussion on the market share model and in the remainder of the chapter, by
collective scheme we imply collective scheme with cost allocation by market share unless
otherwise stated.
We model the relationships among the n producers and a non-profit central authority,
a so-called producer responsibility organization (PRO), under the collective scheme as
a two-stage Nash game. In the first stage, each producer j decides on the treatability
level ξj of her product as all n producers do the same by simultaneously minimizing their
compliance costs given a collection rate. In the second stage, the PRO decides on the
additional collection rate τC by minimizing the total cost of collection and treatment,
i.e., E(TCCC) + E(TCTC). Finally, the uncertainty on the product returns is resolved
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and the total costs are realized. The total collection and treatment cost is divided among
the members of scheme according to their market shares.
Under collective systems, products under each category (for example, the WEEE
Directive covers ten categories of EEE) are collected separately and the actual cost of
treatment for each category is recorded. Fees from a specific category of products are
used exclusively to cover the costs of that category and product categories do not cross
subsidize other product categories (www.weee-forum.org). Therefore, we consider a col-
lective scheme for products under a single category. We assume that the base collection
rate, τ0, and the additional collection rate is specific to a product category and thus every
brand in the same category—every product in the collective scheme—achieves the same
collection rate. We base our assumptions on many reviews for take-back legislations that
report category-wise return rates. For instance, in the UK the collection rate is reported
to be 56% for fridges and 77% for displays (www.360environmental.co.uk/ news/45/). In
addition, we assume that when the investment 2τ0τη + τ
2η is made, the increase in the
collection rate of each product is the same. In other words, this lump sum investment
raises the realized collection rate to the level of τ0+xτ for each firm in the collaboration.
Also, note that the cost of collection does not vary much among products of the same
category. Hence, differentiation of the collection cost between the brands is not necessary
and cC does not depend on the brand.
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3.5.1 Characterization of Optimal Solution
Collaborative Decision: Optimal Collection Rate
When the collective scheme aims to increase the total collection rate by τC , the total
collection cost is
TCCC(τC , x) = 2τ0τCη + τ
2
Cη + cCAnQ(xτC + τ0),
whereas the total treatment cost is
TCTC(τC , ~ξ, x) =
(
n∑
j=1
(cR − βξj)αjQ(τ0 + τCx)
)
− θA2nQ2(τ0 + τCx)2,
where An is the total market share of n firms, i.e., An =
∑n
j=1 αj . The non-profit
PRO decides on the optimal collection rate, τ ∗C by minimizing the total expected cost of
collection and treatment for the collaboration:
Min
1−τ0≥τC≥0
Ex
(
TCCC(τC , x) + TCTC(τC , ~ξ, x)
)
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where Ex(TCCC(τC , x)+TCTC(τC , ~ξ, x)) =
∫ xH
xL
(
TCCC(τC , x) + TCTC(τC , ~ξ, x)
)
f(x) dx
= 2ητ0τC + ητ
2
C +
n∑
j=1
αjQ(cC + cR − βξj)
(
τ0 + τC
∫ xH
xL
xf(x) dx
)
−θA2nQ2
(
τ 20 + 2τ0τC
∫ xH
xL
xf(x) dx+ τ 2C
∫ xH
xL
x2f(x) dx
)
= 2ητ0τC + ητ
2
C + AnQcC (τ0 + τCµ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex(TCCC(τC ,x))
+AnQcR (τ0 + τCµ)−
n∑
j=1
(αjξj)Qβ (τ0 + τCµ)
−θA2nQ2
(
τ 20 + 2τ0τCµ+ τ
2
C(µ
2 + σ2)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex(TCTC(τC ,~ξ,x))
. (3.1)
In the formulation, the expected total collection cost is Ex(TCCC(τC , x)) and the
expected total treatment cost is Ex(TCTC(τC , ~ξ, x)).
Individual Decision: Optimal Treatability Level
Consider n producers acting collectively and sharing the cost with respect to their market
shares. The producers are the Stackelberg leaders and thus each producer simultaneously
decides on her product’s optimal treatability level by minimizing her share of expected
total compliance cost and the cost of increasing the product’s treatability level
Min
ξi≥0
E(TCC,i) =
αi
An
(
Ex
(
TCCC(τ
∗
C) + TCTC(τ
∗
C ,
~ξ)
))
+ kξ2i αiQ
where TCC,i is the total compliance cost for firm i when n firms collaborate.
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The Optimal Policy
The first stage game where the individual decisions are made and the optimal treatability
levels are determined is submodular and thus a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
To show the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we use the dominant diagonal condition in
Milgrom and Roberts (1990). We find that uniqueness is guaranteed as long as condition
(A2) holds.
4k(η − θQ2(µ2 + σ2)A2n)−Qµ2β2αi ≥ 0 ∀i.(A2)
In the rest of the chapter we assume that condition (A2), which also guarantees the
convexity of objective function, holds. Condition (A2) characterizes a lower bound on
η such that η ≥ Q(4kθQ(µ2+σ2)A2n+µ2β2αk)
4k
= ηLBC where αk = max{α1, .., αn}. Note that if
condition (A2) holds for the firm with the biggest market share then it holds for all the
other member firms. In the following proposition, we characterize the optimal policy for
the PRO and each producer i with respect to the base collection rate τ0.
Proposition 15 If η ≥ 4kθQ2µA3n+Qµβ2S2n−2kQµ(cR+cC)A2n
4k
= ηUBC where S2n =
∑n
i=1 α
2
i ,
then τ ∗C = 0 for every τ0. Otherwise, there exist two threshold levels κ
I
C and κ
II
C on τ0
(expressions for κIC and κ
II
C are provided in the proof in Appendix C1) such that
1. if 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ κIC then τ ∗C = 0,
2. if κIC ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIC then 0 < τ ∗C = (Qµβ
2S2n−4k(η−θQ2µA2n)An)τ0−2kQµ(cR+cC)A
2
n
4kAn(η−Q2θA2n(µ
2+σ2))−S2nQµ2β2
< 1 − τ0,
and
3. if κIIC ≤ τ0 then τ ∗C = 1− τ0 .
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Optimal treatability level of firm i is ξ∗i =
βαi(τ0+µτ∗C)
2kAn
. For a possible characterization of
τ ∗C and ξ
∗
i with respect to τ0 see Figure 3.2.
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FIGURE 3.2: A possible characterization of optimal (a) collection rate and (b) treata-
bility level with respect to the base collection rate for two firms under collective com-
pliance with α1 = 0.12, α2 = 0.08, η = 7000, cR = 6, cC = 0.5, β = 3, Q = 1500, θ =
2 · 10−3, µ = 0.65, σ = 0.2, k = 0.025.
Similar to our findings under the individual compliance scheme, one can easily show
that optimal additional collection rate τ ∗C increases as the base collection rate τ0 increases.
In addition, optimal treatability level for each member in the collective scheme increases
as the total collection rate increases. In a collective scheme, a big concern for the member
companies is potential free-riders—companies who do not invest enough in treatability
and benefit from the investments of their partner firms (they benefit because the total
cost is shared). Proposition 15 shows that the optimal treatability level is higher for
member firms with higher market shares (note that for any two firms k and i ξ∗k =
ξ∗i
αi
αk).
Hence, producers’ concern regarding potential free-riders is not groundless, especially if
some partner firms have small market shares. In addition, our results indicate that the
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treatability level is increasing in the final collection rate in proportion to the producer’s
market share. As the collection rate increases, the improvement in the treatability level
of a producer with a small market share will be less than that of a producer with a high
market share. Thus, as the base collection rate increases, the difference between the
optimal treatability levels widens (see Figure 3.2(b)).
3.6 Collective Scheme with Individual Financial Re-
sponsibility (IFR)
As we stated in Section 3.5, in most implementations of the collective compliance scheme,
the total cost is allocated among members according to their market shares. However, in
their original statements most take-back legislations aim for IFR (which do not hold when
the legislation is implemented through a collective scheme with cost allocation by market
share). For example, the WEEE Directive clearly states that each producer should be
financially responsible for managing the waste from her own EOL products. The excerpt
from Article 8.2 reads:
For products placed on the market later than 13 August 2005, each producer shall be
responsible for financing the operations referred to in paragraph 1 relating to the waste
from his own products. The producer can choose to fulfill this obligation either individually
or by joining a collective scheme.
Article 8.2 requires IFR for producers’ own EOL products while providing a choice
in how to fulfil their responsibility, i.e., through an individual or a collective scheme.
Therefore even when the producers become a member of a collective scheme, they are
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still responsible for financing the waste of their own brand name products. However,
when member EU states transposed the WEEE Directive into law, most failed to clarify
IFR and cost allocation with respect to market share has been allowed. The reason why
companies prefer cost allocation by market share is that implementing IFR within a col-
lective compliance scheme requires sorting products by brand and tracking them through
the treatment process in order to record the true cost of treatment. This is a complicated
and costly endeavor. Still, IFR can be implemented within a collective scheme and the
Japanese SHARL where producers are financially responsible for collection and treat-
ment of their EOL products is an example. In the future, with new technologies such
as radio frequency identification (RFID), sorting and tracking of EOL products will be
much easier (Bohr, 2007). Still, RFID tags would be extremely expensive and it brings
the question of who would be responsible for incurring the cost of tagging and tracking.
If we ignore the additional costs incurred due to brand-based tracking, the collective
scheme with IFR is an attractive option for producers: the producer members exploit
the economies of scale in compliance cost and also benefit from better incentives for
improved design since each producer pays only for the collection and treatment of her
own products and there is no free-riding. That is why we analyze collective schemes with
IFR for comparison purposes even though they are not prevalent in implementation.
We model the relationships among the n producers and a non-profit PRO similar to
that under the collective scheme in section 3.5. As producer members are collectively
responsible for collection, the non-profit PRO decides on the optimal collection rate τ ∗F
by minimizing the total cost of collection and treatment for the collaboration as is the
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case under the collective scheme (cf. Section 3.5.1). And each producer simultaneously
decides on her product’s optimal treatability level by minimizing her true compliance
cost:
Min
ξi≥0
E(TCF,i) = Ex (TCCF (τ
∗
F ) + TCTF (τ
∗
F , ξ)) + kξ
2
i αiQ
where TCCF (τ
∗
F ) =
αi
An
(2τ0τ
∗
Fη + (τ
∗
F )
2η) + cCαiQ(xτ
∗
F + τ0) and TCTF (τ
∗
F ,
~ξ) = (cR −
βξi)αiQ(τ0 + τ
∗
Fx)− αiAn (θA2nQ2(τ0 + τ ∗Fx)2).
We assume that the cost of maintaining the collection rate τ ∗F (i.e., 2τ0τ
∗
Fη + (τ
∗
F )
2η) is
allocated among the members according to their markets shares. Under a collective sys-
tem, members share the same physical infrastructure and publicize information about the
collection activities collectively. Therefore, they are collectively responsible for financing
the collection points and the activities required to increase the customer awareness. And
since these costs depend on the total volume treated and not on the individual product
characteristics, cost allocation by market share is reasonable. Similarly, we assume that
the decrease in the total treatment cost due to economies of scale (i.e., θA2nQ
2(τ0 + τ
∗
Fx)
2)
is also allocated among the members according to their market shares. Recall that the
economies of scale in treatment cost arises from the capital intensive treatment pro-
cesses such as shredding or smelting through which all products of the same category go
through. Therefore, the member firms benefit from the economies of scale collectively
regardless of brand or product characteristics.
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3.6.1 Characterization of Optimal Policy
The first stage game where the individual decisions are made and the optimal treatability
levels are determined is submodular and thus a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
To show the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we once again use the dominant diagonal
condition in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and find that uniqueness is guaranteed as long
as condition (A3) holds.
4k(η − θQ2(µ2 + σ2)A2n)−Qµ2β2An ≥ 0 (A3)
In the rest of our analysis we assume that condition (A3), which also guarantees the
convexity of objective function, holds. Condition (A3) characterizes a lower bound on η
such that η ≥ QAn(4kθQ(µ2+σ2)An+µ2β2)
4k
= ηLBF . Proposition 16 characterizes the optimal
policy for the PRO and the producer members with respect to the base collection rate
τ0.
Proposition 16 If η ≥ 4kθQ2µA2n+Qµβ2An−2kQµ(cR+cC)An
4k
= ηUBF , then τ
∗
F = 0 for every τ0.
If ηUBF ≥ η ≥ ηLBF , there exist two threshold levels κIF and κIIF on τ0 (expressions for κIF
and κIIF are provided in the proof in Appendix C1) such that
1. if 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ κIF then τ ∗F = 0,
2. if κIF ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIF then 0 < τ ∗F = (QAnµβ
2−4k(η−θQ2µA2n))τ0−2kQµ(cR+cC)An
4k(η−θQ2A2n(µ
2+σ2))−QAnµ2β2
< 1− τ0,
3. if κIIF ≤ τ0 then τ ∗F = 1− τ0.
Optimal treatability level of firm i is ξ∗i =
β(τ0+µτ∗F )
2k
.
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3.7 Comparison of Compliance Schemes
3.7.1 Producers’ Preference for a Collective Scheme over the
Individual Scheme
Even though producers are occasionally restricted by governments to comply with leg-
islation through a particular compliance scheme, more often they are free to choose the
most cost effective one among the alternatives. In this section, we characterize a pro-
ducer’s preference regarding the most cost-effective form of compliance. In doing the
comparisons, we assume that when firm i joins a collective scheme (with IFR or with
cost allocation by market share) of market share An−αi (with n−1 members) the PRO
calculates the updated optimal collection rate. Since the PRO aims to provide the most
cost effective compliance for its members, once the new member joins the scheme, she
may modify the collection rate by changing the effort she puts in collection activities. Ev-
idence suggests that PROs do vary their collection rates over time. For example, Repic,
a collective compliance scheme in the UK, recently contacted with additional collection
sites in order to increase the collection rate (Gyekye, 2009). In addition, we assume that
when firm i becomes a member of the collective scheme, each existing member calculates
the updated optimal treatability level. Since the total volume collected goes up and,
furthermore, the collection rate may be updated by the PRO once a new firm becomes
a member, existing members may find it optimal to adjust their products’ treatability
levels in response. The following example demonstrates that how willing companies are
to invest in treatability levels depends on both the collection rate and the total volume
collected: HP’s take-back compliance manager states that there are design changes they
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can make but they do not get enough products back (BBCNews, 2007) to justify them.
First, we characterize how cost effective it is to follow a collective compliance scheme
with IFR in comparison to the other two compliance schemes we consider.
Proposition 17 A firm with market share αi always prefers to join a collective scheme
of size An − αi that follows IFR rather than setting up her own individual compliance
scheme. She prefers to join a collective scheme with IFR rather than the one with cost
allocation by market share if and only if 2S2n − A2n − α2i ≤ 0.
As intuition suggests, a collective scheme with IFR yields lower compliance cost when
compared to an individual compliance scheme because the members share the cost of
maintaining the collection level and benefit from economies of scale in the treatment
cost. On the other hand, surprisingly implementing IFR within a collective scheme does
not always yield lower cost than allocating the cost by market share. That is the case only
if 2S2n−A2n−α2i ≤ 0, which is more likely to hold when small producers are members of
the collective scheme. Since members with small market shares may free-ride, treatability
levels are lower under cost allocation by market share, which increases the total cost for
all members. For a firm with moderate of large market share, collective scheme with cost
allocation by market share is preferred only when the scheme consists of firms with large
market shares. By the same token, collective scheme with cost allocation by market share
is preferred only by small firms and only when the scheme consists of firms with large
market shares. Since the partner firms with large market shares will invest in treatability
and thus the total treatment cost will be low, market share allocation rule yields smaller
cost for the smaller firm.
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Next, we compare the collective scheme with cost allocation by market share and the
individual scheme with respect to the minimum cost of compliance achieved under each.
First, we let τ = 0 and define the difference between the costs of compliance under each
scheme as
Ω = E(TCS)(τ = 0)− E(TCC)(τ = 0) = 4kθQA
2
n(An − αi) + β2(2S2n −A2n − α2i )
4kA2n
.(3.2)
Note that Ω ≥ 0 if and only if
n−1∑
j=1
α2j ≥ Ω0 =
β2(A2n − α2i )− 4kθQA2n(An − αi)
2β2
. (3.3)
The next proposition characterizes the producer’s optimal decision regarding choosing
the compliance scheme that yields lower compliance cost.
Proposition 18 Consider firm i with market share αi. We compare her compliance cost
under an individual scheme with that under a collective scheme where she collaborates
with n− 1 other producer members of total market size An−αi and we find that for firm
i
1. If Ω ≥ 0 then collective scheme yields lower cost of compliance unless τ1 ≤ τ0 ≤ τ2,
η ≤ η1, and Ω ≤ Ω1 hold simultaneously, where
η1 =
αiQµ(β
2(A2n − S2n)− 4A2nkθQ(An − αi))
4kAn(An − αi) ,
Ω1 =
A2nµ(4k(α
2
iQ
2µθ − η) + αiQµβ2)2
αiµQ(4kα
2
i θQ
2(µ2 + σ2)− 4ηk + αiQµ2β2) .
94
2. If Ω ≤ 0 then
(a) If η ≥ η1 then
i. If Ω ≤ Ω2(τ0, η, θ, αi, An, k, µ, σ,Q) then the individual scheme yields lower
cost regardless of τ0.
ii. Otherwise the collective scheme yields lower cost if τ3 ≤ τ0 ≤ τ4.
(b) Otherwise the collective scheme yields lower cost if and only if τ5 ≤ τ0 ≤ τ6.
The bounds τi for i = 1, .., 6 on τ0 and Ω2 are provided in Appendix C1.
Which compliance scheme yields lower cost depends, among other things, on the sign
of Ω. One may interpret Ω as an indicator of how costly it is to set up an individual scheme
compared to joining a collective scheme when the base collection rate is maintained as the
final collection rate (i.e., the additional collection rate τ ∗ = 0). Using the equivalence of
Ω ≥ 0 to expression (3.3), we observe that Ω ≥ 0 is more likely to hold when the existing
members of the collective scheme have large market shares. Thus if the collective scheme
already consists of firms with big market shares, then a firm with market share αi is more
likely to pay a lower compliance cost under the collective compliance scheme. Especially,
when Ω ≥ 0, the individual scheme yields a lower cost if and only if η ≤ η1, Ω < Ω1, and
τ0 is in the right interval.
Let us take a closer look at the conditions that need to be satisfied for the individual
scheme to yield a lower cost when Ω ≥ 0. The first condition is that η ≤ η1, which
means that the market environment is such that it is relatively cheap to maintain a high
collection rate. Under this condition, a firm complying under the individual scheme may
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find it optimal to set the collection rate high, to the extent that τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C (one can show
that τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C is a necessary condition for the individual scheme to yield a lower cost).
One reason for choosing the individual scheme is to be able to invest in treatability and
reap 100% of the benefits. However, for this investment to pay off, the firm needs to
achieve a high collection rate and be able to collect a critical volume of products and this
is possible when η ≤ η1. Hence, a low η favors the individual scheme.
The second condition is that Ω < Ω1 and a closer inspection of this condition reveals
that this condition is more likely to hold when the market sizes of the existing members
of the collective scheme are not too large. When the existing members are really big, the
collective scheme benefits from economies of scale and regarding the treatability levels,
the incentive to free-ride is low. Hence, when the firms in the collective scheme are really
big, it is unlikely that the individual scheme will yield a lower cost.
Finally, when Ω ≥ 0, which collective scheme yields the lower cost depends on the
base collection rate τ0. When τ0 is low, the collective scheme yields lower cost because it
is expensive for individual firms to increase the total collection rate and they join their
volumes to benefit from economies of scale. When τ0 is of moderate values, the optimal
collection rate under individual compliance may be higher than that under the collective
scheme (because firms would like to increase their products’ treatability levels and this
investment is economical only if they are above a critical collection rate rate). As a result,
firm i enjoys both economies of scale benefits and lower treatability costs and only then
individual scheme yields lower compliance cost. Finally, when the base collection rate is
high, the collective scheme is the less costly alternative again because treating the large
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volumes returned individually is very expensive.
We also observe that if β = 0 (recall that β is the coefficient for possible savings
in unit treatment cost) then the collective scheme always yields a lower cost for firm i
because there is no incentive to set up an individual compliance scheme. This finding is
aligned with the expectation that small appliances such as electric toothbrushes, hand-
held vacuum cleaners, toasters and irons will be treated together and their treatment will
be jointly financed (CECED, 2002). These kind of appliances have low metal content
which, as discussed in section 3.4, is an indication of a small β.
Corollary 4 If αiµ
2β2Q(2S2n−A2n−α2i )+4αikA2nθQ2(µ2+σ2)(An−αi)+4kA(An−αi)η ≤
0 then the firm incurs lower compliance cost under the individual scheme regardless of
τ0.
Observe that the condition in Corollary 4 holds only if A2n ≫ S2n, i.e., A2n−1 +
2An−1αi ≫ S2(n−1). Hence when S2(n−1) is sufficiently small and An−1 is sufficiently high
(this means that the collective scheme consists of many small firms before firm i joins),
the individual scheme yields a lower compliance cost for firm i. In other words, for a
given firm, it is not cost effective to join a collective scheme if it consists of many firms
with small market shares.
When Ω ≤ 0, unless τ ∗C = 0 or Corollary 4 holds, the base collection rate τ0 determines
the most cost-effective compliance scheme. The individual scheme yields a lower cost
when the base collection rate is low or very high. When τ0 is small, τ
∗
C = τ
∗
S = 0 (or
both are very small). Hence, the total volume collected is small and the firm prefers
the individual scheme and invests in higher treatability levels in order to reduce the
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total compliance cost (as opposed to joining the collective scheme with small members
and trying to exploit economies of scale). On the other hand, as τ0 increases, the cost
of collection increases. This decreases her willingness to go individual and invest more
in higher treatability levels. Rather, she prefers the collective scheme to benefit from
economies of scale. Eventually when τ0 is very high, because of high volume of returns
which come at no cost to the firm, the firm again prefers the individual scheme and
benefits from both economies of scale and higher treatability levels.
For a possible characterization of the optimal compliance decision given a base col-
lection rate see Figure 3.3 which plots δ = E(TCS)− E(TCC). The figure confirms our
analytical insights that for sufficiently low and high base collection levels, individual com-
pliance scheme yields lower compliance cost while for moderate levels of base collection
rate, the collective scheme yields a lower cost.
Difference  between  the optimal compliance  costs
t0
0.24 0.65 1
d
K1,500
K1,000
K500
0
500
FIGURE 3.3: A possible characterization of compliance decision respect to base collection
rate: When δ = E(TCS)−E(TCC) ≥ 0(≤ 0) the optimal decision is joining the collective
scheme (setting up an individual scheme)
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Effect of return uncertainty on the Producer’s Preference for a Collective Scheme:
When the base collection rate τ0 is small, which compliance scheme yields lower cost
depends on the sign on Ω. It is apparent that the sign of Ω depends neither on the mean
collection rate µ nor on how much the collection rate deviates σ. Therefore, if the base
collection rate is small then the uncertainty in collection rate does not affect a producer’s
preference for a collective scheme. On the other hand, this might not be the case when
the base collection rate maintained by government and non-profits is relatively high.
Next we provide an example where the producer’s preference for the collective scheme
changes as µ increases.
EXAMPLE 1. Assume that the total market size is Q = 1000 and a firm of size
α1 = 0.15 considers setting up a collective scheme with another firm of size α2 = 0.20.
The treatment/collection costs are cR = 6 and cC = 0.1. The other parameters are as
follows: β = 5, k = 0.1, θ = 5.5 104, η = 3150, σ = 0.2. When µ = 0.3, the individual
scheme yields lower cost regardless of the base collection rate τ0. When µ = 0.5 the
compliance decision with respect to τ0 is as depicted in Figure 3.3.
This example illustrates that even the individual scheme might yield lower cost when
the mean collection rate µ is small, collective scheme might be the less costly alternative -if
the base collection rate is of moderate values- when the mean collection rate is high. When
µ is high, expected collection rate is higher and thus the firm benefits from economies
of scale under a collective scheme. Thus, the firm’s willingness to set up an individual
scheme and to invest in higher treatability levels decrease. Still, when τ0 is very high she
does not need to join the collective scheme to benefit from economies of scale because a
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high volume of returns is already maintained by government/non-profits.
Impact of Collection Targets on Producer’s Preference for a Collective Scheme
Assume that the take-back legislation specifies a lower bound τL (specified as a percentage
of the total sales of the company) on the EOL products to be collected and disposed of or
treated properly. For example, in their take-back legislation for video display devices, the
state of Minnesota sets τL to 70% for the first year and increases it to 80% after that. In
New York City, the collection target is set at 25%. Not all forms of take-back legislation
specify the collection rate as a minimum percent of sales in the previous year. WEEE
sets the collection targets as a percentage of the weight of EEE put on the market. For
example, for large household appliances, the collection target is 80% of the total weight
of appliances sold in the previous period. Since we are modeling an economy with a single
category of products, if the products under the same category weigh almost the same
then even these different types of collection targets can be represented as some τL percent
of previous period’s sales. On the other hand, if the products under the same category
do not weigh same, then we can tweak the model by using adjusted market shares which
are obtained by multiplying the market shares with the corresponding product’s weight.
In this section, we analyze how a firm’s compliance scheme preference is affected
by exogenous collection targets. We restrict attention to cases where τL is higher than
the optimum collection rates the firms would otherwise choose since there would be
no need for the governments to set such targets if the firms were voluntarily meeting
them. First, as Proposition 17 shows, imposing a collection target does not influence
a firm’s preference for the collective system with IFR over the other schemes. But
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as Proposition 19 demonstrates, it may impact a firm’s preference for the individual
scheme over the collective scheme. Most importantly, comparing Proposition 18 with
Proposition 19 reveals that an exogenous collection target of τL makes the collective
scheme more attractive to producers. This is intuitive; if legislation forces a producer to
collect more than she otherwise would, she joins the collective scheme to benefit from
possible scale economies.
Proposition 19 If the government imposes a lower bound τL = τ0+µτ¯ on the percentage
of goods sold that should be collected and treated properly, which compliance scheme yields
lower cost for firm i depends on Ω (given by (3.2)) as follows:
• If Ω ≥ 0 then the collective scheme yields lower compliance cost.
• If Ω ≤ 0 then the collective scheme yields lower compliance cost if and only if η ≥ η5
and τL is sufficiently large for a given τ0. Otherwise, individual scheme yields lower
cost.
3.7.2 Policymaker’s Perspective: Environmental Benefits
In this section, we take the policymaker’s perspective and assume that firm i with mar-
ket share αi is told to follow either the individual scheme or the collective scheme. In
other words, at this point we are not concerned about the firm’s preference regarding the
compliance scheme that yields lower compliance cost but assume that the compliance
scheme is already imposed. Although producers are free to choose individual compli-
ance scheme under the WEEE Directive, some governments impose strict administrative
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requirements such as providing additional waste plans and financial guarantees for indi-
vidual compliance and thus individual compliance becomes a highly unattractive option.
For that reason, in countries such as Greece or Slovenia, no firm has yet applied for
individual compliance (Perchards, 2007). In this section, we aim to understand if the
policy maker’s decision to impose additional requirements for individual compliance and
thus turn it into an infeasible option is useful in achieving higher environmental benefits.
In order to identify which compliance scheme achieves higher environmental benefits, we
compare the collection rate and the treatability level achieved when the firm complies in-
dividually versus when she joins a collective scheme. We first compare the total collection
rates achieved under each possible compliance scheme.
Proposition 20 Consider firm i with market share αi and a collective scheme with total
market share An − αi. Then
1. τ ∗F ≥ max{τ ∗C , τ ∗S}.
2. Depending on η, τ ∗S and τ
∗
C compare as follows:
(a) If η ≥ max{ηUBC , ηUBS } then τ ∗C = τ ∗S = 0 for every τ0.
(b) If ηUBC ≥ η ≥ ηUBS (ηUBS ≥ η ≥ ηUBC ) then τ ∗S = 0 (τ ∗C = 0) and τ ∗C ≥ τ ∗S
(τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C) for every τ0.
(c) If min{ηUBC , ηUBS } ≥ η then
i. If η ≥ η1 then τ ∗C ≥ τ ∗S for every τ0.
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ii. If η2 ≤ η ≤ η1 where
η2 =
αiQµ


(4kA2nθQ(µ− µ2 − σ2)(An − αi))(cR + cC)
−(µβ2(A2n − S2n)(1 − µ))(cR + cC)
+2Qβ2σ2θ(A3n − αiS2n)


2((1− µ)(Anαi − S2n)µβ2 + 4kAnθQ(A2n − α2i )(µ2 + σ2 − µ))
then τ ∗C ≥ τ ∗S (τ ∗C ≤ τ ∗S) when τ0 ≥ κ3 (τ0 ≤ κ3).
iii. If η ≤ η2 then τ ∗C ≤ τ ∗S for every τ0.
The expression for κ3 is provided in the proof in Appendix C1.
As intuition suggests, the total collection rate is highest under collective compliance
with IFR. On the other hand, among the other two compliance schemes which one gives
higher environmental benefits in terms of higher collection rates depends on how expen-
sive it is to maintain the collection rate, (i.e., on η). When η is high (e.g., large country,
population dispersed, customers are not willing to return the products) collective schemes
result in higher collection rates because it is feasible to increase the collection rate only
when producers share the costs. On the other hand, when η is low (e.g., small and less
populated country) higher collection rates are achieved if the government enforces the
individual compliance scheme. This result implies that imposing additional requirements
for individual compliance and thus turning collective compliance into the more attractive
alternative in smaller countries such as Greece or Slovenia may be a flawed strategy and
may result in lower collection rates when compared to what would be achieved under
individual compliance. For moderate values of η, the base collection rate τ0 should be
chosen carefully: For higher values of τ0, i.e., τ0 ≥ κ3, collective scheme yields higher
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collection rates. On the other hand, for lower values of τ0, i.e., τ0 ≤ κ3, individual
scheme achieves higher collection rates. The conditions under which individual scheme
yields higher collection rates, i.e., η2 ≤ η ≤ η1 and τ0 ≤ κ3, are satisfied if β is high and
there are relatively small firms in a big collective scheme, i.e., total market share of the
collective scheme is big enough but member shares are relatively small. Therefore, when
they act collectively they benefit from economies of scale and do not need to increase
the collection rate for small values of τ0. On the other hand, when the firm with market
share αi (a relatively large market share) sets up an individual scheme she benefits from
increasing the collection rate since β is high.
Finally, note that if the base collection rate is very low or very high, i.e., τ0 ≤
min{κIS, κIC} or τ0 ≥ min{κIIS , κIIC }, then both schemes achieve the same level of collection
rate. In the former case, the optimal additional collection rate is zero for both schemes,
while in the latter case it is 1 − τ0. Thus, in either case, the policy maker does not
need to worry about imposing a particular compliance scheme in order to achieve higher
collection rates.
Proposition 21 Consider firm i with market share αi and a collective scheme with total
market share An − αi. Then, ξ∗F ≥ max{ξ∗C, ξ∗S}. The optimal treatability level under
collective scheme is higher than that under individual scheme, i.e., ξ∗C ≥ ξ∗S if and only
if η2 ≤ η ≤ η3 = Qµ
2(4kA3nθQ+β
2S2n)+4kA2nθQ
2σ2(An−αi)
4k(An−αi+αiµ)
, and τ7 ≤ τ0 ≤ τ8. The bounds τi for
i = 7, 8 on τ0 are provided in Appendix C1.
With Proposition 21, we establish the intuitive result that the treatability level is
highest under the collective scheme with IFR. In addition, we conclude that if η is small,
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i.e., η ≤ η2, the optimal treatability level achieved under the individual scheme is higher
than that under the collective scheme regardless of the base collection rate. When η is
small, it is cheap to increase the collection rate further and the additional collection rate is
higher under the individual scheme. Since the treatability level is linear in the collection
rate (see Propositions 14 and 15), the treatability level is higher under the individual
scheme. On the other hand, when η is large, i.e., η ≥ η3, the treatability level is higher
under the individual scheme for completely different reasons. Note that for higher values
of η, the difference between collective and individual collection rates decreases since
increasing the collection rate is very costly in either case. Therefore, collective scheme
can never achieve high enough collection rates that is necessary for higher treatability
levels. Finally, only when both η and τ0 are in the right interval, optimal treatability
level under the collective scheme is higher than the individual treatability level. The
treatability level under the collective scheme increases as the collection rate and/or the
market share of the firm increases. That is why we observe a higher treatability level
under the collective scheme only if the collective collection rate is significantly higher
than the individual collection rate.
Another condition under which the difference between the two collection rates is
particularly high is when the market shares of each of the firms in the collective scheme
are large. Therefore, the collective scheme may yield higher treatability levels than the
individual scheme when it comprises of firms with large market shares. The treatability
level under the collective scheme is generally lower than that under the individual scheme
since firms do not invest as much when the other firms free-ride on their investment
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(Tojo, 2004). However, our result shows that this fear is somewhat mitigated when the
collective scheme members have large market shares and are less likely to free-ride (since
the optimal action for all members is to invest in high levels of treatability).
Proposition 21 implies that even when the collective collection rate is higher, treata-
bility levels may be higher under the individual scheme. Therefore, policy makers should
be particularly careful when imposing a specific compliance scheme because there may
be conflicting environmental benefits. Next we provide an example to illustrate this.
EXAMPLE 2. Assume that the total market size is Q = 1000 and a firm of size
α1 = 0.23 considers setting up a collective scheme with another firm of size α2 = 0.3.
The treatment/collection costs are cR = 6 and cC = 0.5. The other parameters are as
follows: β = 3.5, k = 0.039, θ = 0.01, η = 9500, σ = 0.5 and µ = 0.6. The optimal
collection and treatability levels under collaborative and individual scheme are depicted
in Figure 3.4.
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FIGURE 3.4: Conflicting environmental benefits unless τ0 is in the right interval
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For this specific example, even when the collective collection rate is higher, individual
scheme gives a higher treatability level unless τ0 is in the right interval and there are
conflicting environmental benefits for a large range of base collection rates.
Recall that in Section 3.7 we show that if a minimum collection level is imposed by
the government, a producer, who would otherwise choose the individual scheme, may
end up joining a collective compliance scheme. In that context, our results suggest that
if such an exogenous collection target causes the firm to switch compliance schemes, it
may result in a degradation in the treatability levels and our next example demonstrates
that this is indeed possible.
EXAMPLE 3. Assume that the total market size is Q = 100 and a firm of market
share α1 = 0.3 considers setting up a collective scheme with another firm of market share
α2 = 0.3. The treatment/collection costs are cR = 7 and cC = 1. The other parameters
are as follows: β = 5, k = 0.1, θ = 0.05, η = 1400, σ = 0.2 and µ = 0.8. In the
absence of collection targets, individual scheme yields lower compliance cost regardless
of τ0. However, under legislation with a collection target of τL = 0.95, collective scheme
yields lower compliance cost when τ0 ≤ 0.695 (for the difference between the compliance
costs under individual and collective schemes see Figure 3.5(a)). The optimal treatability
levels are plotted on Figure 3.5(b).
When the legislation imposes collection targets, both collective and individual schemes
achieve the same level of collection rate, i.e., τ0+µτL, which is higher than the collection
rate achieved in the absence of collection targets. While the collection rate increases, in
this specific example, we observe that the treatability level under the optimal compliance
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FIGURE 3.5: For Example 3, (a)the collective scheme yields lower compliance cost under
τL (b)ξL,k k ∈ {S,C} is the optimal treatability level under the compliance scheme that
yields lower cost under τL and ξS the optimal treatability level in the absence of τL.
decision may be lower than that would be achieved in the absence of collection targets.
We observe a degradation in treatability levels only when the base collection rate is of
moderate levels. When the base collection rate τ0 is low, even though the optimal compli-
ance decision changes from individual scheme to collective scheme, optimal treatability
does not decrease. In the absence of collection targets, the producer does not have much
incentive neither to increase the collection rate nor the treatability level. Recall that
the collective scheme achieves higher treatability levels than the individual scheme only
when the collective collection rate is significantly higher than the individual collection
rate. Here, inducing very high collection targets causes the firm to switch to collective
compliance, increases the collection rate drastically and thus yields higher treatability
levels. For moderate levels of base collection rate, in the absence of collection targets, the
individual scheme is optimal and achieves higher collection rates and treatability levels
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than the collective scheme. The target collection rate causes a switch to the collective
scheme, but the overall collection rate is not high enough to ensure higher treatability
levels under the collective scheme. Finally, when base collection rate is high, optimal com-
pliance decision remains the same, i.e. individual scheme yields lower cost, and therefore
optimal treatability level increases as the legislation imposes high collection rates.
3.8 Conclusions
As an increasing number of countries act to require producers to finance the collection and
treatment of their end-of-life products through legislation, it is important for producers
to fully understand the compliance-related costs and how they depend on the particular
compliance scheme followed. Even though research on take-back legislations is growing,
no previous work looked at the question of which compliance scheme yields the lowest
cost for a producer and our research aims to fill this gap.
Given the choice, some producers (e.g., Cisco) choose individual compliance whereas
others prefer collective compliance (e.g., ERP by Braun, Electrolux, HP, Sony). In order
to characterize the market and operating conditions that make one form of compliance
more cost effective than the others, we first compare the three compliance schemes with
respect to the compliance cost a producer incurs under each. We find that, as intuition
suggests, collective compliance with IFR is in general the most cost effective alternative
since it allows producers to exploit the economies of scale inherent in a collective system
as well as recoup the benefits of their environmentally-friendlier products. However,
the collective scheme with IFR is not easy to implement in practice because it requires
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sorting EOL products by brand and tracking them through the treatment process in
order to record the true cost of treatment. For that reason, individual scheme and
collective scheme with cost allocation by market share are the two prevalent forms of
compliance in practice. We find that which scheme (of these two) gives lower compliance
cost depends on the base collection rate maintained by the government and non-profits as
well as the market shares of partner firms. If the partner firms have large market shares
then collective compliance, in general, yields lower cost for a producer. The producer
not only benefits from economies of scale but also invests in increasing the treatability
level—and thus decreases the treatment cost—with no fear that the others will free-ride
on her investment. On the other hand, if the partner firms have small market shares, a
producer pays lower compliance cost under collective scheme only if the initial collection
rate maintained by the government is of moderate levels.
Our research has policy implications. We analyze how the choice of a particular com-
pliance scheme affects the success of legislation in terms of increasing the collection rate
and creating incentives for designing environmentally-friendlier products. One lever pol-
icymakers have in enacting legislation is to specify the compliance scheme producers are
allowed to follow. To that end, we find that collective scheme with IFR provides superior
environmental outcomes than the others, but as evidence from the implementation of
the WEEE Directive suggests, collective scheme with IFR is difficult to implement and
enforce. When we compare the individual scheme with the collective scheme with cost
allocation by market share, we find that, in general, the treatability level is higher in
the former and the collection rate is higher in the latter. However, if the government is
110
willing to maintain a moderate level of collection rate and incur the related cost, both
the collection rate and the treatability level may be higher under the collective scheme.
Hence, policymakers should think twice about shifting the cost of EOL products com-
pletely to producers. Another lever the policymakers have is the possibility of imposing
collection rate targets. We find that high collection rate targets cause producers to switch
to the collective scheme and result in lower treatability levels. Therefore, policymakers
need to be cognizant about the trade-off between the collection rates achieved and the
incentives producers have to increase the treatability levels of their products.
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CHAPTER 4
The Impact of Buyback Price
Commitment and Demand
Uncertainty on Channel Conflicts
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with product take-back motivated by the goal of managing distribution
channels better. When manufacturers distribute products through different channel in-
termediaries, channel competition may rise. Effectively managing the relationships with
and mediating the conflicts between intermediaries is of key importance to manufactur-
ers’ profitability. For that reason, a growing number of companies with dual distribution
channels, i.e. rental and sales channels, set up buyback programs, a form of product take-
back. For instance, U.S. automobile manufacturers sell their products through dealers
and rental agencies. Until the late 1980s, these two channels were separate: dealers were
franchised to sell products in the sales market and rental agencies to rent in the rental
market. Low sales in the consumer market prompted manufacturers to experiment with
new channel structures. Initially, they adopted an overlapping channel in which rental
agencies were allowed to sell used rental cars to consumers. This channel arrangement led
to a large number of slightly used rental cars entering the sales market and thus a com-
petition between rental agencies and dealers. Due to dealers’ strong opposition and even
law suits against the manufacturers, this channel strategy failed in action (Auto Rental
News, 1990). In order to mitigate the channel conflicts between the intermediaries, some
manufacturers launched buyback channel structure. Under buyback programs manufac-
turers sell the so-called program cars to rental agencies and then repurchase them at a
guaranteed price after a period of time in order to redistribute them through dealers.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the three channel structures in the U.S. automobile industry.
FIGURE 4.1: Three Channel Structures in the U.S. Automobile Industry
The evolvement of channel structures in the U.S. automobile industry shows that
when setting channel policies manufacturers have to take intermediaries’ profitability
into consideration in addition to their own. While buyback channel clearly avoids direct
competition between dealers and rental agencies, how valuable a buyback channel is in
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mediating channel conflicts seems to depend on the quality of used cars1 Highly durable
used cars increases the competition between new and used cars and thus the competition
between dealers and rental agencies in an overlapping channel structure. Durability
of used cars is often reflected in their residual value, or resale prices. However, price
depreciation of used cars can fluctuate significantly depending on different factors such
as the economy, gas price, or sales of new cars. For example, average resale prices of used
rental cars ranged from $10500 to $13000 in 2005 (Auto Rental News, 2006). Uncertainty
in the residual value of used cars is a source of demand uncertainty that affects the market
size of both new and used cars. In this chapter, we incorporate uncertainty in residual
value and explore how it affects buyback channel’s ability in mediating channel conflicts
and manufacturers’ channel policies.
While a buyback channel alleviates channel conflicts, it does not necessarily maximize
manufacturers’ profits. Their profitability depends on two characteristics of the buyback
program: (i) timing on the announcement of buyback prices; and (ii) quality standards
for the cars repurchased by manufacturers (also called turn-back standards). There are
two alternatives related to timing of setting the buyback price: buyback prices could be
committed by manufacturers at the time of the initial purchase or determined at the
time of repurchase. For example, Ford currently uses a fixed price depreciation rate in
their daily rental repurchase program, under which the buyback price is calculated using
projected rental time (https://www.fleet.ford.com). Using a fixed price depreciation rate
is equivalent to committing the buyback price at the time of initial purchase for a given
1Although our research applies to any durable good industry where rental and sales market coexist,
in the remainder of this chapter we refer to this durable good as car.
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length of usage. One of our main goals in this chapter is to identify how the timing
of price announcement in a buyback program impacts the profitability of manufacturers
and intermediaries.
In a buyback channel, manufacturers set turn-back standards on repurchased program
cars, i.e., used rental cars. To be eligible for repurchase, program cars need to meet
these turn-back standards which include regular maintenance service records, original
factory-installed equipments, completed warranty and recall repairs, etc. These turn-
back standards help to explain the evidences suggesting that program cars typically
have a lower depreciation rate and thus a higher resale price than used cars owned by
consumers (Purohit, 1997). Thus turn-back standards affect how much program cars
depreciate which in turn affect the intensity of competition between rental agencies and
dealers. In this chapter, we aim to understand how manufacturers can use turn-back
standards as an operational lever to mediate channel conflicts and to improve their own
profits.
Among other results, we find that the timing strategy on buyback prices affects not
only total channel profits but also the allocation of profits among the channel members.
Compared to setting it at the time of repurchase, as in (Purohit, 1997), early commitment
of the buyback price under no uncertainty always reduces total channel profit and the
manufacturer’s profit. Moreover, buyback price commitment leads to the lowest profit
for both the channel and the manufacturer among the three channel structures. This
is in stark contrast to the profit rankings under no price commitment with which a
buyback channel always dominates a separate channel in terms of total channel profits
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and the manufacturer’s profit. Even in the presence of residual value uncertainty, the
manufacturers’ profit is always the lowest in a buyback channel when the buyback price
is committed early.
Our results suggest that the timing policy on the buyback price can be used as a
profit lever for the manufacturer. Instead of committing it at the initial time of pur-
chase, the manufacturer can improve profits by setting the buyback price at the time of
repurchase. That brings up the question of why buyback price commitment is still being
implemented in practice by automobile manufacturers. Our main aim in this chapter is
not characterizing the most profitable channel structure for the manufacturer but ratio-
nalizing manufacturer’s decision in launching buyback channel with price commitment.
To this end, we explore different effects that rationalize the choice of price commitment
under buyback channel structure. First, our results suggest that commitment of buyback
price enhances a buyback channel’s ability in resolving channel conflicts in the presence
of residual value uncertainty. The dealer always achieves the highest profit under a buy-
back channel with price commitment. Buyback price commitment also improves the
rental agency’s profit when the depreciation rate differential between program cars and
used cars is sufficiently small. Moreover, in the presence of uncertainty the manufacturer
achieves higher total sales under buyback price commitment than that under no price
commitment. In contrast, in the absence of uncertainty, buyback price commitment al-
ways leads to the smallest total sales among the channel structures. With residual value
uncertainty, we find sufficiently different effects from those obtained with a deterministic
model thereby emphasizing the importance of taking uncertainty into account.
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While the buyback channel never maximizes the manufacturer’s profitability among
the three channel structures, our analysis shows that the manufacturer can use the turn-
back standard as an operational lever to improve profits. A higher turn-back standard
leads to lower depreciation of program cars relative to that of used cars. We show that
the manufacturer’s profit generally increases in the turn-back standard in the presence
of residual value uncertainty.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In §4.2 we review the relevant litera-
ture, in §4.3 we lay out the model. We analyze the impact of buyback price commitment
and turn-back standards on the performance of the three channel structures in §4.4 under
no uncertainty. In §4.5, we explore the same questions under residual value uncertainty.
We conclude in §4.6. All proofs are relegated to Appendix D1.
4.2 Related Literature
This chapter studies profitability of the buyback channel structure by connecting two
important streams of research in operations management literature: Channel competition
and resolution of channel conflicts in a durable good market. Prior academic research
falling in the intersection of these two research streams has been limited. The literature
on durable goods is vast but has primarily concerned a manufacturer’s decision on leasing
vs. selling, e.g. Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), Purohit and Staelin (1994), Purohit (1997),
Desai and Purohit (1999), Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2009).
Only a few papers study competition among intermediaries and its effects on manu-
facturers’ channel decisions. Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2009) study how product durability
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affects interactions between the manufacturer and dealers. They show that when the
competition is intense among dealers, the manufacturer prefers so-called lease brokering
arrangement, where the dealers earn a margin for brokering leases between manufacturer
and customers, instead of selling her product to dealers. Purohit and Staelin (1994),
on the other hand, study the three aforementioned channel structures, namely, separate,
overlapping, and buyback, focusing on the manufacturer maximizing profits through the
dealer channel in a setting where the rental market is fixed. They compare manufac-
turer’s total sales under each channel structure and conclude that total sales of new cars
are greatest under overlapping channel structure.
This chapter is closely related to Purohit (1997), who studies the three channel struc-
tures under no demand uncertainty. Purohit examines the form of buyback channel
structure where buyback price is determined in the second period, i.e. buyback with no
price commitment, and finds that a buyback channel serves to mediate channel conflicts
between dealers and rental agencies. In this chapter, by incorporating uncertainty in
the residual value of used cars, buyback price commitment, and turn-back standards,
we introduce important operational elements into channel management. Our main con-
tribution is showing how residual value uncertainty and an operational policy such as
turn-back standard affect attractiveness of a buyback program and channel competition
Although most papers in the literature on durable goods do not consider uncertainty,
a notable exception is Desai et al. (2007), who study the role of demand uncertainty in a
manufacturer’s production and marketing decisions on a durable product. However, their
paper does not consider intermediaries and channel interactions. In contrast, we focus
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on how uncertainty in the residual value of used products affects channel competition
and a manufacturer’s channel policies.
4.3 The Model
We consider a monopolist manufacturer who makes a durable good and distributes it
to consumers through a dealer and a rental agency. The durable good lasts for two
periods. Although our analysis applies to any durable-good industry where rental and
sales market coexist, we will refer to this durable good as car. There are three types of
cars: new, program, and used cars. Program cars refer to those used rental cars while
used cars refer to those used ones owned by consumers. In the first period only new cars
are available in the market, whereas in the second period new, program, and used cars
might coexist.
Consumers are heterogenous and their valuation for a new car in each period is
represented by φ = [0, 1] where φ is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. The total
mass of consumers is normalized to 1. We use subscript n, p and u to stand for new,
program and used cars, respectively. As discussed in §4.1, program cars owned by the
rental agency depreciate less than used cars owned by consumers. Thus 0 ≤ θp ≤ θu ≤ 1
where θi is the depreciation rate of type i car, i ∈ {p, u}. Without loss of generality we
assume that θp = γθu where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Consumer valuation for program (used) cars is
v = (1− γθu)φ (v = (1− θu)φ). When a consumer with valuation v purchases a car, his
utility is v− p where p is the price. In any period each consumer purchases a car, if any,
that provides him with the highest nonnegative utility.
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For the remainder of this chapter, we use subscript M , D, R, and SC to denote
manufacturer, dealer, rental agency, and supply chain, respectively. In addition we will
use superscript S, O, BC, and BN to denote separate, overlapping, buyback with price
commitment, and buyback with no price commitment, respectively.
Notations.
qij : quantities in the sales market in period i for j ∈ n, p, u type of car
pij : prices in period i for j ∈ n, p, u type of car
q¯ij : rental quantities in period i for j ∈ n, p type of car
p¯ij : rental prices in period i for j ∈ n, p type of car
qD2p : quantity of program cars that the dealer purchases from the manufacturer in a
buyback channel in the second period
qR2p : quantity of program cars that the rental agency sells back to the manufacturer
in a buyback channel in the second period
wi : wholesale price for new cars charged to the dealer in period i
w¯i : wholesale price for new cars charged to the rental agency in period i
wb : buyback price for program cars
wp : wholesale price for program cars charged to the dealer (only relevant in period
2)
Πlij : the total profit to go for j ∈ {M,D,R, SC} in period i under channel structure
l ∈ {S,O,BC,BN}. We assume Πl3j = 0, i.e., the terminal value at the end of period 2
is zero.
The inverse demand functions can be derived from solving a consumer’s purchasing
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decision in the two periods and are listed as follows (For derivations interested reader
might see Purohit (1997)).
p1n = p2u + (1− q1n),
p2n = p2p + γθu(1− q2n),
p2p = p2u + (1− γ)θu(1− q2n − q2p),
p2u = (1− θu)(1− q2n − q2p − q2u),
p¯1n = 1− q¯1n,
p¯2n = p¯2n + γθu(1− q¯2n),
p¯2p = (1− γθu)(1− q¯2n − q¯2p).
We first solve the problem with no uncertainty. Then in §4.5 we introduce uncertainty
by assuming that θu, the rate at which consumer valuation of used cars depreciates, is
distributed uniformly between a and b where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. We assume that the un-
certainty is resolved at the beginning of the second period before all price and quantity
decisions. Because depreciation reduces consumer valuation of used cars, random real-
izations of θu capture demand uncertainty, specifically uncertainty in the allocation of
demand between new and used cars. Since θp = γθu uncertainty exits not only in the
depreciation of used cars but also in the depreciation of program cars. We use uncer-
tainty in the depreciation rates to capture the fact that the residual value of used cars is
stochastic and to introduce the mixed demand uncertainty for new, program, and used
cars. Our model, however, does not capture uncertainty in total market demand, and
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thus holds the maximum demand size to be constant at 1. Because the competition be-
tween new, program, and used cars is the main source of channel conflicts, incorporating
the mixed demand uncertainty enables our model to focus on the impact of uncertainty
on channel competition.
4.3.1 Channel Structures
We first describe the common features of the three channel structures. Regardless of the
channel structure, the manufacturer maximizes her profit in each period by choosing the
optimal wholesale prices. We assume that the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader
and the intermediaries compete on quantities. Therefore based on the wholesale prices
announced by the manufacturer, the intermediaries maximize their individual profits by
choosing the optimal quantities. We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium using
backward induction.
The two-period competition between intermediaries is formulated as a Cournot model
as is commonly used in the literature, e.g. Purohit (1997). While price competition is
appropriate where capacity and production quantity can be adjusted easily (e.g. informa-
tion goods), quantity competition is appropriate in modeling capital-intensive industries
where production capacity is relatively fixed. For durable goods, manufacturing facil-
ity is expensive and can be adjusted only after considerable lead time. Thus modeling
quantities as the decision variables of intermediaries is a reasonable approach. Next we
describe each channel structure in detail.
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Separate Channel
Under a separate channel, the dealer is franchised to sell cars in the sales market and the
rental agency to rent in the rental market. Therefore, in period i the dealer maximizes
his profit ΠSiD = qin(pin−wi)+ΠS(i+1)D by choosing how many new cars to sell in the sales
market (qin) while the rental agency maximizes his profit Π
S
iR = q¯in(p¯in − w¯i) + ΠS(i+1)R
by choosing how many rental cars to rent in the rental market (q¯in). The manufacturer
maximizes her profit ΠSiM = (q
∗
inwi + q¯
∗
inw¯i) +Π
S
(i+1)M by choosing the optimal wholesale
prices (wi, w¯i) in period i given the intermediaries’ optimal quantity decisions. Here note
all rental cars bought in period 1 remain in the rental market, and thus, are rented again
in period 2, i.e. q¯2p = q¯1n.
Overlapping Channel
Under an overlapping channel, the rental agency is allowed to sell some of the used rental
cars in the sales market in period 2. Therefore, the profit maximization problem for each
channel member in each period is the same as the one under the separate channel with
the exception of the rental agency’s second period problem. In period 2, the rental agency
maximizes his profit ΠO2R = q¯2pp¯2p+ q¯2n(p¯2n−w¯2)+q2pp2p by choosing how many program
cars to sell in the sales market (q2p) as well as how many rental cars to rent in the rental
market (q¯2n). Here note that in period 2 the rental agency rents the remaining used
rental cars after selling some in the sales market, i.e. q¯2p = q¯1n − q2p.
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Buyback Channel with Price Commitment
Under a buyback channel with price commitment, the manufacturer repurchases a cer-
tain number of used rental cars from the rental agency at a guaranteed price and sells
them through the dealer in the sales market. Therefore, in the second period the dealer
maximizes his profit, ΠBC2D = q2n(p2n−w2)+qD2p(p2p−wp) by choosing quantities (q2n, qD2p)
whereas the rental agency maximizes his profit ΠB2R = q¯2pp¯2p + q¯2n(p¯2n − w¯2) + qR2pwb by
choosing quantities (q¯2n, q
R
2p). Here note that the rental agency rents out the remaining
program cars after selling qR2p units back to the manufacturer, i.e. q¯2p = q¯1n − qR2p.
We assume that all program cars repurchased from the rental agency are sold to
the dealer, i.e., the manufacturer does not withhold any program cars. Therefore the
wholesale price for the program cars charged to the dealer, wp, comes from the market
equilibrium where (qD2p)
∗ = (qR2p)
∗. The manufacturer maximizes her profit ΠBC2M = q
∗
2nw2+
q¯∗2nw¯2 + (q
D
2p)
∗
w∗p − (qR2p)∗wb by choosing wholesale prices (w2, w¯2).
The formulation of the first period problem for the intermediaries is identical to
the one under the separate channel. The manufacturer, however, maximizes her profit
ΠBC1M = Π
BC
2M + q¯
∗
1n(w¯1, w1, wb) w¯1+ q
∗
1n(w¯1, w1, wb)w1 by choosing the buyback price wb in
addition to the wholesale prices in the first period (w¯1, w1).
Buyback Channel with no Price Commitment
Under a buyback channel without price commitment, the manufacturer repurchases a
certain number of used rental cars from the rental agency and sells them through the
dealer in the sales market. Here, the buyback price is not committed at the time of
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initial purchase but rather determined through market equilibrium in the second pe-
riod. Therefore the intermediaries’ problems are identical to those provided in §4.3.1.
However, the buyback price for program cars paid to the rental agency, wb, comes from
the equilibrium where (qD2p)
∗ = (qR2p)
∗. The manufacturer, in the second period, maxi-
mizes her profit ΠBN2M = q
∗
2nw2+ q¯
∗
2nw¯2+ (q
D
2p)
∗
wp− (qR2p)∗w∗b by choosing wholesale prices
(w2, w¯2) as well as the wholesale price charged to the dealer wp. In the first period,
the manufacturer does not commit to a buyback price and thus maximizes her profit
ΠBN1M = q¯
∗
1n(w¯1, w1) w¯1+q
∗
1n(w¯1, w1)w1+Π
BN
2M by choosing wholesale prices (w¯1, w1) alone.
This channel structure is identical to the buyback channel in Purohit (1997).
4.4 Channel Behavior Under No Uncertainty
In this section, we compare the profitability of different channel structures under no resid-
ual value uncertainty. This allows us to isolate the effect of buyback price commitment.
We are able to derive closed-form solutions for all equilibrium prices and quantities
but the solutions are very complicated functions of θu and γ. As our focus is on profit
comparisons, the equilibrium solutions are omitted here. When comparing the profits, we
conduct numerical analysis by scanning the feasible regions of θu and γ. Given that both
parameters have bounded support [0, 1], our numerical study is designed to cover the
entire parameter space and thus is comprehensive. All proofs are relegated to Appendix
D1.
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4.4.1 Impact of Buyback Price Commitment on Profitability
We compare the profitability of the channel structures and the results are as follows.
Proposition 22 The profit rankings under no uncertainty are:
i) (Manufacturer) ΠO1M ≥ ΠBN1M ≥ ΠS1M ≥ ΠBC1M .
ii) (Rental Agency) Depending on the value of γ, the profit rankings are:
1. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥ ΠBC1R if and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯1(θu) where γ¯1(θu) is a decreasing
function of θu. There exists a θ¯u such that γ¯1(θu) = 1 if and only if θu ≤ θ¯u.
2. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R if and only if γ¯1(θu) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯2(θu) where γ¯2(θu) is a
convex function of θu. There exists a θ¯u such that γ¯2(θu) = 1 if and only if θu ≤ θ¯u.
3. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R, otherwise.
iii) (Dealer) Depending on the value of γ the profit rankings are:
1. ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯1(θu) where γ¯1(θu) is an
increasing function of θu. There exits a θ˜u such that γ¯1(θu) = 0 if and only if
θu ≤ θ˜u.
2. ΠBC1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if γ¯1(θu) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯2(θu) where γ¯2(θu) is an
increasing function of θu. There exits a
˜˜θu ≤ θ˜u such that γ¯2(θu) = 0 if and only if
θu ≤ ˜˜θu.
3. ΠS1D ≥ ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if γ¯2(θu) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯3(θu) where γ¯3(θu) is an
increasing function of θu.
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4. ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠBC1D ≥ ΠO1D, otherwise.
iv) (Supply Chain) ΠO1SC ≥ ΠBN1SC ≥ ΠS1SC ≥ ΠBC1SC .
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FIGURE 4.2: Three regions from left to right are (i) ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥ ΠBC1R , (ii) ΠBN1R ≥
ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R, (iii) ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R
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FIGURE 4.3: Four regions from left to right are (i) ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠBC1D , (ii) ΠS1D ≥
ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D , (iii)ΠBC1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D , (iv) ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠS1D
First, we identify the most and the least profitable channel structures. Proposition
22 shows that the overlapping channel is the most profitable one for the supply chain,
the manufacturer, and the rental agency but is the least profitable one for the dealer.
The other profit rankings depend on the values of γ and θu. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show the
regions for the various cases described in Proposition 22.
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The buyback channel, regardless of when the buyback price is set, can improve the
dealer’s profit at the expense of the rental agency’s profit. This result is consistent
with the findings of Purohit (1997) in terms of a buyback channel’s ability to mediate
the conflicts introduced by an overlapping channel. (Note that the buyback channel in
Purohit (1997) is equivalent to our buyback channel with no price commitment, i.e., BN)
The result is intuitive as a buyback channel avoids direct competition between the dealer
and the rental agency that exists in an overlapping channel and benefits the dealer.
Second, Proposition 22 demonstrates that the attractiveness of a buyback channel
for each party critically depends on whether the buyback price is committed at the time
of initial purchase of new rental cars, i.e., in period 1. For sufficiently small γ, i.e.,
min {γ¯1(θu), γ¯2(θu)} , price commitment makes the buyback channel the most profitable
one for the dealer but the least profitable one for the rental agency. In other words, when
program cars depreciate much less than used cars, buyback price commitment benefits the
dealer but hurts the rental agency. The intuition is as follows. The inclusion of slightly
depreciated program cars in period 2 intensifies the competition between new cars and
program cars, i.e., the competition between the two intermediaries. Early announcement
of the buyback price by the manufacturer allows the dealer to better gauge the rental
agency’s decision on the number of program cars returning to the manufacturer and to
be able to better adjust his quantity decision on new cars in both periods. Therefore,
when channel competition is most intense between the intermediaries, early commitment
of buyback price allows the manufacturer to shift channel profits to the dealer.
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Third, Proposition 22 shows that for the manufacturer the buyback channel with
price commitment is the least profitable one and thus is dominated by the separate
channel. If, however, the buyback price is set in period 2, the buyback channel then
always dominates the separate channel in terms of the manufacturer’s profit, as shown
by Purohit (1997). Our results suggest that by committing the buyback price early, the
manufacturer gives the intermediaries a strategic advantage to adjust their first-period
order quantities, which ends up hurting the manufacturer’s profit.
It is important to understand why a buyback channel with price commitment gives the
lowest profit for the manufacturer. At first glance, one would think that the manufacturer
can always set a buyback price such that no program cars is returned by the rental
agency in period 2, thus mimic the separate channel equilibrium. While this is true if
the buyback price is set in period 2 according to the market clearing price such that
the intermediaries choose (qD2p)
∗ = (qR2p)
∗ = 0, which is indeed the case for BN , it is not
true when the manufacturer commits the buyback price in period 1. Let us denote the
committed buyback price that would make the intermediaries choose (qD2p)
∗ = (qR2p)
∗ = 0
as wzerob . Assume the manufacturer chooses w
zero
b instead of the optimal wb in period 1.
The separate channel equilibrium cannot be mimicked because
1. If the manufacturer chooses to optimize the wholesale prices in period 1, then the
optimal wholesale prices are smaller than those under the separate channel while
the first period new car sales are higher and rental car sales are lower.
2. If the manufacturer does not optimize the first period wholesale prices but chooses
the optimal separate channel wholesale prices, i.e. (w¯S1 , w
S
1 , w
zero
b ), then again
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the dealer orders more and the rental agency orders less compared to the op-
timal quantities under the separate channel, i.e. qB1n(w¯
S
1 , w
S
1 , w
zero
b ) ≥ qS1n and
q¯B1n(w¯
S
1 , w
S
1 , w
zero
b ) ≤ q¯S1n.
We conclude that once the manufacturer commits a buyback price, regardless of
how the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices in the first period, the rental agency
orders less than the optimal order quantity than he would under the separate channel.
We can easily show that the wholesale price for rental cars in the second period w¯2
increases as q1n and/or q¯1n increase under the buyback channel with price commitment,
while it decreases as q¯1n increases under the separate channel. Hence, if the rental
agency increases his first period order quantity under the buyback channel with price
commitment, the manufacturer punishes him in the second period by increasing the
wholesale price. Knowing that he would face a higher w¯2, the rental agency orders less
in the first period, namely keeps q¯1n low compared to that under the separate channel.
In summary, price commitment changes the channel interactions.
Proposition 22 identifies the difference between the two versions of the buyback chan-
nel (i.e., BC and BN): price commitment leads to the worst profit while no price com-
mitment leads to the second best for the manufacturer. The difference is a result of how
the wholesale prices in period 1 and the buyback price are related. When the buyback
price is determined in period 2, i.e., in the case of BN , it does not affect the wholesale
prices and quantities in period 1 but rather it is a function of first-period decisions. As
the wholesale prices in period 1 increase, the number of used cars in period 2 decreases
and thus program cars face less competition from used cars and become more valuable.
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This explains why in the buyback channel with no price commitment, as the wholesale
prices increase in period 1 the buyback price in period 2 increases as well. In the buyback
channel with price commitment, however, the relationship between the buyback price and
the first period wholesale prices is different as shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 23 ΠBC1M is submodular in (wb, w1) and supermodular in (wb, w¯1).
Proposition 23 implies that a higher w∗b implies a higher w¯
∗
1 but a lower w
∗
1. This
suggests that as the manufacturer charges more for new cars, i.e., as the wholesale price
of new cars increases, her incentive to make profit by buying and reselling program cars in
period 2 decreases and so does the buyback price. To further understand why this occurs
under price commitment, we compare the wholesale prices and the profit breakdowns of
the manufacturer under the two versions of the buyback channel in Table 4.1 and Table
4.2, respectively. Note that the only place the manufacturer makes more profit under BC
is from the rental car sales in period 2. Table 4.1 also suggests that price commitment
may hurt the rental agency’s profit by increasing the wholesale price of rental cars in the
second period w¯2, as we discussed earlier. In contrast, price commitment may improve
the dealer’s profit by lowering wp, i.e., the price charged to the dealer for the program
cars.
w1 w¯1 w2 w¯2 wb wp
BN +/- + +
BC + + +
TABLE 4.1: Comparison of wholesale prices under the buyback channel with no price
commitment (BN) and the buyback channel with price commitment (BC).
We have seen how price commitment impacts profitability. It is not ex ante clear how
it would affect the manufacturer’s total sales. Let Q =
∑2
i=1(qin + q¯in) denote the total
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Manufacturer’s Profit
New Cars in
Period 1
Rental Cars
in Period 1
New Cars in
Period 2
Rental Cars
in Period 2
Buyback
Program
BN + +/- + +
BC +
TABLE 4.2: Comparison of profits under the buyback channel with no price commitment
(BN) and the buyback channel with price commitment (BC).
new car sales in both periods.
Proposition 24 The total sales ranking is QO ≥ QBN ≥ QS ≥ QBC .
Proposition 24 suggests that the total sales ranking is consistent with the ranking of
the manufacturer’s profits. In other words, under no uncertainty, larger sales leads to
higher profits for the manufacturer.
In summary, buyback price commitment may shift channel profits from the man-
ufacturer and the rental agency to the dealer. The shift of profit is most significant
when program cars depreciate much less than used cars, i.e., when channel competition
is potentially most severe. Therefore, the manufacturer can use the timing strategy on
buyback price as a lever to redistribute channel profits and to alleviate channel conflicts
caused by competition between program cars and new cars in the sales market.
4.4.2 Channel Conflict Resolution
We have shown how buyback price commitment may shift profits from the rental agency
to the dealer when channel competition is intense. How would this affect a buyback
channel’s ability to resolve channel conflicts? To answer this question, it is useful to
define a measure for channel conflicts and a measure for conflict resolution. Because
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there is no competition between the intermediaries under the separate channel, we use
it as the benchmark channel structure under which there is no channel conflicts. Let
δj = Π
O
1j − ΠS1j for j ∈ {D,R}. Note that δD ≤ 0 while δR ≥ 0 for every θu and γ
as suggested by Proposition 22, which indicates channel conflicts always exist under the
overlapping channel.
To measure a buyback channel’s ability to resolve channel conflicts, we define ∆lj =
Πl1j − ΠS1j for j ∈ {D,R} and l ∈ {BC,BN}. If both ∆lD ≥ 0 and ∆lR ≥ 0 then we say
that channel conflict is resolved by channel structure l. Although we have chosen the
separate channel as the benchmark for no channel conflict for the rest of our analysis,
one might set the standard for conflict resolution differently by requiring ∆lD ≥ x and
∆lR ≥ y where x and y are positive or negative constants. The choices of x and y reflect
how the manufacturer would like to allocate channel profits between the intermediaries.
The choices of x and y will lead to larger or smaller feasible regions for resolving channel
conflicts in the parameter space of θu and γ.
Using the definition of channel conflict and conflict resolution, we first analyze how
well the channel conflict is resolved by a buyback channel without price commitment.
From Proposition 22 we know that for the rental agency this channel structure is always
more profitable than the separate channel, i.e. ∆BNR ≥ 0 for all θu and γ. Therefore
the channel conflict between the two intermediaries is resolved as long as the buyback
channel is more profitable than the separate channel for the dealer, i.e. ∆BND ≥ 0.
Proposition 25 Channel conflict is resolved in a buyback channel with no price commit-
ment, i.e. both ∆BND ≥ 0 and ∆BNR ≥ 0, if and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γBNUB (θu) where γBNUB (θu)
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is an increasing function of θu. Moreover, γ
BN
UB (θu) = 0 if and only if θu ≤ 0.783.
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FIGURE 4.4: Shaded region shows the area where channel conflict is resolved under no
price commitment, i.e. both ∆BNR ≥ 0 and ∆BND ≥ 0.
Although this result has been demonstrated in Purohit (1997) (see Figure 4 in his
paper), we also formalize it here for the purpose of comparing the two versions of the
buyback channel. From Proposition 25 and Figure 4.4, we conclude that channel conflict
is resolved under no price commitment if the depreciation rate for used cars is sufficiently
high, i.e. θu ≥ 0.783. Moreover, if program cars depreciate similarly as used cars, i.e. γ
is high, then channel conflict is resolved only if used car depreciation is remarkably high.
For example if γ = 0.85 then channel resolution is achieved only for θu ≥ 0.95. Therefore
the buyback channel with no price commitment provides a means for channel resolution
only for cars with very high depreciation rates. For cars with lower depreciation rates,
the separate channel is more profitable for the dealer and thus the buyback channel with
price commitment cannot solve channel conflict according to our definition.
Now the question is how committing buyback price early would impact a buyback
channel’s ability to solve channel conflicts. To answer this question we first characterize
the region where the buyback channel with price commitment resolves the channel conflict
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between the intermediaries, as shown in Proposition 26.
Proposition 26 In a buyback channel with price commitment, if θu < 0.7785 then the
channel conflict is not resolved regardless of γ. Otherwise, the conflict is resolved, i.e.
both ∆BCD ≥ 0 and ∆BCR ≥ 0, if and only if γBCLB (θu) ≤ γ ≤ γBCUB (θu) where γBCLB (θu) is
decreasing in θu and γ
BC
UB (θu) is increasing in θu. In addition γ
BC
LB (θu = 1) = 0.5997 and
thus channel conflict is never resolved if γ ≤ 0.5997.
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FIGURE 4.5: Shaded region shows where (a) ∆BCR ≥ 0 (b) ∆BCD ≥ 0 (c) both ∆BCR ≥ 0
and ∆BCD ≥ 0.
From Proposition 26 and Figure 4.5 we conclude that the buyback channel with price
commitment actually provides a middle ground for both intermediaries as long as θu
is sufficiently large and γ is in an appropriate interval. More specifically, we show that
channel conflict is never resolved if θu ≤ 0.7785 or γ ≤ 0.5997. Note that ∆BCR = 0 on the
lower bound γBCLB (θu), whereas ∆
BC
D = 0 on the upper bound γ
BC
UB (θu). Comparing Figure
4.5 (b) with Figure 4.4, we see that the dealer gains in profit in the buyback channel for a
much larger region under price commitment than under no price commitment. However,
Figure 4.5 (a) shows that the rental agency may become worse off in the buyback channel
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with price commitment when both θu and γ are sufficiently large (i.e., the white region
in the lower left corner of the figure). Recall that, on the contrary the rental agency
always has higher profit under a buyback channel with no price commitment than under
the separate channel.
The differences in the shaded regions of Figure 4.4 and 4.5 point out the impact of
price commitment on a buyback channel’s ability to resolve channel conflicts. Commit-
ting buyback price early shifts channel profits from the rental agency to the dealer and
improves the manufacturer’s ability to resolve channel conflicts when program cars depre-
ciate much less than used cars. Our results show that if γ is high then price commitment
solves the channel conflict for a wider range of θu. On the other hand, γ is low then no
price commitment solves the channel conflict for a wider range of θu.
4.4.3 Turn-Back Standard as a Profit Lever
The last two propositions show that a buyback channel’s ability in resolving channel con-
flicts highly depends on the depreciation characteristics of the products, i.e. θu and γ. As
lower γ implies smaller depreciation of program cars in comparison to the depreciation of
used cars, the manufacturer can influence γ by changing turn-back standards on repur-
chased cars. To be eligible for repurchase, program cars need to meet certain turn-back
standards such as regular maintenance service records, completed warranty and recall
repairs, etc. Note that, higher turn-back standards might mean more criteria or higher
levels of a set of criteria. Therefore if the manufacturer requires high turn-back standards
then γ is low, i.e. program cars have a lower depreciation rate compared to used cars. Our
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following analysis demonstrates how the manufacturer’s profitability depends on γ and
suggests that the manufacturer can use turn-back standard as a lever to improve profits.
Although a manufacturer cannot fully control γ through turn-back standards alone, in
the following discussion we use γ interchangeably with turn-back standards. Still, our
results continue to hold if γ is a decreasing linear function of turn-back standards.
Although the buyback channel structure is never the most profitable one for the
manufacturer, by setting turn-back standards optimally the manufacturer might increase
her profit under a buyback channel. First, we consider the buyback channel with no
price commitment and characterize γ∗ that would give highest manufacturer profit while
solving the channel conflicts. We answer this question by solving problem (P1). We
first characterize the behavior of the manufacturer’s profit with respect to depreciation
differential γ in Proposition 27.
(P1) Max0≤γ≤1 Π
BN
1M (γ, θu)
s.t. ∆BNR (γ, θu) ≥ 0
∆BND (γ, θu) ≥ 0
Proposition 27 In a buyback channel with no price commitment, the manufacturer’s
profit function ΠBN1M is convex in γ. In addition, if θu ≤ 0.690 then ΠBN1M is strictly
decreasing in γ.
Since Proposition 27 shows the convexity of the manufacturer’s objective function
in γ, we can easily characterize the solution of the unconstrained profit maximization
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problem,Max0≤γ≤1Π
BN
1M (γ, θu) and then find the maximum profit is obtained at γ
∗(θu) =
0 ∀θu. Therefore, if the manufacturer is not bound by the constraint of solving channel
conflicts then she should set turn-back standards as high as possible. However, if she is,
Proposition 28 provides the characterization of the optimal solution for (P1).
Proposition 28 If θu ≤ 0.783 then problem (P1) has no feasible solution. Otherwise,
the optimal γ that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit under no price commitment while
solving channel conflicts is γ∗(θu) = 0, for ∀θu.
With Proposition 28 we show that optimal γ∗(θu) = 0. Therefore, whether the
manufacturer is constrained by solving channel conflicts or not, she should set turn-back
standards as high as possible. However, she should also keep in mind that if θu is low,
i.e. θu ≤ 0.79, then setting turn-back standards alone would not be sufficient for solving
channel conflicts.
Similarly, the manufacturer can use turn-back standards as a profit lever in a buy-
back channel with price commitment. Again, we first characterize the behavior of the
manufacturer’s profit function with respect to θu and γ.
Proposition 29 The manufacturer’s profit under price commitment ΠBC1M is a convex
function of γ. Besides, if θu ≤ 0.608 then ΠBC1M is a decreasing function of γ.
Proposition 29 implies that the manufacturer should keep γ as small as possible if
θu ≤ 0.608. On the other hand if θu is greater than 0.608 the manufacturer should choose
either the smallest or the highest possible γ whichever provides the highest profit. After
characterizing the behavior of manufacturer’s profit, now it is straightforward to solve the
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unconstrained profit maximization problem, Max0≤γ≤1Π
BC
1M (γ, θu), for the manufacturer.
Again we can show that the maximum profit is obtained at γ∗(θu) = 0 ∀θu. As in the case
of no price commitment, if the manufacturer were not to consider the channel conflicts
under price commitment then she would set the turn-back standards as high as possible.
However she is. Thus, we next solve problem (P2) and provide the characterization of
the optimal solution in Proposition 30.
(P2) Max0≤γ≤1 Π
BC
1M (γ, θu)
s.t. ∆BCR (γ, θu) ≥ 0
∆BCD (γ, θu) ≥ 0
g
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FIGURE 4.6: Optimal γ∗ that solves the channel conflicts is depicted in black dots
Proposition 30 If θu < 0.778 the problem (P2) has no feasible solution. Otherwise
the optimal γ for problem (P2) is as follows: (i) If 0.778 ≤ θu ≤ 0.825 then choose
γ∗(θu) = γ
BC
LB (θu), (ii) otherwise, choose γ
∗(θu) = γ
BC
UB (θu) (see Figure 4.6).
First Proposition 30 shows that the channel conflict can never be resolved if θu <
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0.778. Second, if 0.778 ≤ θu ≤ 0.825 the optimal policy for the manufacturer is setting
the turn-back standards as high as possible, i.e. keeping γ as small as possible. Figure 4.6
shows that for this case γ∗(θu) is identified by the condition where ∆
BC
R = 0 (recall the
two shaded regions from Figure 4.5.) Hence, for moderate values of θu, the manufacturer
chooses γ∗ so that the rental agency makes the same profit as he would make under the
separate channel while the dealer makes more profit than he would under the separate
channel.
Finally, if θu ≥ 0.825 the optimal policy is to set turn-back standards as low as
possible, i.e. γ∗(θu) as high as possible. Figure 4.6 shows that for this case γ
∗(θu) is
identified by the condition where ∆BCD = 0. Thus, when θu is high, it is optimal to set
turn-back standards low so that the dealer makes as much profit as he would make under
the separate channel while the rental agency makes more profit than he would under the
separate channel.
In conclusion, when using a buyback channel to mediate channel conflicts, the manu-
facturer prefers high turn-back standards (i.e., low γ) when the depreciation of used cars
is not too high. This is because high turn-back standards reduce the depreciation rate of
program cars and thus alleviates the competition between used and program cars. This
avoids a sharp decrease in the prices of cars in the used market and in turn helps keep
new car prices high in both periods.
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4.5 Channel Behavior under Uncertainty
In this section we compare the performance of the channel structures under residual
value uncertainty. The way we model residual value uncertainty is by assuming that θu
is distributed uniformly over the region [a, b] where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. The uncertainty is
resolved at the beginning of the second period. Accordingly the second period problem
formulations remain the same as the case of no uncertainty. In the first period, on the
other hand, we maximize the expected profit to go Eθu
[
Πl1j
]
for player j ∈ {M,D,R}
under channel structure l ∈ {S,O,BN,BC}. We first analyze a special case where the
support of θu is [0, 1] and later relax the assumption.
4.5.1 Impact of Buyback Price Commitment on Profitability
Proposition 31 compares the profitability of the channel structures under uncertainty.
Proposition 31 If θu ∼ U [0, 1] then the profit rankings are:
i) (Manufacturer) ΠO1M ≥ ΠBN1M ≥ ΠS1M ≥ ΠBC1M .
ii) (Rental Agency) Depending on the value of γ, the profit rankings are as follows:
1. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥ ΠBC1R if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.549.
2. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R if 0.549 ≤ γ ≤ 0.572.
3. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R if 0.572 ≤ γ ≤ 0.765.
4. ΠBC1R ≥ ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R, otherwise.
iii) (Dealer) ΠBC1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠO1D.
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iv) (Supply Chain) Depending on the value of γ, the profit rankings are as follows:
1. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥ ΠBC1R if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.962.
2. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R if 0.962 ≤ γ ≤ 0.964.
3. ΠO1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R, otherwise.
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FIGURE 4.7: Profit rankings of (a) the manufacturer, (b) the dealer, (c) the rental
agency, and (d) the supply chain when θu ∼ U [0, 1]
First we identify if and how uncertainty affects the relative profitability of channel
structures. Figure 4.7 illustrates the results stated in Proposition 31. As in the case of
no uncertainty, the overlapping channel is the most profitable one for the supply chain
and the manufacturer. However, the rental agency’s profitability in the overlapping
channel decreases under uncertainty. When program cars depreciate similarly as used
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cars, i.e. when γ is high, the buyback channel with price commitment becomes the
most profitable one for the rental agency. Price commitment under uncertainty improves
profits not only for the rental agency but also for the dealer and the supply chain. Even
though the separate channel might be the most profitable one for the dealer for sufficiently
high γ under no uncertainty, the buyback channel with price commitment is always the
most profitable one for the dealer under uncertainty regardless of γ. The manufacturer,
however, still makes the least profit under the buyback channel with price commitment.
Note that under price commitment as γ increases channel profits get transferred from
the manufacturer to the rental agency. For higher γ values, i.e., when program cars
depreciate similarly as used cars, by committing to a buyback price early the manufac-
turer bears the residual value risk and thus improves the rental agency’s profit. Next we
compare total sales across the channel structures.
Proposition 32 Under residual value uncertainty, the rankings of total sales are as
follows:
1. QO ≥ QBN ≥ QS ≥ QBC if and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.915.
2. QO ≥ QBN ≥ QBC ≥ QS if and only if 0.915 ≤ γ ≤ 0.918
3. QO ≥ QBC ≥ QBN ≥ QS, otherwise.
Proposition 32 suggests that uncertainty increases the attractiveness of price commit-
ment in terms of total sales. When γ is sufficiently high, the buyback channel with price
commitment can achieve the second highest total sales. This is in stark contrast to the
ranking under no uncertainty where the buyback channel with price commitment always
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FIGURE 4.8: Total sales achieved under various distribution channel structures
gives the lowest total sales. Total sales is crucial as auto manufacturers are struggling
with the problem of excess capacity and are still constrained to keep their factories open.
Hence the widespread strategy in the auto industry has been keeping their plants running
even if the profits are not high (Henry (2008)). Our result suggests that manufacturers’
preference for the buyback channel with price commitment might also be motivated by
keeping sales high in the face of uncertainty.
4.5.2 Channel Conflict Resolution
Even though the overlapping channel is not always the most profitable one for the rental
agency, it still introduces channel conflicts under uncertainty by Proposition 31. Under
no uncertainty we know that a buyback channel, regardless of the timing of buyback price
announcement, can be used to mediate channel conflicts. Therefore the next question is,
how does uncertainty affect a buyback channel’s ability in resolving channel conflicts?
Proposition 33 Suppose θu ∼ U [0, 1]. The buyback channel with no price commitment
cannot solve the channel conflict. The buyback channel with price commitment solves the
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channel conflict if and only if 0.5485 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Proposition 33 shows that if the buyback price is not committed early then uncertainty
reduces a buyback channel’s ability in solving channel conflicts. However, if the buyback
price is committed early then the channel conflict may be resolved when program cars’
depreciation rate is not much less than used cars’, i.e. γ ≥ 0.5485. This result is also
illustrated in Figure 4.9. Note that in the case of no uncertainty channel conflicts can be
resolved using a buyback channel with price commitment only if γ ≥ 0.5997 and θu is in
the appropriate interval. In comparison, uncertainty enlarges the feasible region of γ for
conflict resolution. In other words, uncertainty enhances a buyback channel’s ability in
conflict resolution when the buyback price is committed.
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FIGURE 4.9: (a)Channel conflicts in the overlapping channel (b) No resolution is
achieved by the buyback channel without price commitment (c) Conflict resolution under
the buyback channel with price commitment when γ ≥ 0.5485
4.5.3 Turn-Back Standard as a Profit Lever
As we discussed earlier, turn-back standards can be used as a lever to improve profits. We
now explore this effect under uncertainty. On the one hand, the manufacturer’s profit is
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monotone decreasing in γ as shown in Figure 4.7(a). On the other hand, channel conflicts
cannot be resolved unless γ is sufficiently high as shown in Figure 4.9 (c). Therefore
the manufacturer has to set γ appropriately considering the trade-off between resolving
channel conflicts and maximizing her profit. Taken together, it is straightforward to see
that for θu ∼ U [0, 1] the optimal γ∗ = 0.5485.
Next we relax our assumption on the distribution of θu by considering a series of
uniform distributions with different mean and range values. We consider nine mean
values ∈ {0.1, 0.2, .., 0.9} and various ranges that are obtained by 0.2 increments. Hence
our experimental setting roughly spans all possible uniform distributions for θu bounded
between 0 and 1. The results are presented in Table 4.3. Note that if no γ value can
resolve channel conflicts for that a particular mean and range combination it is shown
with “−”. For the feasible ones, we provide the lower and upper bound, i.e. [γLB, γUB],
for the γ value range within which channel conflicts can be resolved.
Mean Range
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.9 [0.624,1]
0.8 [0.684,0.804] [0.615,1]
0.7 - [0.671,0.844] [0.595,1]
0.6 - - [0.647,1] [0.571,1]
0.5 - - [0.731,0.862] [0.619,1] [0.548,1]
0.4 - - - [0.677,1]
0.3 - - -
0.2 - -
0.1 -
TABLE 4.3: Mean and range values for θu and the feasible region [γlb, γub] with which
conflict is resolved in a buyback channel with price commitment
From Table 4.3 we first observe that if the mean is below a threshold (less than 0.3
in our experiments) then channel conflict is never resolved regardless of the value of γ.
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Otherwise, channel conflict is resolved if and only if the range is sufficiently high and γ
is in the right interval, i.e. γlb < γ < γub.
Note that for the same mean, as the range increases γlb decreases while γub increases
or remains the same. In other words, as the residual value of used cars becomes more
volatile, channel conflict is resolved for a larger range of γ values. For the same range,
on the other hand, as the mean increases γlb decreases while γub increases or remains the
same, and thus as the average depreciation rate of used cars increases, channel conflict
is resolved for a larger range of γ values. Finally, the largest feasible region for conflict
resolution is achieved when θu ∼ U [0, 1] with mean 0.5.
Mean Range
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.9 1
0.8 0.684 0.615
0.7 - 0.671 0.595
0.6 - - 0.647 0.571
0.5 - - 0.731 0.619 0.548
0.4 - - - 0.677
0.3 - - -
0.2 - -
0.1 -
TABLE 4.4: The optimal γ values maximizing the manufacturer’s profit while solving
the channel conflicts under the buyback channel with price commitment, i.e. γ∗M
We further compute the optimal γ∗ that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit over the
feasible region of conflict resolution and present the results in Table 4.4. We observe that
γ∗M , i.e. the γ value that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit in the buyback channel with
price commitment while resolving channel conflicts, is equal to γlb in many cases. However
when the mean of θu is 0.9 we observe that γub maximizes the profit. Thus if the average
depreciation rate of used cars is very high then the manufacturer should impose lower
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maintenance standards and otherwise she should impose higher maintenance standards.
Recall that this result is consistent with those obtained for the no uncertainty case.
Mean Range
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.9 [0,0.635]
0.8 [0,0.126] [0,0.260]
0.7 - - -
0.6 - - - -
0.5 - - - - -
0.4 - - - -
0.3 - - -
0.2 - -
0.1 -
TABLE 4.5: Mean and range values for θu and the feasible region [γlb, γub] with which
conflict is resolved in a buyback channel with no price commitment
Next we analyze how the buyback channel with no price commitment performs in
terms of solving channel conflicts under uncertainty. The results are displayed in Table
4.5. Comparing Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 we observe that under uncertainty price com-
mitment allows a buyback channel to achieve conflict resolution for a larger set of mean
and range values.
To summarize, residual value uncertainty enhances a buyback channel’s ability to
resolve channel conflicts when the buyback price is committed early. Moreover, price
commitment helps the manufacturer to achieve higher total sales in a buyback channel
when the depreciation rate of program cars and used cars are sufficiently close. Finally,
under uncertainty, the manufacturer, in most cases, should set turn-back standards as
high as possible to improve profits in a buyback channel.
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4.6 Conclusions
Channel conflicts between dealers and rental agencies make it a challenging task for
durable-good manufacturers to set channel policies. While competition among inter-
mediaries leads to higher profits for manufacturers, they have to keep the competition
under control so as not to face opposition from the intermediaries. Prior academic re-
search shows that to mitigate channel conflicts manufacturers can implement a take-back
strategy, so-called buyback program, under which they repurchase used products from
rental agencies and resell them to dealers.
We show that with no uncertainty, early commitment of the buyback price reduces
the total channel profit and the manufacturer’s profit. In addition, price commitment
benefits the dealer but hurts the rental agency when program cars depreciate much less
than used cars. However, our results suggest that under residual value uncertainty,
manufacturers can pull two levers to adjust the performance of a buyback channel: the
timing policy on when to set the buyback price and the turn-back standards on the
repurchased used products. Under uncertainty price commitment enhances a buyback
channel’s ability to alleviate channel conflicts and may lead to higher total sales for
the manufacturer. Finally, setting a higher turn-back standard in general increases the
manufacturer’s profit in the presence of uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Research
In recent times, an increasing number of companies are making product take-back an
important part of their business strategy. Product take-back is mostly motivated for two
different reasons: While some firms are forced by environmental legislations that hold
them responsible for financing collection and treatment of discarded products by the
customers, others are driven by economic and/or marketing concerns. In this dissertation,
we study the profitability and efficiency of various product take-back programs.
The first two essays of this dissertation examine take-back legislation’s impacts on
companies’ collection and treatment decisions as well as the efficacy of various imple-
mentations of take-back legislations. The second chapter of this dissertation titled “The
Impact of Take-Back Legislation on Remanufacturing” investigates how existing forms
of take-back legislations with different collection/recovery targets affect remanufacturing
decisions and if there is any additional benefit in imposing remanufacturing targets in
terms of meeting the objectives of legislations. First, we consider a monopolist OEM with
in-house remanufacturing capabilities (or a monopolist OEM who outsources remanufac-
turing but sells the remanufactured products under her own brand name). We then
consider an OEM who does not sell remanufactured products but faces competition from
a third-party remanufacturer. Using a stylized model of take-back legislation in a two-
period setting, we study how existing forms of legislations as well as extended forms with
additional remanufacturing targets affect optimal production, take-back and remanufac-
turing decisions. Among other results, our key findings are as follows: First, we explore
the effect of take-back legislations on remanufacturing levels and we find that legislation
never causes a decrease in remanufacturing levels of a monopolist OEM. In the presence
of competition, we show that legislation may indeed cause a decrease in remanufacturing
levels and hence imposing take-back legislations in an industry where remanufacturing
is carried out by independent third-party remanufacturers might hurt remanufacturing
industry. Moreover, we compare the effect of legislation on an OEM with in-house re-
manufacturing versus one competing with a third-party remanufacturer. Surprisingly,
we find that the remanufacturing level achieved by a third-party remanufacturer, who is
in competition with an OEM, may be higher than that achieved by a monopolist OEM
facing legislation. This suggests that, in order to achieve higher remanufacturing levels
government might indeed want to consider subsidizing third party remanufacturers rather
than imposing take-back legislations. An underlying motivation for take-back legislation
is to create incentives for environmentally-friendly business decisions such as designing
products that are easier and cheaper to remanufacture. Our results suggest that, legis-
lation creates incentive for designing products that are cheaper to remanufacture at the
expense of increasing manufacturing cost not only for a monopolist OEM but also for an
OEM facing competition from a third-party remanufacturer.
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A firm launching a product take-back program have a number of different options to
utilize the cores: She might remanufacture and sell the product, remanufacture and use
the product for warranty purposes, reuse the cores -as it is- for warranty replacements
or in production processes, recycle and use recycled materials in production process or
recycle and sell recycled materials in the recycling market, etc. Although we study the
impact of legislations on company’s remanufacturing decisions in the second chapter, we
acknowledge that not all returned products can be remanufactured. It depends on the
type of the products, its age, condition and core technology. In some cases, remanu-
facturing is not viable and recycling or reuse -as it is- might be the only option. This
limitation of our research leads to opportunities for future research. The next step would
be to investigate how take-back legislations affect companies’ environmentally-friendly
business decisions when remanufacturing is not an option. In such a setting, collected
cores might be used for warranty replacements, recycling, etc. Analyzing these situa-
tions would also assess the robustness of our results. Another limitation of our research
is that we assume that all items sold in a particular period are available for collection
and remanufacturing in the following period. Although this assumption facilitates the
analysis, another research opportunity is to consider the situation where used products
become available for collection and remanufacturing after some period of time.
In an industry regulated with product take-back legislations, each producer meets
her obligations through a compliance scheme. While we consider take-back legislation
that stipulates individual responsibility in the second chapter, some implementations of
legislation allow manufacturers to fulfill their obligation either individually or by joining
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a collective scheme. In the third chapter of the dissertation titled “Complying with
Take-Back Legislation: A Cost Comparison and Benefit Analysis of Three Compliance
Schemes”, we study a firm’s compliance scheme choice. Complying with legislation is a
valid cost to business and each firm chooses the most cost effective compliance scheme.
In most implementations of take-back legislation, individual and/or collective schemes
(with cost allocation by market share and with IFR) are available/allowed. We consider n
manufacturers and a non-profit PRO who manages the collection and treatment activities
on behalf of its members, and compare the three possible compliance schemes in terms
of cost effectiveness and the environmental benefits they achieve. Among other results,
our key findings are as follows: As intuition suggests, collective scheme with IFR is in
general the most cost effective alternative. However, the question is how feasible it is to
implement a collective scheme with IFR that requires sorting EOL products by brand
and tracking them through the treatment process? Although in the future with RFID
technology, sorting and tracking of EOL products would be much easier (but still costly)
and thus IFR within a collective scheme might be easier to implement; individual scheme
and collective scheme with cost allocation by market share are the two prevalent forms of
compliance that we encounter in practice. We find that which scheme (of these two) gives
lower compliance cost depends on the initial collection rate maintained by government
and non-profits as well as the market shares of partner firms. If the partner firms have
high market shares then collective compliance, in general, yields lower cost for a producer.
On the other hand, if the partner firms have small market shares then a producer pays
lower compliance cost under collective scheme only if the initial collection rate maintained
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by the government is of moderate levels. Hence, which compliance scheme is more cost
effective depends not only on the total market share of the collective scheme but also on
the market shares of individual members. From policy maker’s perspective we analyze
how the choice of a particular compliance scheme affects the environmental benefits, i.e.,
collection rate and treatability level, achieved. Our results suggest that, before imposing a
particular compliance scheme, the policy maker should be aware of the trade-offs involved
and should recognize that even when the collection level is higher under the collective
scheme, the individual scheme, in general, gives higher treatability levels. Therefore, our
results suggest that high collection rates and treatability levels may be hard to achieve
simultaneously unless governments are willing to partially incur the collection costs. We
also show that high collection targets imposed by governments push more producers to
choose the collective compliance scheme and result in a degradation of treatability levels.
When comparing the three compliance schemes we assume that the cost parameters
are the same under each compliance scheme. However, treatment activities are usually
carried out by third-party treatment companies and third-party companies might quote
a lower price for the collective schemes due to various reasons including the bargaining
power of collective schemes. Our research does not capture this potential difference in
cost parameters. Therefore, a possible extension would be to consider the cost parameter
differentials between individual and collective schemes. Another interesting extension
would be to consider alternative cost sharing mechanisms such as Shapley value and
explore how different cost sharing mechanisms affect the goals of the legislations as well
as the compliance cost for the producers.
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Some companies launch product take-back programs even in the absence of legisla-
tions. In the fourth chapter of the dissertation titled “The Impact of Buyback Price
Commitment and Demand Uncertainty on Channel Conflicts”, we study product take-
back motivated by the goal of managing distribution channels better and mitigating the
channel conflicts between the intermediaries. We consider a durable goods manufacturer
with dual distribution channels, i.e., rental and sales channel, and compare the buyback
channel structure with two other channel structures, i.e., separate channel and overlap-
ping channel. Although it is argued in the literature that buyback channel does not
maximize the manufacturer’s profits (Purohit, 1997), buyback programs are still com-
monly implemented in practice. In this chapter, using a two-period model of the relation-
ship between the manufacturer and the intermediaries, we rationalize a manufacturer’s
decision in launching buyback channel even if it does not provide the most profitable al-
ternative among the three channel structures. We consider two characteristics that affect
the profitability of the buyback program: (i) timing on the announcement of buyback
prices; and (ii) turn-back (quality) standards for the repurchased cars. We find that the
manufacturer can improve profits by setting the buyback price at the time of repurchase
instead of committing it at the time of initial purchase. Then, why is buyback price
commitment still being implemented in practice by durable goods manufacturers? The
answer becomes clear under demand uncertainty considerations. We show that in the
presence of demand uncertainty, commitment of buyback price enhances a buyback chan-
nel’s ability in resolving channel conflicts –which are introduced by overlapping channel
structure. In addition, in the presence of uncertainty the manufacturer achieves higher
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total sales under buyback price commitment than that under no price commitment. In
contrast, in the absence of uncertainty, buyback price commitment always leads to the
smallest total sales among the channel structures. Finally, we identify operational levers
that might improve the manufacturer’s profitability under buyback channel and show
that the manufacturer’s profit generally increases in the turn-back standard.
Although we consider the three different channel structures, the current prevailing
channel structure is close to the hybrid of a buyback channel and an overlapping channel.
An interesting extension to the fourth chapter would be to consider a hybrid channel
structure where the manufacturer announces an upper bound on the amount of items
that she would buyback from the rental agency and then the rental agency decides on
how many items to sell back to manufacturer and how many items to sell in the sales
market.
While this dissertation contributes to the better management of take-back programs,
there are still several different avenues for future research. For example, while some com-
panies take back only their own brand-name products, some others (e.g. HP) take back
products regardless of the products’ brand name. When a company accepts all product
returns without distinguishing brand name, the total volume of products collected would
be higher and thus the company might benefit from economies of scale in treatment cost
or if the treatment is a profitable business she might make more profit by collecting com-
petitors’ products. However, she also faces an uncertainty in the condition (treatability
level) of other brand-name products. Thus, an interesting research question would be to
explore how a manufacturer should design the take-back program when she takes back
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products regardless of brand-name. Another question that arises in this setting is how
the competition in collection activities affect the take-back decisions when the treatment
of discarded products is a profitable business.
157
A1 Appendix for Chapter 2: Proofs
In this section we provide proofs of theorems and propositions in Chapter 2. Note that
throughout the analysis we assume that Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD) ≥ 0 and αQ−cR−cC ≥ 0 to
avoid the trivial situations where neither manufacturing nor remanufacturing is profitable
in the second period. We define cmaxM = Q− φβ(cC + cD) and cmaxR = αQ− cC .
Proof of Theorem 1. Characterization of the optimal regions in the absence of
regulations: The problem in the absence of regulations is obtained by setting both βR = 0
and β = 0 in (P1). The Lagrangian function is ΠLagrM = ΠM + γ1(q1M − q2C) + γ2(q2C −
q2R) + γ3q2M + γ5q2R. Then the first order conditions are
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2M
= φ (Q− cM − 2αq2R − 2q2M) + γ3 = 0 , (A-1)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − 2q1M = 0 , (A-2)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2C
= γ2 − γ1 − φ (cC + cD) = 0 , (A-3)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2R
= φ (α (Q− q2M − q2R)− cR + cD − α(q2R − q2M ))− γ2 + γ5 = 0. (A-4)
We can shot that the Hessian is negative semidefinite and the first order conditions
guarantee optimality.
From the first order condition (A-3), γ2 = γ1 + φ (cC + cD) > 0 and hence q2C = q2R.
As long as q2M > 0, i.e. γ3 = 0, the first order condition (A-1) can be written as
q2M =
Q−cM
2
− αq2R. On the other hand, since q1M − αq2R > 0 should hold, from the
first order conditions (A-1) and (A-2), we conclude that q1M −αq2R = −γ3/φ+2q2M+γ12 > 0.
Hence when q2M = 0, i.e. γ3 > 0 , q1M = q2C . Using these properties we find that
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four different regions are feasible. After the redundant optimality conditions (OCs) are
eliminated (For the identification of redundant OCs see Appendix B1.2.) we rewrite the
remaining conditions characterizing each feasible region as bounds on cM where bound
BiM,N stands for the i
th bound for the monopoly model under no regulation. Table A1
and Table 2.1 summaries our results.
(a) Bounds characterizing the optimal regions
Bound Expression
B1M,N
cC+cR
α
B2M,N
(1−α)αQ+cC+cR
2α−α2
B3M,N
Q(1−α)(1+αφ)+αφ(cR+cC)
1−α+αφ
(b) Optimal regions and the corresponding optimal quantities
Reg. Condition q∗1M q
∗
2R q
∗
2M
1 cM ≤ B1M,N Q−cM2 0 Q−cM2
2 B1M,N ≤ cM ≤ B2M,N Q−cM2 α cM−cC−cR2α(1−α) Q−cM2 − αq∗2R
3 B2M,N ≤ cM ≤ B3M,N Q−φ(cC+cR)−cM (1−αφ)2(1+αφ(1−α)) q∗1M Q−cM2 − αq∗2R
4 B3M,N ≤ cM Q(1+φα)−φ(cR+cC)−cM2(1+αφ) q∗1M 0
TABLE A1: The characterization of the optimal regions for the monopolist OEM in the
absence of regulation
In Region 1, the OC γ5 = φ (−αcM + cR + cC) ≥ 0 implies cM ≤ B1M,N .
In Region 2, the OC q2R ≥ 0 implies cM ≥ B1M,N while q1M − q2R ≥ 0 implies
cM ≤ B2M,N .
In Region 3, the OC q2M =
αφ(cR+cC)−(1+αφ−α)cM+(1−α+αφ(1−α))Q
2(1+φα(1−α))
≥ 0 implies cM ≤
B3M,N while γ1 = φ
−(cR+cC)+(2−α)αcM−α(1−α)Q
(1+φα(1−α))
≥ 0 implies cM ≥ B2M,N .
In Region 4, the OC γ3 = φ
(1−α(1−φ))cM−φα(cC+cR)−((1+φα)(1−α))Q
(1+φα)
≥ 0 can be expressed
as cM ≥ B3M,N .
Observe that the bounds that characterize the regions are ordered as B1M,N ≤
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B2M,N ≤ B3M,N . The ordering implies that if cM is increasing while the other pa-
rameters are held constant, the optimal regions change in the following order: 1-2-3-4.
Finally, note that in the absence of regulations when αQ−cC−cR < 0 and Q−cM < 0,
neither manufacturing nor remanufacturing is profitable in the second period; however
we eliminate this region from analysis due to our earlier-stated assumptions on the values
of the cost parameters.
Characterization of the optimal regions under partial regulation: The problem under
partial regulation is obtained by setting βR = 0 in (P1). The Lagrangian function is
ΠLagrM = ΠM + γ1(q1M − q2C) + γ2(q2C − q2R) + γ3(q2M ) + γ4 (q2C − βq1M) + γ5q2R. Then
the first order conditions are
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2M
= φ (Q− cM − φβ (cC + cD)− 2αq2R − 2q2M ) + γ3 = 0 , (A-5)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − γ4β − 2q1M = 0 , (A-6)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2C
= γ4 + γ2 − γ1 − φ (cC + cD) = 0 , (A-7)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2R
= φ (α (Q− q2M − q2R)− cR − αq2R − q2Mα + cD)− γ2 + γ5 = 0. (A-8)
The Hessian is still negative semidefinite, therefore the first order conditions guarantee
optimality.
Note that as long as q2M > 0 which implies that γ3 = 0, the first order condition (A-5)
can be written as q2M =
Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)
2
− αq2R. Now consider the first order condition
given in (A-7). If q∗2C > q
∗
2R, then the corresponding Lagrange multiplier γ2 should be
zero. Then the first order condition (A-7) becomes γ4 = γ1 + φ (cC + cD). Hence γ
∗
4 > 0
160
holds and q∗2C = βq
∗
1M at the optimality. On the other hand, if it is optimal for the OEM to
collect more than the regulation requires, i.e. βq∗1M < q
∗
2C , then γ
∗
4 = 0 and the first order
condition becomes γ2 = γ1+φ (cC + cD) > 0 which implies q
∗
2C = q
∗
2R. Hence the amount
of cores collected by the OEM is either equal to the optimum level of remanufacturing or
the level of collection dictated by legislation, whichever is larger. On the other hand, since
q1M − αq2R > 0 should hold, from the first order conditions (A-5), (A-6), and (A-7) we
conclude that q1M−αq2R = −γ3/φ+2q2M+(1−β)γ1+βγ22 > 0. Hence when q2M = 0, i.e. γ3 > 0,
γ2 = γ1 = 0 cannot hold which means that q1M > q2C > q2R cannot be optimal if there
is no second period manufacturing. Using these properties we find that eight different
regions are feasible. After the redundant OCs are eliminated (For the identification of
redundant OCs see Appendix B1.2.) we rewrite the remaining conditions characterizing
each feasible region as bounds on cM where bound BiM,P (BiM,F ) stands for the i
th
bound for the monopoly model under partial regulation (under partial regulation when
full regulation is redundant). Table A2 and Table 2.2 (with βR = 0) summarize our
results.
In Region 1, the OC γ5 = φ (−αcM − αβφ (cC + cD) + (cR − cD)) ≥ 0 can be written
as cM ≤ B1M,P .
In Region 2, the OC q2R ≥ 0 can be written as cM ≥ B1M,P while and βq1M−q2R ≥ 0
implies cM ≤ B3M,F .
In Region 3, the OC γ4 = φ
(cR+cC)−αβφ(cC+cD)−(1+β(1−α))αcM+αβ(1−α)Q
(1+φβ2α(1−α))
≥ 0 implies cM ≤
B5M,F and q2M =
β2αφ(cR+cC)−(1+β
2αφ−βα)cM−(β
2αφ+1)βφ(cC+cD)+(1−βα+αφβ2(1−α))Q
2(1+φβ2α(1−α))
≥ 0 can
be written as cM ≤ B4M,F while γ2 ≥ 0 implies cM ≥ B3M,F .
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(a) Bounds characterizing the optimal scenarios
Bound Expression
B1M,P
−αβφ(cC+cD)+cR−cD
α
B3M,F
αβ(1−α)Q−αβφ(1+β(1−α))(cC+cD)+cR−cD
α(1+β(1−α))
B4M,F
Q(1+φβ2α(1−α)−αβ)−(1+φβ2α)φβ(cC+cD)+αβ
2φ(cC+cR)
1−αβ(1−φβ)
B5M,F
α(1−α)βQ−αβφ(cC+cD)+cR+cC
α(1+β(1−α))
B6M,F
α(1−α)Q+cR+cC−αβφ(cC+cD)
2α−α2
B7M,F Q(1− α)− βφ(cC + cD) + cC + cR
B8M,F
Q(1−α)(1+αφ)+αφ(cC+cR)−βφ(cC+cD)(1+φα)
1−α+αφ
B10M,F
−αQ(1−β)+cR+cC
αβ
B11M,F
cC+cR
α
(b) Optimal regions and the corresponding optimal quantities
Reg. Condition q∗1M
1 cM ≤ B1M,P Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)2
2 B1M,P ≤ cM ≤ B3M,F Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)2
3 B3M,F ≤ cM ≤ min(B4M,F , B5M,F ) Q−cM+βφ((αcM−cC−cR)+βαφ(cC+cD))2(1+φαβ2(1−α))
4 B5M,F ≤ cM ≤ min(B6M,F , B7M,F ) Q−cM2
5 B6M,F ≤ cM ≤ B8M,F Q−(1−αφ)cM+φ
2αβ(cC+cD)−φ(cR+cC)
2(1+φα(1−α))
6 B4M,F ≤ cM ≤ B10M,F (1+φβα)Q−φβ(cR+cC)−cM2(1+φβ2α)
7 max(B10M,F , B7M,F ) ≤ cM ≤ B11M,F Q−cM2
8 max(B8M,F , B11M,F ) ≤ cM (1+φα)Q−cM−φ(cR+cC)1+φα
(c) Optimal regions and the corresponding optimal quantities
Reg. Condition q∗2C q
∗
2R
1 cM ≤ B1M,P βq∗1M 0
2 B1M,P ≤ cM ≤ B3M,F βq∗1M αcM−cR+cD+αβφ(cC+cD)2α(1−α)
3 B3M,F ≤ cM ≤ min(B4M,F , B5M,F ) βq∗1M βq∗1M
4 B5M,F ≤ cM ≤ min(B6M,F , B7M,F ) αcM−cR−cC+αβφ(cC+cD)2α(1−α) q∗2C
5 B6M,F ≤ cM ≤ B8M,F q∗1M q∗1M
6 B4M,F ≤ cM ≤ B10M,F βq∗1M βq∗1M
7 max(B10M,F , B7M,F ) ≤ cM ≤ B11M,F αQ−cR−cC2α q∗2C
8 max(B8M,F , B11M,F ) ≤ cM q∗1M q∗1M
TABLE A2: Characterization of the optimal regions for the monopolist OEM under
partial regulation
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In Region 4, the OC q2R − βq1M ≥ 0 implies cM ≥ B5M,F while q1M − q2R ≥ 0 can
be written as cM ≤ B6M,F and q2M = Q(1−α)−cM−βφ(cC+cD)+(cR+cC)2(1−α) ≥ 0 can be written as
cM ≤ B7M,F .
In Region 5, the OC q2M =
αφ(cR+cC)−(1+αφ−α)cM−(αφ+1)βφ(cC+cD)+(1−α+αφ(1−α))Q
2(1+φα(1−α))
≥ 0
can be written as cM ≤ B8M,F while γ1 = φ−(cR+cC)+(2−α)αcM+αβφ(cC+cD)−α(1−α)Q(1+φα(1−α)) ≥ 0
implies cM ≥ B6M,F .
In Region 6, the OC γ4 = φ
(cC+cR)−βαcM−α(1−β)Q
1+φβ2α
≥ 0 can be written as cM ≤ B10M,F
while γ3 = φ
−φβ2α(cR+cC)+βφ(1+φβ2α)(cC+cD)+(1−βα(1−βφ))αcM−(1−αβ+φβ2α(1−α))Q
1+φβ2α
≥ 0 can be
written as cM ≥ B4M,F .
In Region 7, the OC q1M−q2R ≥ 0 can be written as cM ≤ B11M,F while q2R−βq1M ≥
0 can be written as cM ≥ B10M,F and γ3 = (α−1)Q+cM +βφ (cD + cC)− (cR + cC) ≥ 0
can be written as cM ≥ B7M,F .
In Region 8, the OC γ3 = φ
βφ(1+φα)(cC+cD)+(1−α(1−φ))cM−φα(cC+cR)−((1+φα)(1−α))Q
(1+φα)
≥ 0
can be written as cM ≥ B8M,F while γ1 = φαcM−cR−cC1+φα ≥ 0 can be written as cM ≥
B11M,F .
After eliminating the redundant OCs and rearranging the remaining ones, we obtain
the following possible orderings:
I. B1M,P ≤ B3M,F ≤ B5M,F ≤ B6M,F ≤ B8M,F which implies that if cM is increasing
while the other parameters are held constant, the optimal regions change in the following
order: 1-2-3-4-5-8.
II. B1M,P ≤ B3M,F ≤ B5M,F ≤ B7M,F ≤ B11M,F which implies that if cM is increasing
while the other parameters are held constant, the optimal regions change in the following
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order: 1-2-3-4-7-8.
III.B1M,P ≤ B3M,F ≤ B4M,F ≤ B10M,F ≤ B11M,F which implies that if cM is increasing
while the other parameters are held constant, the optimal regions change in the following
order: 1-2-3-6-7-8.
Finally, note that in the presence of regulations when αQ + cD − cR < 0 and Q −
cM − φβ(cC + cD) < 0, neither manufacturing nor remanufacturing is profitable in the
second period; however we eliminate this region from analysis due to our earlier-stated
assumptions on the values of the cost parameters.
Characterization of the optimal regions under full regulation: The monopolist OEM’s
problem under full regulation is given in (P1). Then the Lagrangian function becomes:
ΠLagrM = ΠM + γ1(q1M − q2C) + γ2(q2C − q2R) + γ3(q2M )
+γ4 (q2C − βq1M) + γ5 (q2R − βRq1M ) (A-9)
The first order conditions are
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2M
= φ (Q− cM − βφ (cC + cD)− 2αq2R − 2q2M ) + γ3 = 0 , (A-10)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − βγ4 − βRγ5 − 2q1M = 0 , (A-11)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2C
= γ4 + γ2 − γ1 − φ (cC + cD) = 0 , (A-12)
∂ΠLagrM
∂q2R
= φ (α (Q− q2M − q2R)− cR − αq2R − q2Mα + cD)− γ2 + γ5 = 0.(A-13)
Again the first order conditions ensure optimality. With similar arguments to those
given under partial regulation, we can see that the amount of cores collected by the
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OEM is either equal to the optimum level of remanufacturing or the level of collection
dictated by legislation, whichever is larger. On the other hand q1M > q2C > q2R cannot
be optimal if there is no second period manufacturing. Note that as long as γ5 = 0,
the first order conditions are the same as the ones under partial regulation. In other
words, if q∗2R > βRq
∗
1M under partial regulation imposing full regulation is redundant.
Hence under full regulation Regions 3-8 are the same as the corresponding ones under
partial regulation whereas Regions 1 and 2 may change. Table A3 and 2.2 summarize
our results. After the redundant OCs are eliminated (For the identification of redundant
OCs see Appendix B1.2.) we rewrite the remaining conditions for Regions 1 and 2 as
bounds on cM and the bounds on cM which characterize each feasible region are provided
in Table A3.
(a) Bounds characterizing the optimal regions
Bound Expression
B1M,F
(cR−cD)+βRα(1−α)Q−(1+βR(1−α))αβφ(cC+cD)
(1+βR(1−α))α
(b) Optimal regions and the corresponding optimal quantities
Reg. Condition q∗1M
1 cM ≤ B1M,F Q+φβRα(cM+φβ(cC+cD))−(cM+φβ(cC+cD))−φβR(cR−cD)2(1+φβ2
R
α(1−α))
2 B1M,F ≤ cM ≤ B3M,F Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)2
(c) Optimal regions and the corresponding optimal quantities
Reg. Condition q∗2C q
∗
2R
1 cM ≤ B1M,F βq∗1M βRq∗1M
2 B1M,F ≤ cM ≤ B3M,F βq∗1M α(cM+φβ(cC+cD))−cR+cD2α(1−α)
TABLE A3: The characterization of different optimal regions for the monopolist OEM
under full regulation
In Region 1, the OC γ5 = φ
−(βR(1−α)+1)βφα(cC+cD)+(cR−cD)−(1+βR(1−α))αcM+βRα(1−α)Q
(1+φβ2Rα(1−α))
≥ 0
implies cM ≤ B1M,F . In Region 2, the OCs βq1M−q2R ≥ 0 can be written as cM ≤ B3M,F
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and q2R − βRq1M ≥ 0 can be written as cM ≥ B1M,F .
Observe that under full regulation, the possible orderings of the regions are the same
as those under partial regulation.
Proof of Theorem 2. For each region that can be optimal under no regulation, we
study in detail what happens as partial regulation is imposed. It is easy to see how q∗1M ,
q∗2R and p
∗
2R change by checking the the expressions provided in the proof of Theorem 1:
Region 4 Under No Regulation. Since max {B8M,F , B11M,F} ≤ B3M,N holds, if Region
4 is optimal under no regulation, i.e. B3M,N < cM , Region 8 becomes optimal after
imposing partial regulation and q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R stay the same.
Region 3 Under No Regulation. Since max {B6M,F , B11M,F} < B2M,N holds, Region 3
under no regulation corresponds to Region 5 or 8 under partial regulation. In either case,
q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R increase.
Region 2 Under No Regulation. Observe that B1M,P < B1M,N which implies that Region
1 can be optimal under partial regulation only if Region 1 is optimal under no regulation.
Hence if Region 2 is optimal under no regulation, i.e. B1M,N = B11M,N < cM < B2M,N ,
either one of Regions 2, 3, 4, 5 or 8 can be optimal as partial regulation is imposed.
If Region 2 or 3 becomes optimal, q∗1M and p
∗
2R decrease but q
∗
2R increases. If Region
4 becomes optimal, q∗1M and p
∗
2R stay the same but q
∗
2R goes up. Finally, if Region 5 or
8 becomes optimal q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R increase.
Region 1 Under No Regulation. Note that if Region 1 is optimal under no regulation, i.e.
cM < B1M,N , then region 5 and 8 where cM > max {B6M,F , B11M,F} > B11M,F = B1M,N
can never be optimal as partial regulation is imposed. Therefore if Region 1 (where
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q∗2R = 0) is optimal under no regulation, either one of Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 or 7 can be
optimal under partial regulation.
If Region 1 becomes optimal as partial regulation is imposed, q∗1M decreases while
q∗2R = 0 stays the same. Note that unless Region 1 is optimal under partial regulation,
q∗2R increases. In the absence of regulations q
∗
1M in Region 1 is the same as q
∗
1M in Region 2
(see proof of Theorem 1). Hence the results given above for Region 2 under no regulation
regarding how q∗1M changes when Region 2, 3 or 4 becomes optimal as partial regulation
is imposed, also hold here. On the other hand, if Region 6 is optimal q∗1M decreases, but
if Region 7 becomes optimal q∗1M stays the same.
Let us summarize the analysis: If B3M,N < cM , then q
∗
1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R stay the same
as partial regulation is imposed. Otherwise, as partial regulation is imposed
1. q∗1M and p
∗
2R go down if cM < max{B5M,F , B10M,F} = κ1, i.e. region 1-3 or 6
becomes optimal under partial regulation, remain the same if κ1 < cM < κ2 =
max{B6M,F , B11M,F}, i.e. region 4 or 7 becomes optimal under partial regulation,
and go up if κ2 < cM , i.e. region 5 or 8 becomes optimal under partial regulation.
2. q∗2R remains the same if cM < B1M,P , i.e. region 1 becomes optimal under partial
regulation and goes up if cM > B1M,P , i.e. region 2-8 becomes optimal under
partial regulation.
Proof of Theorem 3. Under full regulation Regions 3-8 are the same as the ones
under partial regulation. For Regions 1 and 2, we study what happens as full regulation is
imposed. Observe that B1M,F−B1M,P = βR(1−α)(αQ−cR+cD)α(1+βR−αβR) ≥ 0 because αQ−cR−cC ≥ 0
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holds in the parameter region of interest. Hence Region 1 and part of Region 2 under
partial regulation corresponds to Region 1 under full regulation. It is easy to see how
q∗1M , q
∗
2R and p
∗
2R change by checking the expressions provided in the proof of Theorem
1.
Region 1 Under Partial Regulation. Region 1 remains optimal under full regulation; q∗2R
goes up while q∗1M goes down.
Region 2 Under Partial Regulation. When cM < B1M,F , Region 1 becomes optimal as
full regulation is imposed. Then q∗1M and p
∗
2R decrease while q
∗
2R increases. Finally when
cM > B1M,F , Region 2 remains optimal as full regulation is imposed and the decision
variables of interest do not change.
Proof of Proposition 1. Under partial regulation Region 1 is optimal when cM ≤
B1M,P (see proof of Theorem 1) which can be written as β ≤ −αcM+cR−cDαφ(cC+cD) = β∗. On the
other hand, if cM ≥ B1M,P , i.e. β ≥ β∗ Region 1 cannot be optimal. Note, that Region
1 is the only region with no remanufacturing under partial regulation. Hence as long as
β ≥ −αcM+cR−cD
αφ(cC+cD)
, there is some level of remanufacturing under partial regulation.
The only two regions where all products from the first period are remanufactured
are Regions 5 and 8. These regions are optimal when cM ≥ max {B11M,F , B6M,F}.
We can write cM ≥ B6M,F as β ≥ α(1−α)Q+cR+cC−(2−α)αcMαφ(cC+cD) = β1 and cM ≥ B11M,F as
αcM − cC − cR ≥ 0. Hence when both αcM − cC − cR ≥ 0 and β ≥ β1 all first period
cores are remanufactured under partial regulation.
Proof of Proposition 2. With Proposition 1, we show that when cM ≤ B1M,P
which can be written as β ≤ −αcM+cR−cD
αφ(cC+cD)
= β∗, Region 1 is optimal and there is no
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remanufacturing under partial regulation; hence βR is always binding if β ≤ β∗. When
cM ≥ B1M,P , i.e. β ≥ β∗, one of Regions 2-8 is optimal. When Region 2 is optimal
under partial regulation, the additional regulation on remanufacturing level is redundant
only if q∗2R > βRq
∗
1M which can be rewritten as q
∗
2R − βRq∗1M = αcM+αβφ(cC+cD)−(cR−cD)2α(1−α) −
βR
Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)
2
≥ 0 which we further simplify to βR ≤ αcM+αβφ(cC+cD)−(cR−cD)α(1−α)(Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)) =
φ(β−β∗)(cC+cD)
(1−α)(Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD))
. Finally, when one of Regions 3-8 is optimal and thus q∗2R ≥ βq∗1M
under partial regulation, the additional regulation on remanufacturing level is redundant.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we find the threshold θ under partial regulation:
Assume that at point A =
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
remanufacturing is not profitable, i.e. Region 1
is optimal under partial regulation, hence the optimal production quantities are qA1M =
qA2M =
Q−cAM−φβ(cC+cD)
2
. The profit at point A is
ΠAM =
(Q− cAM − φβ (cC + cD))2(1 + φ)
4
.
Now compare the profit at point B =
(
cBM , c
B
R
)
where cBR < c
A
R, c
B
M > c
A
M and remanu-
facturing is profitable, i.e. Region 2 is optimal, with profit at A =
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
. The optimal
production quantities at point B are
qB1M =
Q− cBM − φβ (cC + cD)
2
,
qB2M =
Q (1− α)− cBM − βφ (cC + cD) +
(
cBR − cD
)
2 (1− α) ,
qB2R =
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
)
2α (1− α) .
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The profit at point B is
ΠBM =
φ
(
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
))2
4α (1− α) +
(Q− cBM − φβ (cC + cD))2(1 + φ)
4
.
Now let us compare the profit values obtained at point A where remanufacturing is
not profitable and at point B where remanufacturing becomes profitable:
ΠBM −ΠAM = ∆ =
φ
(
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
))2
4α (1− α)
−
(
cBM − cAM
) (
2Q− cBM − cAM − 2βφ(cD + cC)
)
(1 + φ)
4
Simplifying the difference we get a second order polynomial of cAM , ∆ = c
A
M − cBM +
k
(cBM−B1M,P )
2
(2X−cB
M
−cA
M
)
where k = φα
(1+φ)(1−α)
and X = 2Q−2βφcD−2βφcC . Solving the polynomial
we find two roots, r1,2 = X ±
√
(cBM −X)2 + k(cBM −B1M,P )2. Note that the larger
root, r2 is greater than c
B
M . The sign of smaller root, r1 depends on ∆(c
A
M = 0) =
(X−cB
M
)2+k(cB
M
−B1M,P )
2−X2
2X−cB
M
. There are two possibilities: (i) If ∆(cAM = 0) < 0 then r1 > 0
and ∆ is positive in the interval (r1, c
B
M). (ii) If ∆(c
A
M = 0) > 0 then r1 < 0 and
∆ is positive in the interval (0, cBM). Hence the profit at point B is higher when θ =
max {0, r1} < cAM < cBM . Finally the lower bound, r1 decreases as the legislation becomes
stricter:
∂r1
∂β
= − kαφ(cC + cD)
(
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
))√
k(αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)− (cBR − cD))2 + α2(cBM −X)2
< 0 .
170
Proof of Proposition 4. The Lagrangian function for the remanufacturer’s problem
(P2) can be written as L2R = Π2R+ η1q
R
2C + η2
(
q1M − q2C − qR2C
)
+ η3q2S . Then the OCs
are:
∂L2R
∂qR2C
= α
(
Q− q2M − 2
(
qR2C + q2S
))− cR − cRC + η1 − η2 = 0 (A-14)
∂L2R
∂q2S
= α
(
Q− q2M − 2
(
qR2C + q2S
))− cR − p2S + η3 = 0 (A-15)
η1
(
qR2C
)
= 0 (A-16)
η2
(
q1M − q2C − qR2C
)
= 0 (A-17)
η3 (q2S) = 0 (A-18)
In addition, 0 ≤ qR2C ≤ q1M − q2C , q2S ≥ 0, η1 ≥ 0, η2 ≥ 0, η3 ≥ 0 should hold.
Solving OCs (A-14)-(A-18) we find the five possible solutions given in Table A5. The
corresponding Lagrangian multipliers are given in Table A4.
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Region η1 η2 η3
R1 −αQ+ αq2M + cR + cRC 0 −αQ+ αq2M + cR + p2S
R2 0 0 p2S − cRC
R3 0 αQ− αq2M − cR − cRC − 2α (q1M − q2C) −αQ+ αq2M + cR + p2S + 2α (q1M − q2C)
R4 cRC − p2S 0 0
R5 0 p2S − cRC 0
TABLE A4: The Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to each feasible strategy of the remanufacturer
Region qR2C q2S
R1 0 0
R2
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C
2α 0
R3 q1M − q2C 0
R4 0 αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S2α
R5 q1M − q2C αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S−2α(q1M−q2C)2α
TABLE A5: The feasible strategies for the remanufacturer
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Note that for a region to be optimal, the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers must
be nonnegative. Therefore, nonnegativity of Lagrangian multipliers from the remanufac-
turer’s problem become constraints in the OEM’s problem. Next we show that Region
R2 and Region R3 can never be optimal and Region R5 can only be optimal if q1M = q2C .
In each case the proof is by contradiction.
Elimination of Region R2: Assume that Region R2 is optimal, the following OCs should
be satisfied by the OEM’s solution: q∗1M − q∗2C ≥ qR∗2C = αQ−αq
∗
2M
−cR−c
R
C
2α
≥ 0 and η3 =
p∗2S − cRC ≥ 0.
If the OEM sets p2S = c
R
C − δ holding q∗1M and q∗2M the same, it becomes optimal for
the remanufacturer to purchase the cores from the OEM, i.e.
(
qR∗2C
)new
= 0, (q∗2S)
new > 0.
The new optimal amount of remanufacturing is
(q∗2S)
new =
αQ− αq∗2M − cR − cRC + δ
2α
= qR∗2C +
δ
2α
> qR∗2C
whereas the optimal amount of collected items is (q∗2C)
new = max ((q∗2S)
new , q∗2C).
Note that the new solution is already feasible. The OEM’s first period profit does
not change and the change in the second period’s profit is
∆Π2OEM = −q∗2M
δ
2
+
(
cRC − δ
)(
qR∗2C +
δ
2α
)
− cC max
(
qR∗2C +
δ
2α
, q∗2C
)
−cD
(
max
(
qR∗2C +
δ
2α
, q∗2C
)
− qR∗2C −
δ
2α
)
+ (cC + cD) q
∗
2C .
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When (q∗2C)
new = max ((q∗2S)
new , q∗2C) = (q
∗
2S)
new, we have
∆Π2OEM = −q∗2M
δ
2
+
(
cRC − δ − cC
)(
qR∗2C +
δ
2α
)
+ (cC + cD) q
∗
2C .
We observe that the change in profit is positive as δ goes to zero: lim
δ→0
∆Π2OEM =(
cRC − cC
)
qR∗2C + (cC + cD) q
∗
2C > 0.
When (q∗2C)
new = max ((q∗2S)
new , q∗2C) = q
∗
2C , we have:
∆Π2OEM = −αq∗2M
δ
2α
+
(
cRC − δ + cD
)(
qR∗2C +
δ
2α
)
.
Similarly, the change in profit is positive as δ goes to zero:
lim
δ→0
∆Π2OEM =
(
cRC + cD
)
qR∗2C > 0.
Hence the OEM can make more profit by collecting the items herself (and setting the
price so that the remanufacturer purchases the cores from the OEM) rather than letting
the remanufacturer collect cores himself.
Elimination of Region R3: Assume that Region R3 is optimal, so that the remanufacturer
collects all the remaining cores but does not buy from the OEM, i.e. qR∗2C = q
∗
1M −q∗2C ≥ 0
and q∗2S = 0. The OEM’s solution should satisfy the following conditions:η
∗
2 = αQ −
αq∗2M−2αq∗1M+2αq∗2C−cR−cRC ≥ 0 and η∗3 = −αQ+αq∗2M+2αq∗1M−2αq∗2C+cR+p∗2S ≥ 0.
Note that η∗2 + η
∗
3 = p
∗
2S − cRC ≥ 0. Keeping q∗1M , q∗2M and q∗2C the same, the OEM can
set p2S = c
R
C + δ such that
αQ−αq∗
2M
−cR−c
R
C
−δ
2α
= q∗1M − q∗2C . Then η∗3 becomes zero, but
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the optimal solution remains the same. If the OEM collects all the available cores, i.e.
(q∗2C)
new = q∗1M , and sells just q
∗
1M − q∗2C to the remanufacturer at a price p2S = cRC + δ,
she makes more profit. Moreover, the remanufacturer still makes positive profit. Hence
the regions where the OEM collects some of the cores and lets the remanufacturer collect
and remanufacture the rest cannot be optimal.
Elimination of Region R5:Region 5 can be optimal only if the OEM collects all the
available cores, i.e. q∗1M = q
∗
2C . Assume that Region R5 is optimal, and q
∗
1M > q
∗
2C . Note
that the total remanufactured amount does not depend on q∗1M − q∗2C , i.e. qR∗2C + q∗2S =
αQ−αq∗
2M−cR−p
∗
2S
2α
. Hence the OEM makes more profit by collecting all the available items,
i.e. (q2C
∗)new = q∗1M and increasing q2S by q
∗
1M − q∗2C so that (q∗2S)new = αQ−αq
∗
2M
−cR−p
∗
2S
2α
while decreasing qR2C to zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that if the OEM
collects cores to restrict the availability of cores to the remanufacturer, it is profitable
for her to collect all the cores. Now we show that the OEM never sets p2S = c
R
C under
this situation. First, assume that the OEM prices the remanufactured product at the
collection cost of the remanufacturer. Then the OEM’s second period profit can be
written as
Π2OEM = q2M
((
Q− q2M − α
(
qR∗2C + q
∗
2S
))− cM − φβ (cC + cD))
−q2CcC + q∗2Sp2S − (q2C − q∗2S) cD
= q2M ((Q− q2M − αq∗2S)− cM − φβ (cC + cD))
−q1McC + q∗2ScRC − (q1M − q∗2S) cD
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where q∗2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C
2α
≥ 0 and qR∗2C = q1M − q2C = 0.
Now assume that the OEM keeps q1M and q2M constant but decreases the price of
the remanufactured products by an infinitesimal amount δ, namely pnew2S = c
R
C − δ. Then
purchasing the cores from the OEM becomes more profitable for the remanufacturer
compared to collecting the cores himself from the market. Hence by setting pnew2S = c
R
C−δ
the OEM does not need to collect all the items from the market, i.e. qnew2C ≤ q1M . Note
that the amount remanufactured becomes qnew2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C
+δ
2α
= q2S +
δ
2α
and also
qnew2S ≤ qnew2C ≤ q1M holds. The second period profit of the OEM is
Πnew2OEM = q2M
(
Q− q2M − α
(
q∗2S +
δ
2α
)
− cM − φβ (cC + cD)
)
− qnew2C cC
+
(
q∗2S +
δ
2α
)(
cRC − δ
)−(qnew2C − q∗2S − δ2α
)
cD .
Hence as δ goes to zero the increase in the profit function can be written as ∆Π2OEM =
Πnew2OEM − Π2OEM = (q1M − qnew2C ) (cD + cC) ≥ 0.
Therefore the OEM does not set the price of the cores equal to the collection cost
of the remanufacturer under Policy C. Since preemptive collection only happens under
Policy C, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6. Under preemptive collection q1M = q2C > q2S and q2C > βq1M
by definition and hence the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers are zero i.e., γ2 = 0,
γ4 = 0 (see the OEM’s Lagrangian function given in equation (B-3) in Appendix B1.2).
With Proposition 5 we show that p2S > c
R
C should hold and hence the corresponding
Lagrangian multiplier is also zero (γ7 = 0). Setting γ2 = 0, γ4 = 0, γ7 = 0 and
q2C = q1M and solving the first order conditions given in equations (B-4)-(B-5) for p2S
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we obtain p2S =
(φαQ−φcR−φcD−γ5)
2φ
. Note that under Policy C, p2S > c
R
C , and hence
p2S − cRC = (φαQ−φcR−φcD−γ5−2φc
R
C
)
2φ
> 0 implies that (αQ − cD − γ5/φ − 2cRC) > cR.
Therefore, preemptive collection cannot be optimal when cR ≥ αQ− cD − 2cRC .
Proof of Proposition 7. First we show that preemptive collection strategy is feasible
over a larger region of cost parameters under partial regulation compared to no regulation.
For the bounds under no regulation and partial regulation please refer to Tables B1 and
B2-B3 respectively in Appendix B1.2.
Note that the regions C1 and C2 define the preemptive collection region. In the
absence of regulations C1 is optimal if B2C,N ≤ cM ≤ B7C,N and C2 is optimal if
B7C,N ≤ cM ≤ B8C,N and B2C,N ≤ B7C,N ≤ B8C,N . Under partial regulation C1 is
optimal if B3C,P ≤ cM ≤ B2C,P and C2 is optimal if B2C,P ≤ cM ≤ B33C,F and B3C,P ≤
B2C,P ≤ B33C,F . Observe that the lower bound is lower under partial regulation, i.e.
B2C,N − B3C,P = βφ(cC + cD) > 0; while the upper bound is also lower, i.e. B8C,N −
B33C,F =
βφ(cC+cD)
(3−α)
> 0. The magnitude of decrease on the upper bound is smaller and
hence the overall feasible region becomes larger.
Since the feasible region of preemptive collection strategy overlaps with the regions
of Policy B, we need to compare the optimal profits in order to understand whether
partial regulation favors preemptive collection. In the proof of Proposition 8, we show
that the formulations of no regulation and partial regulation scenarios differ only by the
cost of manufacturing in the second period and the lower bound on the collection level.
Since the OEM already collects all available cores under preemptive collection (Policy
C), the lower bound on the collection level is not binding and thus this constraint does
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not affect the profit. On the other hand, under Policy B the profit may go down due
to the constraint. Under no regulation, the cost of manufacturing in the second period,
cM 2 is equal to cM , while under partial regulation it becomes cM + βφ (cC + cD). It is
sufficient to show that the difference between the profits under Preemptive Collection
Strategy and Policy B, i.e. ΠCOEM −ΠBOEM increases as cM 2 increases. According to how
the regions C1 and C2 and Policy B can overlap, we analyze four cases:
Case i. Region C1 and Region B1 overlap and Region C1 is optimal under no regulation.
The difference between the profits is
ΠC1OEM − ΠB1OEM = −
(2(Q− cM)− φ(cC + cD))(cC + cD)
4φ
+
φ(αQ− 2cRC − 2cC + αcM 2)2
4α2
.
The difference increases as cM 2 increases because
∂(ΠC1OEM − ΠB1OEM)
∂cM 2
=
φ(αQ− 2cRC − 2cC + αcM 2)
2α
=
φ(pC12S − cRC)
α
> 0.
Case ii. Region C1 and Region B2 overlap and Region C1 is optimal under no regulation.
The difference between the profits increases as cM 2 increases because
∂(ΠC1OEM −ΠB2OEM)
∂cM 2
=
φ(cR + cC − αcM2)
2(2− α) =
γC15 + (cC + cD)φ
2(2− α) > 0.
Case iii. Region C2 and Region B1 overlap and Region C2 is optimal under no regulation.
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The difference between the profits increases as cM 2 increases because
∂(ΠC2OEM − ΠB1OEM)
∂cM 2
=
φ((2− α)αQ− 2(2− α)cRC − (4− α)cR + 2αcM2 + αcD)
2α(2− α)
=
αγB17 + 2φαq
C1
2S
2
> 0.
Case iv. Region C2 and Region B2 overlap and Region C1 is optimal under no regulation.
The difference between the profits increases as cM 2 increases because
∂(ΠC2OEM − ΠB2OEM)
∂cM 2
=
φ(cD + cC)
2(2− α) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 8. First we give the proof for partial regulation:
From No Regulation to Partial Regulation: In Part a, we give the proof for Policies A-B,
then in Part b we give the proof for Policy C.
Part a. When either Policy A or B is optimal under no regulation, the OEM’s problem
is
(P5) Max ΠOEM = φ(q2M
(
Q− q2M − α
(
qR2C + q2S
)− cM)
+p2Sq2S − cCq2C − cD (q2C − q2S)) + q1M (Q− q1M − cM)
s.t. q1M ≥ q2C ≥ q2S
q2S + q
R
2C ≥ 0
q2M ≥ 0, p2S ≤ cRC , q2S =
αQ− αq2M − cR − p2S
2α
, qR2C = 0
179
whereas under partial regulation, the problem is
(P6) Max ΠOEM = φ(q2M
(
Q− q2M − α
(
qR2C + q2S
)− (cM + φβ (cC + cD)))
+p2Sq2S − cCq2C − cD (q2C − q2S)) + q1M (Q− q1M − cM)
s.t. q2C + q
R
2C ≥ βq1M (A-19)
q1M ≥ q2C ≥ q2S
q2S + q
R
2C ≥ 0
q2M ≥ 0, p2S ≤ cRC , q2S =
αQ− αq2M − cR − p2S
2α
, qR2C = 0
Note that (P5) and (P6) differ by the cost of manufacturing in the second period and
the constraint (A-19). We show that as cM 2 increases q2S increases under no regulation
and that imposing constraint (A-19) never causes a decrease in q2S. For the OCs and
the values of the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers under no regulation and partial
regulation please refer to Appendix B1.2. In the remainder of the proof, we use the
following notation: cM
I
2 = cM and cM
II
2 = cM + βφ (cC + cD).
Under no regulation when Region A1 is optimal q
∗
2S = 0,
∂γA1
5
∂cM2
= −φα < 0 and
∂(cRC−p2S)
∂cM2
= −α
2
< 0. Hence as cM 2 increases while the amount of remanufacturing
stays the same, the region in which Region A1 stays optimal shrinks. Since the total
remanufacturing level is already zero when Region A1 is optimal under no regulation,
imposing partial regulation cannot decrease the remanufacturing level further.
Under no regulation when Region A2 is optimal, as cM 2 increases, the amount of
remanufacturing increases, i.e
∂qA2
2S
∂cM2
= 1
2(2−α)
> 0, whereas one of the upper bounds
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characterizing the optimal region of Region A2 decreases, i.e.
∂(qA2
1M−q
A2
2S )
∂cM2
= − 1
2(2−α)
<
0, while the second one does not change, i.e.
∂(cRC−p2S)
∂cM2
= 0. If Region A2 remains
optimal as cM 2 increases then either βq1M < q2C or βq1M ≥ q2C holds at cM 2 = cMII2 .
Under the former case, constraint (A-19) is already redundant. We check what happens
when the constraint is binding. Under partial regulation, the optimal remanufacturing
level can be written as qpartial2S =
(φαcM 2−γ3α−φcR+γ5−φcC+γ4)
2αφ(2−α)
in terms of the Lagrangian
multipliers while under no regulation qA22S =
(αcM2−cR−cC)
2α(2−α)
. Hence the difference in the
remanufacturing levels is qpartial2S − qA22S = (γ
partial
5
+γpartial
4
−γpartial
3
α)
2αφ(2−α)
which is positive as long
as γpartial3 = 0. When γ
partial
3 > 0 which also implies that q
partial
2M = 0, the difference is
qpartial2S − qA22S = (γ
partial
5
+γpartial
4
−αγpartial
3
)
2αφ(2−α)
>
(γpartial
5
+γpartial
4
−2γpartial
3
)
2αφ(2−α)
= (2Q−αQ−2cM2+cR+cC)
2α(2−α)
=
qA2
2M
α
> 0. Hence, imposing partial regulation cannot decrease the remanufacturing level.
On the other hand when Region A2 is optimal at cM
I
2 but Region A3 is optimal at
cM
II
2 ,
γA31 (cM
II
2 ) =
φ(2αcM + αcM
II
2 + α
2Q− 2αQ− α2cM − cR − cC)
1 + 2φα− φα2 > 0
which implies cM
II
2 >
2αQ−α2Q−2αcM+α
2cM+cR+cC
α
= Y should hold under Region A3 at
cM
II
2 . The change in the remanufacturing level is positive when q
A3
2S (cM
II
2 )− qA22S (cMI2) =
cR+cC−α(3−α+φα(2−α))cM+α(2−α)(Q+φαcM
II
2
)
2(1+2φα−φα2)α(2−α)
> 0 which can be written as
cM
II
2 >
−cR − cC + α(3− α + φα(2− α))cM − α(2− α)Q
φα2(2− α) = X.
Since qA21M(cM)− qA22S (cM) = 2αQ−α
2Q−3αcM+α
2cM+cR+cC
2α(2−α)
> 0 should hold under Region
A2 at cM
I
2, we conclude that Y −X = (1+2φα−φα
2)(2αQ−α2Q−3αcM+α
2cM+cR+cC)
α2(2−α)φ
> 0. Since
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Y > X, cM
II
2 > Y implies cM
II
2 > X. Hence the remanufacturing level goes up as
increasing cM causes a move from Region A3 from Region A2. Since all available cores are
collected and remanufactured under Region A3 and A4, the lower bound on the collection
level is redundant for this particular situation and also in the rest of the analysis for Policy
A in Part a.
When Region A3 remains optimal, the amount of remanufacturing increases, i.e.
∂qA3
2S
∂cM2
= φα
2(1+2φα−φα2)
> 0, whereas the upper bound characterizing the region in which
Region A3 is optimal decreases, i.e.
∂qA3
2M
∂cM 2
= − 1+2φα
2(1+2φα−φα2)
< 0. When Region A3 is opti-
mal at cM
I
2 but Region A4 is optimal at cM
II
2 , the change in the remanufacturing level is
positive because qA42S (cM
II
2 ) − qA32S (cMI2) =
φα((1−φα2+2φα−α)Q+φαcR+φαcC+(−2φα+α−1)cM)
2(1+2φα−φα2)(1+2φα)
=
αφqA3
2M
(cM
I
2
)
(1+2αφ)
≥ 0. Hence the amount of remanufacturing goes up as the increase in the
cost of manufacturing results in a move to Region A4 from Region A3. When Region
A4 remains optimal, the amount of remanufacturing does not depend on the cost of
manufacturing in the second period.
Next we analyze in detail how the remanufacturing level changes under Policy B. For
the OCs and the values of the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers under no regulation
and partial regulation please refer to Appendix B1.2.
When Region B1 is optimal under no regulation, since q
B1
2S = 0, the amount of re-
manufacturing cannot decrease. On the other hand, as cM 2 increases, the upper bound
characterizing the region in which Region BI is optimal decreases, i.e.
∂γB1
5
∂cM 2
= −2α < 0.
When Region B1 is optimal under cM
I
2 but Region B2 is optimal under cM
II
2 , the reman-
ufacturing level goes up.
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When Region B2 is optimal under no regulation, as cM 2 increases, the amount of
remanufacturing increases, i.e
∂qB2
2S
∂cM2
= 1
2(2−α)
> 0, whereas the upper bound charac-
terizing the optimal region of Region B2 decreases, i.e.
∂(q1M−q2S)
∂cM2
= − 1
2(2−α)
< 0.
When Region B2 stays optimal as cM 2 increases, either βq1M < q2C or βq1M ≥ q2C
holds at cM 2 = cM
II
2 . Under the former case, constraint (A-19) is redundant. We next
analyze what happens when the constraint is binding, i.e. γ1 = 0 and γ4 > 0: Un-
der partial regulation, the optimal remanufacturing level can be written as qpartial2S =
(2αQ+αcR+2αcM2−α
2Q−αcC−4cR−4c
R
C+2αc
R
C)φ+αγ4−2γ3α+γ5α
4αφ(2−α)
in terms of the Lagrangian multipli-
ers while under no regulation qB22S =
(2αQ+αcR+2αcM2−α
2Q−αcC−4cR−4c
R
C+2αc
R
C)
4α(2−α)
. Hence, the
difference between the remanufacturing levels is qpartial2S − qB22S = (γ5+γ4−2γ3)4φ(2−α) which is pos-
itive as long as γ3 = 0. When γ3 > 0 which also implies that q
partial
2M = 0, the difference
is qpartial2S − qB22S = (2Q−αQ−2cM2+cR+cC)4(2−α) =
qB2
2M
2α
> 0. Hence, imposing partial regulation
cannot decrease the remanufacturing level.
Part b. When Policy C is optimal under no regulation the OEM’s problem is
(P7) Max ΠOEM = φ
(
q2M
(
Q− q2M − α
(
qR2C + q2S
)− cM))
+φ (p2Sq2S − cCq2C − cD (q2C − q2S)) + q1M (Q− q1M − cM)
s.t. q1M ≥ q2C ≥ q2S
q2S =
αQ− αq2M − cR − p2S
2α
− (q1M − q2C) ≥ 0
qR2C = q1M − q2C , q2M ≥ 0, p2S ≥ cRC
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whereas under partial regulation the problem is
(P8) Max ΠOEM = φ
(
q2M
(
Q− q2M − α
(
qR2C + q2S
)− (cM + φβ (cC + cD))))
+φ (p2Sq2S − cCq2C − cD (q2C − q2S)) + q1M (Q− q1M − cM)
s.t. q2C + q
R
2C ≥ βq1M
q1M ≥ q2C ≥ q2S
q2S + q
R
2C ≥ 0
q2S =
αQ− αq2M − cR − p2S
2α
− (q1M − q2C)
qR2C = q1M − q2C , q2M ≥ 0, p2S ≥ cRC
For the OCs and the values of the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers under no
regulation and partial regulation please refer to Appendix B1.2.
In Proposition 4 we show that under Policy C, the OEM collects all the available
cores at the beginning of the second period. Therefore as long as Policy C stays optimal,
imposing partial legislation on the first period’s production is redundant. On the other
hand, collecting β percent of the second period production in order to comply with the
legislation increases the manufacturing cost in the second period.
When Region C1 is optimal under no regulation, the amount of remanufacturing does
not change while the upper bound characterizing the optimal region decreases as cM 2
increases, i.e.
∂γC1
5
∂cM2
= −φα
2
< 0. When Region C1 is optimal under cM
I
2 but Region C2 is
optimal under cM
II
2 , the remanufacturing level goes up.
When Region C2 is optimal under no regulation, the amount of remanufacturing
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increases as cM 2 increases, i.e.
∂qC2
2S
∂cM2
= 1
2(2−α)
> 0 while the upper bound characterizing
the feasible region decreases, i.e.
∂(qC2
1M−q
C2
2S )
∂cM2
= − 1
2(2−α)
< 0.
On the other hand when Region C2 is optimal at cM
I
2 but Region C3 is optimal at
cM
II
2 , γ
C3
2 (cM
II
2 ) =
φ(−(2−α)αQ+αcM
II
2
+(2−α)αcM+2φαcC−φα
2cC−cR+cD+2φαcD−φα
2cD)
1+2φα−φα2
> 0 which
implies
cM
II
2 >
φ((2− α)αQ− α(2− α)cM − (2− α)φα(cC + cD) + cR − cD
α
= Y
should hold under Region C3 at cM
II
2 . Besides,
(qC21M − qC22S )(cMI2) =
((2− α)αQ− φα(2− α)(cC + cD)− (3− α)αcM + cR − cD)
2α(2− α) > 0
should hold under Region C2 at cM
I
2.
The change in the remanufacturing level is positive when
qC32S (cM
II
2 )− qC22S (cMI2) =
(2− α)φα(αcM2II − (cC + cD))
−(3− α + φα(2− α))αcM − cD + cR + (2− α)αQ
(1 + 2φα− φα2)2α(2− α) > 0
which implies cM
II
2 >
(2−α)φα(cC+cD)+(3−α+φα(2−α))αcM+cD−cR−(2−α)αQ
(2−α)φα2
= X. Since qC21M(cM)−
qC22S (cM) > 0, we can conclude that
Y −X = (1 + φα(2− α))((2− α)(αQ− φα(cC + cD))− (3− α)αcM + cR − cD)
φα2(2− α) > 0.
Therefore cM
II
2 > Y implies cM
II
2 > X. Hence remanufacturing level goes up as the
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increase in the cost of manufacturing results in moving to Region C3 from Region C2.
When Region C3 remains optimal, the amount of remanufacturing increases, i.e.
∂qC3
2S
∂cM2
= φα
2(1+2φα−φα2)
> 0, whereas the upper bound characterizing the region in which
Region C3 is optimal decreases, i.e.
∂qC3
2M
∂cM2
= − 1+2φα
2(1+2φα−φα2)
< 0. When Region C3 is opti-
mal at cM
I
2 but Region C4 is optimal at cM
II
2 , the change in the remanufacturing level is
qC42S (cM
II
2 )− qC32S (cMI2) =
φα((1+2φα−φα2−α)Q−(1+2φα)cMI2+αcM+φαcR+φαcC)
2(1+2φα)(1+2φα−φα2)
= φα
qC3
2M
(cM
I
2
)
(1+2φα)
≥ 0.
Hence the amount of remanufacturing goes up as the increase in the cost of manufacturing
results in moving to Region C4 from Region C3.
Finally, when Region C4 stays optimal, the amount of remanufacturing does not
depend on the cost of manufacturing in the second period. Therefore the increase in the
cost of manufacturing and the additional bound on the amount of collected items do not
cause a decrease in the amount of remanufacturing as long as imposing partial regulation
does not cause switching between policies.
From Partial Regulation to Full Regulation We complete the proof by analyzing how q2S
changes as full regulation is imposed: In Appendix B1.2, we show that the OCs for regions
where q∗2S ≥ βq∗1M are the same under partial and full regulation. When in a region where
q∗2S = 0 is optimal under partial regulation, amount of remanufacturing definitely goes
up as full regulation is imposed. Hence analyzing the regions where 0 < q∗2S < βq
∗
1M is
optimal, i.e. regions A2, B2 and C2 under partial regulation is sufficient. For the OCs
and the values of the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers for each policy under full
regulation, refer Appendix B1.2.
i. Under partial regulation when A2 is optimal, if q
partial
2S > βRq
partial
1M then imposing full
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regulation does not change q2S . If q
partial
2S < βRq
partial
1M which we can rewrite as cM < B2C,F ,
subregion A1 becomes optimal under full regulation. The difference q
full
2S − qpartial2S is
positive because qfull2S − qpartial2S > 0⇔ cM < B2C,F which holds in the region of interest.
ii. Under partial regulation when B2 is optimal, if q
partial
2S > βRq
partial
1M then imposing
full regulation does not change q2S. If q
partial
2S < βRq
partial
1M which we can rewrite as
cM < B21C,F region B1 becomes optimal under full regulation. Then the difference
qfull2S − qpartial2S is positive because qfull2S − qpartial2S > 0⇔ cM < B21C,F which already holds
in the region of interest.
iii. Under partial regulation when C2 is optimal, if q
partial
2S > βRq
partial
1M then imposing
full regulation does not change q2S. On the other hand, if q
partial
2S < βRq
partial
1M which we
can rewrite as cM < B30C,F region C1 becomes optimal under full regulation. Then the
difference qfull2S − qpartial2S is positive because qfull2S − qpartial2S > 0 ⇔ cM < B30C,F which
holds in the region of interest.
Hence, under full regulation the amount of remanufactured products remains the
same or goes up as long as it is still optimal to play the Policy that was optimal under
partial regulation.
Proof of Corollary 1. When cR > αQ + cC − 2cRC either Policy A or region C5 or
region C8 is optimal. By Proposition 8 as long as Policy A stays optimal as partial (full)
regulation is imposed, the level of remanufacturing remains the same or goes up. Since
qC52S = q
A5
2S and q
C8
2S = q
A8
2S (for optimal quantities under partial regulation see Appendix
B1.2), the result follows from the analysis provided for regions A5 and A8 in the proof of
Proposition 8.
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Proof of Proposition 9. The only regions under which remanufacturing is not feasible
under partial regulation are A1, B1 and C1.
i. Consider regions A1 and C1. In Appendix B1.2 we show that if cM ≤ B2C,P ,
either region A1 or C1 is optimal. Hence some remanufacturing is imposed as long as
cM ≥ B2C,P which can be written as β ≥ −αcM+cR−cDαφ(cC+cD) = β∗.
ii. Consider region B1. In Appendix B1.2 we show that region B1 is optimal when
B2C,P ≤ cM ≤ B21C,P . Thus if policy B stays optimal as legislation is introduced,
some remanufacturing is imposed as long as cM ≥ B21C,P which can be written as
β ≥ (−2α+α2)Q+(4−α)cR−2αcM−αcD+(4−2α)cRC
2αφ(cC+cD)
.
Proof of Proposition 10. Note that when αQ− cD − 2cRC < cR, A1 is the only region
under which there is no remanufacturing. First, we find the threshold θc under partial
regulation: Assume that at point A =
(
cAM , c
A
R
)
remanufacturing is not profitable, i.e. Re-
gion A1 is optimal under partial regulation, hence the optimal production quantities are
qA1M = q
A
2M =
Q−cA
M
−φβ(cC+cD)
2
. The profit at point A is ΠAOEM =
(Q−cA
M
−φβ(cC+cD))
2(1+φ)
4
.
Now consider point B =
(
cBM , c
B
R
)
where cBR < c
A
R, c
B
M > c
A
M and remanufacturing is
profitable, i.e. Region 2 is optimal. The optimal production quantities at point B are
qB1M =
Q− cBM − φβ (cC + cD)
2
,
qB2M =
Q (2− α)− 2(cBM + βφ (cC + cD)) +
(
cBR − cD
)
2 (2− α) ,
qB2R =
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
)
2α (2− α) ,
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and the profit at point B is
ΠBOEM =
φ
(
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
))2
4α (2− α) +
(Q− cBM − φβ (cC + cD))2(1 + φ)
4
.
Now let us compare the profit values obtained at point A where remanufacturing is
not profitable and at point B where remanufacturing becomes profitable:
ΠBOEM − ΠAOEM = ∆ =
φ
(
α(cBM + βφ (cC + cD))−
(
cBR − cD
))2
4α (2− α)
−
(
cBM − cAM
) (
2Q− cBM − cAM − 2βφcD − 2βφcC
)
(1 + φ)
4
Simplifying the difference we get a second order polynomial of cAM , ∆ = c
A
M − cBM +
kc
(cBM−B2C,P )
2
(2X−cB
M
−cA
M
)
where kc =
φα
(1+φ)(2−α)
, B2C,P =
cBR−cD−αβφ(cC+cD)
α
(from in Table B2 in
Appendix B1.2) and X = 2Q−2βφcD−2βφcC. Solving the polynomial we find two roots:
rc1,2 = X ±
√
(cBM −X)2 + kc(cBM −B2C,P )2. Note that the larger root, rc2 is greater than
cBM . The sign of smaller root, r
c
1 depends on ∆(c
A
M = 0) =
(X−cB
M
)2+kc(cBM−B2C,P )
2−X2
2X−cB
M
.
There are two possibilities: (i) If ∆(cAM = 0) < 0 then r
c
1 > 0 and ∆ is positive in
the interval (rc1, c
B
M). (ii) If ∆(c
A
M = 0) > 0 then r
c
1 < 0 and ∆ is positive in the
interval (0, cBM). Hence the profit at point B is higher than the profit at point A when
θC = max {0, rc1} < cAM < cBM .
In addition rc1 decreases as the legislation becomes stricter, i.e.
∂rc1
∂β
= − kcαφ(cC + cD)
(
αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)−
(
cBR − cD
))√
kc(αcBM + αβφ (cC + cD)− (cBR − cD))2 + α2(cBM −X)2
< 0 .
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Now, consider the proof of Proposition 3 and observe that B1M,P = B2C,P and
k > kc. Hence r1 evaluated at k = kc is equal to r
c
1 and r1 increases as k decreases
and thus we conclude that the threshold under competition is higher compared to the
threshold under monopoly.
Proof of Proposition 11. Under Policy A, q2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S
2α
, qR2C = 0, and the
total remanufacturing level q2R = q2S + q
R
2C =
αQ−αq2M−cR−p2S
2α
. Solving for p2S to get
α (Q− q2M − 2q2R)−cR and plugging this expression into the OEM’s problem we obtain:
(P9) Max
q2M , q2R, q2C
Π2OEM = q2R (α (Q− q2M − 2q2R)− cR)
+q2M ((Q− q2M − αq2R)− cM)
−q2CcC − (q2C − q2R) cD − (cC + cD) βφq2M
s.t. βq1M ≤ q2C ≤ q1M , βRq1M ≤ q2R ≤ q2C , q2M ≥ 0
We show that problem (P9) where q2R is a variable (instead of p2S) is equivalent to
OEM’s original problem under Policy A. Compare (P9) to the problem of the monopolist
OEM:
Max
q2M , q2R, q2C
Π2M = q2R (α (Q− q2M − q2R)− cR) + q2M ((Q− q2M − αq2R)− cM)
−q2CcC − (q2C − q2R) cD − (cC + cD) βφq2M
s.t. βq1M ≤ q2C ≤ q1M , βRq1M ≤ q2R ≤ q2C , q2M ≥ 0
Observe that the problem of the monopolist OEM and the problem of the OEM
facing competition differ only in the objective function and Π2OEM = Π2M − q22Rα. As
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the coefficient of q22R is smaller in the competition model, at the optimality q
Competition
2S <
qMonopoly2R holds and thus the optimal amount of remanufacturing for an OEM facing
competition under Policy A can never be higher than that under monopoly.
Proof of Theorem 12. In Theorem 1 we provide eight regions that characterize
the feasible strategies for a monopolist OEM under partial regulation. Using Implicit
Function Theorem, we show that in each of these eight regions, total consumer surplus
decreases as the collection target β increases. Let J(q1M , q2M , q2R, q2C , γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5)
denote the Jacobian of the first order conditions given in (A-5)-(A-8), i.e. f1 =
∂ΠLagr
M
∂q1M
= 0,
f2 =
∂ΠLagr
M
∂q2M
= 0, f3 =
∂ΠLagr
M
∂q2R
= 0, and f4 =
∂ΠLagr
M
∂q2C
= 0 , along with the complementary
slackness conditions, i.e. f5 = γ1(q1M − q2C) = 0, f6 = γ2(q2C − q2R) = 0, f7 = γ3(q2M ) =
0, f8 = γ4 (q2C − βq1M) = 0, and f9 = γ5q2R = 0. Then using implicit function theorem
we obtain the derivatives as
[
∂q∗
1M
∂β
∂q∗
2M
∂β
∂q∗
2R
∂β
∂q∗
2C
∂β
∂γ∗
1
∂β
∂γ∗
2
∂β
∂γ∗
3
∂β
∂γ∗
4
∂β
∂γ∗
5
∂β
]
= −J(q1M , q2M , q2R, q2C , γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5)−1 ·MT
where M =
[
∂f1
∂β
∂f2
∂β
∂f3
∂β
∂f4
∂β
∂f5
∂β
∂f6
∂β
∂f7
∂β
∂f8
∂β
∂f9
∂β
]
is
[
−γ4 −φ2(cC + cD) 0 0 0 0 0 −γ4q1M 0
]
.
Note that the change in surplus S =
q2
1M
2
+
(
αq2
2R+q
2
2M+2αq2Rq2M
2
)
φ with respect to β is
∂S
∂β
= φ
(
(q∗2M + αq
∗
2R)
∂q∗2M
∂β
+ α
∂q∗2R
∂β
(q∗2M + q
∗
2R)
)
+ q∗1M
∂q∗1M
∂β
.
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By plugging in the values of decision variables, we obtain the change in surplus in each
feasible region as in Table A6.
Region Change in Surplus ∂S
∂β
Region Change in Surplus ∂S
∂β
1
−q∗
2M
φ2(cC+cD)−γ
∗
4
q∗
1M
2 5
−q∗
2M
φ2(cC+cD)
2
2
−q∗
2M
φ2(cC+cD)−γ
∗
4
q∗
1M
2 6
−γ∗
4
q∗
1M
2
3
−q∗
2M
φ2(cC+cD)−γ
∗
4
q∗
1M
2 7 0
4
−q∗
2M
φ2(cC+cD)
2 8 0
TABLE A6: The change in consumer surplus in each feasible region
Finally we calculate the surplus S in each region i at cM = BiM,P and show that
the surplus is continuous at the boundaries. Since by IFT, we know that as β increases
surplus decreases in each region, we conclude that as β increases surplus goes down under
partial regulation.
Under full regulation, the optimal strategies are the same as those under partial regu-
lation except the strategy characterized by Region 1 and the upper bound characterizing
that region. Applying IFT we obtain the change in surplus (as β increases) in Region 1
under full regulation as
−q∗
2Mφ
2(cC+cD)−γ
∗
4
q∗
1M
2
≤ 0. Moreover, the surplus is continuous at
the boundary, cM = B1M,F .
Similarly, we analyze how the change in remanufacturing target βR affects total con-
sumer surplus. Under full regulation, in Region 1 applying IFT we obtain the change in
surplus (as βR increases) as
−q∗
1Mγ
∗
5
2
≤ 0. In the other regions, the change in surplus is
zero as the surplus does not depend on βR.
Proof of Proposition 13. We compare the total consumer surplus under monopoly
(SM) and under competition when Policy A is optimal (SA). The difference ∆S =
SM − SA = (qM1M )2−(qA1M )2
2
+
(
α(qM
2R)
2+qM
2M (q
M
2M+2αq
M
2R)
2
− α(qA2S )2+qA2M (qA2M+2αqA2S)
2
)
φ.
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In order to show that ∆S is always nonnegative, we first prove that q
M
1M ≥ qA1M : In
Section B1.2 and B1.2 we derive the bounds on cM characterizing the feasible regions for
the OEM’s policies. Using the bounds, we identify the ordering of eight possible regions
under Policy A as follows: I. B2C,P (B2C,F under full regulation) ≤ B5C,F ≤ B7C,F ≤
B10C,F ≤ B11C,F which implies that if cM is increasing, the optimal regions change in
the following order: A1−A2−A3−A4−A5−A8, II. B2C,P ≤ B5C,F ≤ B6C,F ≤ B9C,F ≤
B18C,F which implies that if cM is increasing, the optimal regions change in the following
order: A1 −A2 − A3 −A4 − A7 − A8, III. B2C,P ≤ B5C,F ≤ B6C,F ≤ B16C,F ≤ B18C,F
which implies that if cM is increasing, the optimal regions change in the following order:
A1 − A2 − A3 − A6 − A7 − A8. In the proof of Theorem 1 we show that there are
eight different feasible regions under monopoly and we also provide the bounds that
characterize each region. It is easy to show that for each one of the eight regions, the lower
bound of Region i under monopoly is smaller than the lower bound that characterizes
Region Ai under competition. This implies that if Region i is optimal under monopoly
then only Region Aj where j ≤ imay be optimal for i ≤ 5, and Region Aj where 5 < j ≤ i
or 1 ≤ j ≤ j − 3 may be optimal for i ≥ 6, under competition. In Section B1.2 and B1.2
we provide how q1M is expressed in terms of the nonzero Lagrangian multipliers in region
each Ai. It is easy to verify that the same expression (in terms of the corresponding
Lagrangian multipliers) hold in Region i for all i under monopoly. Since we know how
the feasible regions under monopoly scenario would overlap with those under competition
scenario (Policy A), for any Region i under monopoly that may overlap with Region Aj
under competition, we compare the expressions and deduce that qM1M in Region i is always
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(weakly) greater than qA1M in Region Aj . Therefore q
M
1M ≥ qA1M and thus the consumer
surplus in the first period is higher under monopoly.
Next we compare the consumer surplus under second period: From the first order con-
dition given in (A-10), we know that under monopoly qM2M =
φ(Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD))+γ
M
3
−2αφqM
2R
2φ
.
Similarly, solving the first order conditions given in (B-1) and (B-2) in Appendix B1.2
for qA2M after plugging in γ
A
7 = 0 (Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint p2S ≥ cRC which
holds as strict inequality under Policy A) and qA2S =
αQ−αq2M−cR−p2s
2α
(see Table 2.3), we
obtain qA2M =
(φ(Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD))+γA3 )−2αφqA2S
2φ
. Therefore the difference between the total
consumer surplus in the second period is
∆S2 = φ
(
α(qM2R)
2 + qM2M(q
M
2M + 2αq
M
2R)
2
− α(q
A
2S)
2 + qA2M(q
A
2M + 2αq
A
2S)
2
)
(A-20)
=
φ
2

α(1− α)(qM2R)2 +
((
φ(Q− cM − βφ(cC + cD)) + γM3
)
2φ
)2
−φ
2

α(1− α)(qA2S)2 +
((
φ(Q− cM − βφ(cC + cD)) + γA3
)
2φ
)2 . (A-21)
Next we analyze four cases depending on the second period manufacturing levels, keeping
in mind that (qM2R)
2 ≥ (qA2S)2 (see Proof of Proposition 8): Case i. If qM2M > 0 and qA2M > 0
then γM3 = 0 and γ
C
3 = 0. Therefore from Equation (A-21) we deduce that second period
surplus is higher under monopoly, i.e. ∆S2 ≥ 0. Case ii. If qM2M = 0 and qA2M = 0 then
Equation (A-20) implies that ∆S2 ≥ 0. Case iii. If qM2M = 0 and qA2M > 0 then γM3 > 0
and γC3 = 0. Therefore from Equation (A-21) we deduce that ∆S2 ≥ 0. Case iv. The
above analysis regarding how optimal regions under monopoly overlap with those under
competition indicate that qA2M can never be zero unless q
M
2M = 0. Thus the case where
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qM2M > 0 and q
A
2M = 0 is not possible.
Therefore both the first period and the second period surplus is higher under monopoly
when compared to those under Policy A of competition.
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B1 Appendix for Chapter 2: Optimality Conditions
In this section we provide the details of how the optimal solutions to the monopoly and
competition scenarios are derived for the problems presented in Chapter 2.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we characterize the optimal regions and the corresponding
optimality conditions (OCs) for a monopolist OEM under different levels of take-back
legislation; however, we do not explain how the redundant OCs are eliminated. In Section
B1.1 we give details of how we identify those redundant OCs. For each one of these
conditions, we show that either it can be expressed in terms of the other necessary OCs
(that are provided in the proof of Theorem 1) or it never assumes a negative value in the
region where cM ≤ cmaxM and cR ≤ cmaxR , and thus it can be eliminated.
In Section B1.2 we characterize the optimal regions and the corresponding OCs for an
OEM facing competition under no, partial and full regulation, respectively. As provided
in Table 2.3, there are three possible optimal policies for the OEM. For each of the three
policies we solve the OEM’s problem by setting up the Lagrangian function and then
solving for the first order conditions and the complementary slackness conditions. After
deriving the OCs, we eliminate the redundant OCs using the approach as in monopoly
problem, as explained above. Then we rewrite the remaining OCs characterizing each
feasible region as bounds on cM . Since the feasible region for Policy C might overlap
with the feasible regions of the other two policies, we also compare the profit of OEM
under Policy C with the profit under Policy A or B in order to figure out which Policy is
optimal in the regions where more than one policy is feasible.
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B1.1 Elimination of the Redundant OCs for the Monopolist
OEM’s Problem
Redundant OCs under No Regulation:
Region 1 (q2R = q2C = 0, q2M > 0): In this region, γ2 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 is redundant.
Region 2 (0 < q2C = q2R < q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q2M =
Q(1−α)−cM+(cR+cC)
2(1−α)
=
(q1M − q2R) + (1− α) q2R ≥ 0 and γ2 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Region 3 (q2R = q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−φ(cR+cC)−(1−φα)cM
2(1+φα(1−α))
=
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0 and γ2 = φ (cD−cR)+(2−α)αcM+αφ(1−α)(cC+cD)−α(1−α)Q(1+φα(1−α)) = γ1 + φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0
are redundant.
Region 4 (q2R = q1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region, q1M =
(1+φα)Q−cM−φ(cR+cC)
2(1+φα)
=
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0, γ2 = φαcM−(cR−cD)+αφ(cC+cR)(1+φα) = γ1+φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0, and γ1 = αcM−cR−cC1+φα =
(1−α)(Q−cM)+γ3
φα
≥ 0 are redundant.
Redundant OCs under Partial Regulation:
Region 1 (0 = q2R < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q2M =
Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)
2
≥ 0
and γ4 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Region 2 (0 < q2R < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q2M = q1M − αq2R ≥ 0 and
γ4 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Region 3 (q2R = βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
q2M+βγ2/2
(1−αβ)
≥ 0 is
redundant.
Region 4 (βq1M < q2C = q2R < q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, γ2 = φ (cC + cD) is
redundant.
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Region 5 (q2R = q1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0 and
γ2 = φ
(cD−cR)+(2−α)αcM+αφ(β+1−α)(cC+cD)−α(1−α)Q
(1+φα(1−α))
= γ1 + φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Region 6 (q2R = βq1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region, q1M =
γ3+φ(Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD))
2φαβ
≥ 0
and γ2 =
γ3+φ(1−αβ)(Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD))
φαβ2
≥ 0 are redundant.
Region 7 (βq1M < q2C = q2R < q1M , q2M = 0): In this region, γ2 = φ (cC + cD) is
redundant.
Region 8 (q2R = q1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0 and
γ2 = γ1 + φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Redundant OCs under Full Regulation:
Region 1 (βRq1M = q2R < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M ≥ 0 is redundant
because ∂q1M
∂cM
< 0 and ∂q1M
∂cR
< 0 and q1M(cM = c
max
M , cR = c
max
R ) =
φβR(cC+cD)
2(1+φβ2Rα(1−α))
>
0. In addition, q2M =
(1−βRα−φβ
2
Rα(α−1))Q+(−1+βRα(1−φβR))(cM+φβ(cC+cD))+φβ
2
Rα(cR−cD)
2(1+φβ2
R
α(1−α))
=
(1− αβR) q1M + βRγ5/2 ≥ 0 and γ4 = φ (cC + cD) are also redundant.
Region 2 (βRq1M < q2R < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): The redundant OCs are the same as
the ones in Region 2 under Partial regulation.
B1.2 Solution of the OEM’s Problem facing Competition
No regulation: Problem Formulation
In Proposition 4, we show that the OEM chooses the quantities and prices so that either
Region R4 or R5 (see Table A5) is optimal for the remanufacturer. If the remanufac-
turer’s optimal solution is in Region R4, the OEM’s problem is given by (P5) (see the
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proof of Proposition 8). The Lagrangian function is ΠLagrOEM = ΠOEM + γ1(q1M − q2C) +
γ2(q2C − q2S) + γ3q2M + γ5q2S + γ7(cRC − p2S). Plugging in qR2C and q2S in the Lagrangian
function and taking the first order derivatives, we obtain the following OCs:
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2M
=
φ ((2− α)Q− 2cM + cR − cD − 2 (2− α) q2M ) + 2γ3 + γ2 − γ5
2
= 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − 2q1M = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2C
= γ2 − γ1 − φ (cC + cD) = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂p2S
=
φ (αQ− cR − cD − 2p2S)− 2αγ7 + γ2 − γ5
2α
= 0 .
We can show that the Hessian is negative semidefinite and the first order conditions
ensure optimality.
From the first order condition
∂ΠLagr
OEM
∂q2C
= 0, γ2 = γ1 + φ (cC + cD) > 0 and hence
q2C = q2S . On the other hand, since q1M − αq2S > 0, from the first order conditions, we
conclude that 2φ (q1M − αq2S) = −γ3−αγ7+2φq2M +γ1φ > 0. Hence when q2M = 0, i.e.
γ3 > 0 , q1M = q2C should hold. Using these properties we solve the OEM’s problem under
no regulation for each region. Note that when cRC > p
∗
2S we obtain Policy A solutions
whereas when the constraint is tight, i.e. cRC = p
∗
2S we obtain Policy B solutions.
Solving the OEM’s problem under Region R5 of remanufacturer’s solution we obtain
Policy C solutions. Given the remanufacturer plays R5 the OEM’s problem can be
written (P7) (see the proof of Proposition 8). Then the Lagrangian function is ΠLagrOEM =
ΠOEM + γ1(q1M − q2C) + γ2(q2C − q2S) + γ3q2M + γ5q2S + γ7(p2S − cRC). Plugging in qR2C
and q2S in the Lagrangian function and taking the first order derivatives, we obtain the
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following OCs:
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2M
=
φ ((2− α)Q− 2cM + cR − cD − 2 (2− α) q2M ) + 2γ3 + γ2 − γ5
2
= 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − 2q1M − φp2S − φcD + γ2 − γ5 = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2C
= γ5 − γ1 + φ (p2S − cC) = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂p2S
=
φ (αQ− cR − cD − 2p2S) + 2αγ7 + γ2 − γ5 − 2αφ(q1M − q2C)
2α
= 0 .
From the first order condition
∂ΠLagr
OEM
∂q2C
= 0 we deduce that γ1 = γ5 + φ (p2S − cC) > 0
and hence q2C = q1M . On the other hand, since q1M − αq2S > 0 should hold, from the
first order conditions, we can conclude that 2φ (q1M − αq2S) − 2φq2M + φ2(cC + cD) =
−γ3+αγ7+γ2φ > 0. With proposition 5 we show that p2S > cC , i.e. γ7 = 0 under Policy
C. Hence when q2M = 0, i.e. γ3 > 0 , q2S = q2C should hold. Using these properties we
solve the OEM’s problem under no regulation for region C.
The OCs that should be satisfied under each region are given in sections B1.2-B1.2
below. After the redundant OCs are eliminated we rewrite the remaining conditions as
bounds on cM and the bounds on cM characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM
are provided in Table B1.
OCs for No Regulation: Policy A where p∗2S < c
R
C:
Region A1 (q2S = q2C = 0, q2M > 0): In this region, q1M = q2M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0 and
γ2 = φ
(
cRC + cD
) ≥ 0 are redundant. Remaining OCs are γ5 = φ (−αcM + cR + cC) ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≤ B1C,N and cRC − p2S =
−α(Q+cM)+2(cR+cRC)
2
≥ 0 which can
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Bound Expression
B1C,N
cR+cC
α
B2C,N
−αQ+2(cR+cRC)
α
B3C,N
α(2−α)Q+cC+cR
α(3−α)
B4C,N
(1−α+φα(2−α))Q+φα(cC+cR)
(1−α+2φα)
B5C,N
(1−(2−α)φα−α)αQ+(2+φα(2−α))cR+2(1+φα(2−α))c
R
C
−(2−α)φαcC
(3−α)α
B6C,N
−φα2Q−αφcC+(1+αφ)cR+(1+2φα)c
R
C
α
B7C,N
cR−cD
α
B8C,N
(2−α)αQ+cR−φα(2−α)cC−(1+φα(2−α))cD
(3−α)α
B9C,N
−α(2−α)Q+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C
+αcC
2α
B10C,N
α(2−α)Q+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C
+αcC
2α(3−α)
TABLE B1: Bounds characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM facing competition
under no regulation
be written as cM ≤ B2C,N . Since B2C,N − B1C,N = (cR−αQ+2c
R
C+cC)
α
we conclude that
if cR > αQ − 2cRC + cC then cRC − p2S > 0 is redundant. On the other hand, when
cR < αQ− 2cRC + cC holds, γ5 ≥ 0 is redundant.
Region A2 (0 < q2S = q2C < q1M , q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0, γ2 =
φ
(
cRC + cD
) ≥ 0, and q2M = (2−α)Q−2cM+cC+cR2(2−α) = (q1M − q2S) + (1− α) q2S ≥ 0 are
redundant. Remaining OCs are q2S =
αcM−cC−cR
2α(2−α)
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥
B1C,N , q1M − q2S = α(2−α)Q−α(3−α)cM+cC+cR2α(2−α) ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B3C,N
and cRC − p2S = −αQ−cC+cR+2c
R
C
2
≥ 0 which can be written as cR > αQ+ cC − 2cRC.
Region A3 (q2S = q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM+φ(αcM−cC−cR)
2(1+2φα−φα2)
=
2q2M+γ1
2(1−α)
≥ 0 and γ2 = (−2α+α
2)φQ−φcR+(3α−α2)φcM+(2φα−φα2)φcC+(1+2φα−φα2)φcD
(1+2φα−φα2)
= γ1 +
φ
(
cRC + cD
) ≥ 0 are redundant. Remaining OCs are
q2M =
(1− α+ φα (2− α))Q− (1− α+ 2φα) cM + φα (cC + cR)
2 (1 + 2φα− φα2) ≥ 0
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which can be written as cM ≤ B4C,N , γ1 = (−2α+α
2)φQ+φ(3α−α2)cM−φcC−φcR
(1+2φα−φα2)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≥ B3C,N , and
cRC − p2S =
(1− (2− α)φα− α)αQ+ (2 + φα (2− α)) cR + 2 (1 + φα (2− α)) cRC
− (3− α)αcM − (2− α)φαcC
2 (1 + 2φα− φα2) ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≤ B5C,N .
Region A4 (q2S = q1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region q1M =
(1+φα)Q−cM−φcC−φcR
2(2φα+1)
=
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0 and γ2 = −φ(αQ−2αcM−(1+2αφ)cD+cR−2αφcC)(1+2φα) = γ1 + φ(cC + cD) ≥ 0 and
γ1 =
−φ(αQ−2αcM+cC+cR)
(1+2φα)
= (1−α)φ(Q−cM )+γ3
φα
≥ 0 are redundant. Hence γ3 ≥ 0 and cRC −
p2S ≥ 0 are enough to ensure the optimality of this region. Remaining OCs are γ3 =
−(1−α+φα(2−α))φQ+(1−α+2φα)φcM−φ
2α(cC+cR)
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 which can be expressed as cM ≥ B4C,N and
cRC − p2S = −φα
2Q−αcM−αφcC+(1+αφ)cR+(1+2φα)c
R
C
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B6C,N .
OCs for No Regulation: Policy B where p∗2S = c
R
C:
Before proceeding with the details of possible regions, we prove that in this region q∗2C <
q∗1M . Assume that q2C = q1M , then q2S = q2C = q1M =
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C
2α
should hold. Then
the OEM’s profit is
ΠB5OEM =
α2 (−1 + 2φα− 4φ) q22M
−2α (φα(α− 2)Q+ α(2φ− 1)cM − αφcC + (1− αφ)cR + cRC) q2M
+
(
αQ− cR − cRC
) (
αQ− 2αφcC + 2αφcRC − 2αcM + cR + cRC
)
4α2
.
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If the OEM increases p2S such that the new price is p
new
2S = p2S + δ = c
R
C + δ while
keeping q2M the same, the optimal production amounts become q
new
2S = q
new
2C = q
new
1M =
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C
−δ
2α
. Then the profit ΠB5
new
OEM is
ΠB5OEM+
δ
(−δ − 2α(φδ + q2M ) + 2α(φαQ+ cM)− 2(1 + 2αφ)cRC − 2cR − 2αφ(cR − cC))
4α2
.
Hence the difference ΠB5
new
OEM − ΠB5OEM is positive as long as 0 ≤ δ ≤ δUB where
δUB = 2
(
φα2Q− αq2M + αcM − (1 + 2αφ)cRC − (1 + αφ)cR + φαcC
)
1 + 2φα
.
Setting γ5 = 0, p2S = c
R
C and solving the OCs for γ7, we get
γ7 =
φα2Q− cRC − 2αφcRC − αφcR − cR − αq2M + αcM + φαcC
2α2
.
Hence δUB ≥ 0 and also ΠB5newOEM −ΠB5OEM ≥ 0 for any δ ≤ δUB. Finally note that the proof
does not depend on the value of q2M and also goes through when q2M = 0.
Region B1 (q2S = q2C = 0, q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0, γ2 =
φ
(
cRC + cD
) ≥ 0, and q2M = αQ−cR−cRCα = (2γ7α+γ4)+φ(cRC−cC)φα ≥ 0 are redundant. Re-
maining OCs are γ7 =
φ(αQ+αcM−2cR−2cRC)
α2
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B2C,N and
γ5 =
φ(−α(2−α)Q−2αcM+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)cRC+αcC)
α
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B9C,N . In
this region B9C,N −B2C,N = (αQ−cR−2c
R
C
+cC)
2
≥ 0 and thus cR < αQ− 2cRC + cC should.
Region B2 (0 < q2S = q2C < q1M , q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0, γ2 =
φ
(
cRC + cD
) ≥ 0, and q2M = Q(2−α)−2cM+cR+cC2(2−α) = (q1M − q2S) + (1− α) q2S + γ7α2φ ≥ 0 are
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redundant. Remaining OCs are q2S =
α(2−α)Q+2αcM−(4−α)cR−2(2−α)c
R
C−αcC
4α(2−α)
≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≥ B9C,N , q1M − q2S = α(2−α)Q−2α(3−α)cM+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C+αcC
4α(2−α)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≤ B10C,N and γ7 = φ(αQ−cR−2c
R
C+cC)
2α
≥ 0 which can be written as
cR < αQ+ cC − 2cRC .
OCs for No Regulation: Policy C where p∗2S > c
R
C:
Recall that q2C = q1M under Policy C by Proposition 4.
Region C1 (q2S = 0, q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM−φ(cC+cD)
2
≥ 0
is satisfied as long as γ1 ≥ 0 and q2M = Q−cM2 ≥ 0 is also redundant. In addition
γ1 =
φα(Q−cM)−2φ(cC+cD)
2
= φ (p2S − cC) + γ5 ≥ 0 is redundant p2S − cC > p2S − cRC ≥ 0.
Remaining OCs are γ5 = −φ (αcM − cR + cD) ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B7C,N
and p2S−cRC =
α(Q+cM )−2(cR+cRC)
2
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B2C,N . In this region
B7C,N − B2C,N = (αQ−cR−2c
R
C
−cD)
α
> 0 and thus cR < αQ− 2cRC − cD should hold.
Region C2 (0 < q2S < q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φ(cC+cD)
2
≥
0 and γ1 =
φαQ−φ(cR+cD−2cC)
2
= φ (p2S − cC) > φ
(
p2S − cRC
) ≥ 0 are redundant. In
addition q2M =
(2−α)Q−2cM−cD+cR
2(2−α)
≥ 0 is also redundant because q1M − q2M − αq2S =
− (cC + cD)φ/2 < 0, so q1M−q2M−αq2S < 0 and q1M−q2S < q1M−αq2S < q2M and thus
(q1M − q2S) ≥ 0 implies q2M ≥ 0. Remaining OCs are q2S = αcM+cD−cR2α(2−α) ≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≥ B7C,N , q1M − q2S = (2−α)αQ−(3−α)αcM+cR−φα(2−α)cC−(1+φα(2−α))cD2α(2−α) ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≤ B8C,N , and p2S − cRC = αQ−cR−cD−2c
R
C
2
> 0 which can
be written as cR < αQ − 2cRC − cD. Note that B8C,N − B7C,N > 0 can be written as
cR < −φcCα− φcDα + αQ+ cD, which is already satisfied when cR < αQ− 2cRC − cD.
Region C3 (q2S = q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM+φ(αcM−cC−cR)
2(1+2φα−φα2)
=
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2γ1+(Q−cM)(2−φα)
2(2+φα(2−α))
≥ 0 and γ1 = φ (p2S − cC) > φ
(
p2S − cRC
) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are q2M =
(1−α+2φα)(Q−cM )−φα(αQ−cC−cR)
2(1+2φα−φα2)
≥ 0 which can be written
as cM ≤ B4C,N , γ2 = −α(2−α)φQ−φcR+(3−α)φαcM+φα(2−α)φcC+(1+φα(2−α))φcD(1+φα(2−α)) ≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≥ B8C,N , and p2S − cRC > 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B5C,N .
Since B5C,N − B8C,N = (1+2φα−φα
2)(−αQ+cR+2cRC+cD)
α(3−α)
, cM ≥ B5C,N is active when cR >
αQ− 2cRC − cD.
Region C4 (q2S = q1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region, q1M =
(1+φα)Q−cM−φcC−φcR
2(2φα+1)
=
Q−cM+γ1
2(1+φα)
≥ 0 and γ1 = φ
2α2Q+φαcM−φ(φα+1)cC−φ(φα+1)cR
(1+2φα)
= φ (p2S − cC) > φ
(
p2S − cRC
) ≥
0 are redundant. In addition, γ2 =
−φ(αQ−2αcM−(1+2αφ)cD+cR−2αφcC)
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 is redundant
because γ3 − φαγ2 = −φα (cC + cD) − (1− α) (Q− cM) < 0 which implies that γ3 <
φαγ2 < γ2. Hence γ3 ≥ 0 and p2S − cRC ≥ 0 are enough to ensure the optimality of this
region. Remaining OCs are γ3 =
−(1−α+φα(2−α))φQ+(1−α+2φα)φcM−φ
2α(cC+cR)
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 which can
be expressed as cM ≥ B4C,N and p2S − cRC = φα
2Q+αcM+αφcC−(1+αφ)cR−(1+2φα)c
R
C
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≥ B6C,N .
Comparison of Profits of Regions B1 and B2 with C1 and C2:
Note that Policy B is feasible in the region where B2C,N ≤ cM ≤ B10C,N and cR ≤
αQ − 2cRC + cC . When we compare the bounds of regions of Policies B and C, at cR =
αQ−2cRC+cC we find that B10C,N−B8C,N = (cD+cC)(1+4φ−2φα)2(3−α) > 0 and B9C,N−B7C,N =
(cD + cC)/2 > 0. Hence Region B1 overlaps with at least Region C1 and C2 whereas
Region B2 overlaps with at least Region C2 and C3. Observe that as long as C3 or C4
is feasible, the profit from that region is higher than the profit under any other possible
feasible region at the same point. Hence we proceed with comparison of profits under
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Regions B1 and B2 with profits under Regions C1 and C2.
Under both B1 and B2, γ1 = 0, γ3 = 0, p2S = c
R
C , and q2C = q2S hold. Plugging these
into the first order conditions and solving for q2M we get q2M =
Q−αQ+cR−cM+c
R
C
+γ7α/φ
2−α
.
Also note that qB11M = q
B2
1M =
Q−cM
2
.
Under both C1, C2 γ3 = 0, γ2 = 0, p2S = c
R
C + δ > c
R
C , and q2C = q1M hold. Plugging
these into first order conditions and solving for q2M we get q2M =
Q−αQ+cR−cM+c
R
C
+δ
2−α
. Also
note that qC11M = q
C2
1M =
Q−cM−φ(cC+cD)
2
. Plugging these values into the profit function, we
find the condition under which B regions would give higher profit.
ΠBOEM − ΠCOEM =
φδ
(−αQ+ 2cRC + cD + cR + δ)
α (2− α)
+
γB7 α
(
φαQ− γB7 α− 2φcRC + φcC − φcR
)
φ2 (2− α)
+
φ (cC + cD) (−α(2− α)(cD + cC)φ)
4α(2− α)
+
φ (cC + cD)
(−2α(3− α)cM + 4cR + 2α(1− α)Q+ 4cRC)
4α(2− α)
=
−δC(γC5 + φδC)
α (2− α) +
γB7 α(γ
B
5 + αγ
B
7 )
φ2 (2− α)
+
φ (cC + cD)
(−φαcC − φcDα− 2αcM + 2αqun2M + 2cRC + 2cR)
4α
> 0
where qun2M =
(Q−αQ+cR−cM+cRC)
2−α
Note that when cC + cD is high, Policy B is more likely to be optimal.
Partial regulation: Problem Formulation
Given the remanufacturer plays R4 (see Table A5), the OEM’s problem is given by
(P6) (see the proof of Proposition 8). Then the Lagrangian function is ΠLagrOEM = Π2M +
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γ1(q1M−q2C)+γ2(q2C−q2S)+γ3(q2M)+γ4(qR2C+q2C−βq1M)+γ5(qR2C+q2S)+γ7(cRC−p2S).
Plugging in qR2C and q2S in the Lagrangian function and taking the first order derivatives,
we obtain the following OCs:
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2M
=
φ ((2− α)Q− 2cM − 2βφ(cC + cD))
φ (cR − cD − 2 (2− α) q2M) + 2γ3 + γ2 − γ5
2
= 0 , (B-1)
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q1M
= Q− cM − γ4β + γ1 − 2q1M = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2C
= γ2 − γ1 + γ4 − φ (cC + cD) = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂p2S
=
φ (αQ− cR − cD − 2p2S)− 2αγ7 + γ2 − γ5
2α
= 0 . (B-2)
Note that the Hessian is still negative semidefinite, so first order conditions ensure opti-
mality. From the first order condition
∂ΠLagr
OEM
∂q2C
= 0, γ2+γ4 = γ1+φ (cC + cD) > 0 and hence
q2C = max(q2S , βq1M). On the other hand, since q1M−αq2R > 0 should hold, from the first
order conditions we conclude that 2φ(q1M−αq2R−q2M ) = −αγ7−γ3+(1− β)φγ1+βφγ2 >
0 holds. Hence when q2M = 0, i.e. γ3 > 0, γ2 = γ1 = 0 cannot hold which means that
q1M > q2C > q2R cannot be optimal if there is no second period manufacturing. Using
these properties, we solve the OEM’s problem under no regulation for each region. When
cRC > p
∗
2S we obtain Policy A solutions whereas when the constraint is tight, i.e. c
R
C = p
∗
2S
we obtain Policy B solutions.
On the other hand, solving the OEM’s problem under Region R5 (see Table A5) of
remanufacturer’s solution we obtain Policy C solutions. Under Region R5 the OEM’s
problem is given in (P8) (see the proof of Proposition 8). The Lagrangian function is
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ΠLagrOEM = ΠOEM+γ1(q1M−q2C)+γ2(q2C−q2S)+γ3(q2M )+γ4(qR2C+q2C−βq1M)+γ5(qR2C+
q2S) + γ7(c
R
C − p2S). Plugging in qR2C and q2S in the Lagrangian function and taking the
first order derivatives, we obtain the following OCs:
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2M
=
φ ((2− α)Q− 2cM − 2φβ(cC + cD) + cR − cD − 2 (2− α) q2M)
+2γ3 + γ2 − γ5
2
= 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − 2q1M − φp2S − φcD + γ2 − γ5 + γ4 − βγ4 = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2C
= γ5 − γ1 + φ (p2S − cC) = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂p2S
=
φ (αQ− cR − cD − 2p2S) + 2αγ7 + γ2 − γ5 − 2α(q1M − q2C)
2α
= 0 .
From the first order conditions, γ1 = γ5 + φ (p2S − cC) > 0 and hence q2C = q1M . On
the other hand, since q1M − αq2S > 0, from the first order conditions, we conclude that
2φ (q1M − αq2S − q2M + (1− β)φ(cC + cD)/2) = −γ3 + γ2φ > 0. Hence when q2M = 0,
i.e. γ3 > 0, q2S = q2C . Using these properties, we solve the OEM’s problem under no
regulation for region C.
The OCs that should be satisfied under each region are given in sections B1.2-B1.2
below. After the redundant OCs are eliminated we rewrite the remaining conditions as
bounds on cM and the bounds on cM characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM
facing competition under partial regulation are provided in Table B2 and B3.
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OCs for Partial Regulation: Policy A where p∗2S < c
R
C:
Region A1 (0 = q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φβcC−βφcD
2
≥
0, q2M =
Q−cM−φβcC−φβcD
2
≥ 0, and γ4 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ5 = φ (−αcM + cR − cD − αβφ (cC + cD)) ≥ 0 which can be
written as cM ≤ B2C,P and cRC − p2S = 2c
R
C−αQ−αcM+2cR−αβφcC−αβφcD
2
≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≤ B3C,P . Note that B3C,P − B2C,P = cR−αQ+2c
R
C+cD
α
. Hence if cR >
αQ−2cRC−cD then cRC−p2S > 0 is redundant. On the other hand, when cR < αQ−2cRC−cD
holds, γ5 ≥ 0 is redundant.
Region A2 (0 < q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φβcC−φβcD
2
≥
0, q2M =
(2−α)Q−2(cM+φβcC+φβcD)+cR−cD
2(2−α)
= q1M − αq2S ≥ 0, and γ4 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are
redundant.
Remaining OCs are q2S =
αcM+αβφcC+αβφcD−cR+cD
2α(2−α)
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥
B2C,P , βq1M − q2S = (2−β)βαQ−(β(2−α)+1)αcM−(β(2−α)+1)αβφcC−((β(2−α)+1)βαφ+1)cD+cR2α(2−α) ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≤ B5C,F , and cRC − p2S = (
−αQ+2cR
C
+cR+cD)
2α
≥ 0 which can be
written as cR > αQ− 2cRC − cD.
Region A3 (q2S = βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD)+βγ2
2
=
Q−cm
2
− βγ4
2
≥ 0 is redundant.
Remaining OCs are q2M ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B6C,F , γ2 ≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≥ B5C,F , γ4 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B7C,F , and cRC−p2S ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≤ B8C,F . AsB8C,F−B7C,F = −(1+2φαβ
2−φα2β2)(αQ−2cRC−cR+cC)
α(1+β(2−α))
,
if cR > αQ − 2cRC + cC then cRC − p2S > 0 is redundant. On the other hand, when
cR < αQ− 2cRC + cC holds, γ4 ≥ 0 is redundant. Also note that in order for this region
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to be feasible B8C,F − B5C,F = −(1+2φαβ
2−φα2β2)(αQ−2cRC−cR−cD)
α(1+β(2−α))
> 0 should be satisfied.
Therefore this region can be optimal only if αQ− 2cRC − cD < cR is satisfied.
Region A4 (βq1M < q2S = q2C < q1M , q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0 and
γ2 = φ (cC + cD) ≥ 0 are redundant. In addition, q2S = α(cM+βφcC+βφcD)−cC−cR2α(2−α) ≥ 0 is
redundant because q2S − βq1M ≥ 0 holds already.
Remaining OCs are q2M =
(2−α)Q−2(cM+βφcC+βφcD)+cC+cR
2(2−α)
≥ 0 which can be written as
cM ≤ B9C,F , q1M − q2S = α(2−α)Q−α(3−α)cM+(1−αβφ)cC−αβφcD+cR2α(2−α) ≥ 0 which can be written
as cM ≤ B10C,F , q2S − βq1M = −βα(2−α)Q+(α+2βα−βα
2)cM−(1−αβφ)cC+αβφcD−cR
2α(2−α)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≥ B7C,F , and cRC−p2S = (
−αQ+2cRC−cC+cR)
2α
≥ 0 which can be written
as cR > αQ− 2cRC + cC .
Region A5 (q2S = q1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0 and
γ2 = γ1 + (cC + cD)φ ≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are cRC − p2S ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B12C,F , q2M ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≤ B11C,F , and γ1 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B10C,F .
In order for this region to be feasible B12C,F−B10C,F = −(1+2φα−φα
2)(αQ−2cRC−cR+cC)
α(3−α)
> 0
and thus αQ− 2cRC + cC < cR should be satisfied.
Region A6 (q2S = βq1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region q1M =
(1+αβφ)Q−cM−βφ(cC+cR)
2(2αβ2φ+1)
=
Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD)+βγ2
2
= Q−cM−βγ4
2
≥ 0 and γ2 = φα(1−2β)Q+2αβφ(cM+φβ(cC+cD))+φ(cD−cR)2αβ2φ+1 =
γ3+φ(1−αβ)(Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD))
φαβ2
≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ3 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B6C,F , γ4 ≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≤ B16C,F , and cRC − p2S ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B17C,F . As
B17C,F −B16C,F = −(1+2φαβ
2)(αQ−2cRC−cR+cC)
2αβ
, if cR > αQ− 2cRC + cC then cRC − p2S > 0
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is redundant. On the other hand, when cR < αQ− 2cRC + cC holds, γ4 ≥ 0 is redundant.
Region A7 (βq1M < q2C = q2S < q1M , q2M = 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0 is
redundant. In addition q2S =
αQ−cC−cR
4α
≥ is redundant because q2S − βq1M ≥ 0 holds
already.
Remaining OCs are γ3 = − (2−α)Q−2(cM+φβcC+φβcD)+cC+cR2 ≥ 0 which can be written
as cM > B9C,F , q1M − q2C = αQ−2αcM+cC+cR4α ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B18C,F ,
q2C − βq1M = α(1−2β)Q+2αβcM−cC−cR4α ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B16C,F , and
cRC − p2S = φ(
−αQ+2cR
C
−cC+cR)
2
which can be written as cR > αQ− 2cRC + cC .
Region A8 (q2S = q1M = q2C , q2M = 0): In this region q1M =
(1+αφ)Q−cM−φcR−φcC
2(2αφ+1)
=
Q−cM+γ1
2
≥ 0 and γ2 = γ1 + (cC + cD)φ ≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ3 = φ
−(1−α+φα(2−α))Q+(1−α+2φα)cM+(1+2φα)βφ(cC+cD)−φα(cC+cR)
(1+2φα)
≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≥ B11C,F , γ1 = −φ(αQ+cC−2αcM+cR)2αφ+1 ≥ 0 which can be written
as cM ≥ B18C,F , and cRC − p2S = (2αφ+1)c
R
C−α
2φQ−αcM+(1+αφ)cR−αφcC
2αφ+1
≥ 0 which can be
written as cM ≤ B19C,F . In order for this region to be feasible B19C,F − B18C,F =
− (1+2φα)(αQ−2c
R
C−cR+cC)
2α
> 0 and thus αQ− 2cRC + cC < cR should be satisfied.
OCs for Partial Regulation: Policy B where p∗2S = c
R
C:
First we prove that under Policy B, q∗2C < q
∗
1M . Assume that it is optimal to collect and
remanufacture all the items, i.e. q2S = q2C = q1M =
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C
2α
and p2S = c
R
C . Then
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the profit can be written as follows:
ΠB5OEM =
α2 (2φα− 1− 4φ) q22M
+
(
αQ− cR − cRC
) (
α(Q− 2φ (cC − cRC)− 2cM) + cR + cRC)
−2α (φα2Q− αcM − αφcC − αφcR + cR + cRC) q2M
+4α2φ (Q− cM − βφcC − βφcD) q2M
4α2
If the OEM increases p2S such that the new price is p
new
2S = p2S + δ = c
R
C + δ while
keeping q2M the same, the optimal production levels become q
new
2S = q
new
2C = q
new
1M =
αQ−αq2M−cR−c
R
C−δ
2α
. Then the OEM’s profit is
ΠB5
new
OEM =
(
αQ− cR − cRC − δ
) (
α(Q− 2φ (cC − cRC − δ)− 2cM) + cR + cRC + δ)
−2α (φα2Q− αcM − αφcC − αφcR + cR + cRC + δ) q2M
+4α2φ (Q− cM − βφcC − βφcD) q2M + α2 (2φα− 1− 4φ) q22M
4α2
.
The change in profit ΠB5
new
OEM − ΠB5OEM is
δ
(
2φα2Q+ 2αcM − 2(1 + φα)cR − 2(1 + 2φα)cRC + 2αφcC − 2αq2M − (1 + 2φα) δ
)
4α2
.
Note that it is positive as long as 0 ≤ δ ≤ δUB where
δUB = 2
φα2Q+ αcM − αq2M − cR − φα(cR − cC + 2cRC)− cRC
1 + 2φα
=
4α2γ7
1 + 2φα
.
212
Hence δUB ≥ 0 and also ΠB5newOEM −ΠB5OEM ≥ 0 for any δ ≤ δUB. Finally note that the proof
does not depend on the value of q2M and also goes through when q2M = 0.
Region B1 (0 = q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φβcC−φβcD
2
≥ 0
and γ4 = (cC + cD)φ ≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ5 =
−α(2−α)Q+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C−2αcM−α(2βφ+1)cD−2αβφcC
α
which can
be written as cM ≤ B21C,P and γ7 = φ−2c
R
C
+αQ+αcM−2cR+αβφcC+αβφcD
α2
≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≥ B3C,P . In order for this region to be feasible B21C,P − B3C,P =
αQ−2cRC−cR−cD
2
> 0 and thus cR < αQ − cD − 2cRC should be satisfied. Hence q2M =
αQ−cRC−cR
α
≥ 0 is also redundant.
Region B2 (0 < q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φβ(cC+cD)
2
≥ 0
and q2M =
(2−α)Q+cR−cD−2cM−2βφcC−2βφcD
2(2−α)
= (2q1Mφ−2q2Sαφ+γ7α)
2φ
≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are q2S =
2(2−α)Q−(4−α)cR−2(2−α)c
R
C+2αcM+2αβφcC+α(1+2βφ)cD
4α(2−α)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≥ B21C,P , γ7 = φ(αQ−2c
R
C
−cR−cD)
2α
≥ 0 which can be written as
cR < αQ− cD − 2cRC , and βq1M − q2S ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B23C,F .
Region B3 (q2S = βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD)+βγ2
2
≥ 0
is redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ2 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B23C,F , q2M ≥ 0 which can
be written as cM ≤ B24C,F , γ4 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B25C,F , and γ7 ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≥ B8C,F . As B23C,F −B8C,F = (1+2φβ
2(2−α))(αQ−2cRC−cR−cD)
1+β(2−α)
,
if cR < αQ − 2cRC − cD then γ7 ≥ 0 is redundant. On the other hand, when cR >
αQ − 2cRC − cD holds, γ2 ≥ 0 is redundant. Also in order for this region to be feasible
B25C,F −B8C,F = (1+2φβ
2(2−α))(αQ−2cRC−cR+cC)
1+β(2−α)
> 0 and thus cR < αQ+ cC − 2cRC should
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be satisfied.
Region B4 (βq1M < q2C = q2S , q2M > 0): In this region q1M =
Q−cM
2
, γ2 = φ (cC + cD),
and q2S =
(2−α)αQ−(4−α)cR−2(2−α)c
R
C
+2αcM−α(1−2φβ)cC+2αφβcD
4α(2−α)
≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are q2M =
(2−α)Q+cR+cC−2cM−2βφcC−2βφcD
2(2−α)
≥ 0 which can be written as
cM ≤ B9C,F , q1M − q2C = Qα(2−α)+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C−2α(3−α)cM+α(1−2βφ)cC−2αβφcD
4α(2−α)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≤ B27C,F , q2C − βq1M ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B25C,F ,
and γ7 = φ
(αQ−2cRC+cC−cR)
2α
≥ 0 which can be written as cR < αQ− 2cRC + cC .
Region B6 (q2S = βq1M = q2C , q2M = 0): Under this region, q1M =
αQ−cR−c
R
C
2βα
≥ 0
is redundant because this region can be optimal only if cR < αQ + cC − 2cRC which
guarantees that q1M is positive. In addition, γ2 =
(1−β)αQ+β2αφ(cC+cD)−c
R
C
−cR+βαcM
αβ2
=
γ3+αγ7+2φ(1−αβ)q1M
βφ
≥ 0 is also redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ7 =
(α+α2β2φ−αβ)Q+αβcM−(1+2αβ2φ)cRC−(1+αβ2φ)cR+αβ2φcC
2α2β2
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≥ B17C,F , γ4 = −(1−β)αQ−βαcM+cR+c
R
C
αβ2
≥ 0 which can be written
as cM ≤ B28C,F , and γ3 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B24C,F . Also in order for
this region to be feasible B28C,F − B17C,F = φβ(αQ − 2cRC − cR + cC) > 0 and thus
cR < αQ+ cC − 2cRC should be satisfied.
Region B7 (βq1M < q2C = q2S, q2M = 0) In this region, q1M =
Q−cM
2
≥ 0 and q2S =
αQ−cR−c
R
C
2α
≥ 0 are redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ3 =
−(2−α)Q−cR−cC+2cM+2βφcC+2βφcD
2
≥ 0 which can be written
as cM ≥ B9C,F , q1M − q2C = −αcM+cR+c
R
C
2α
which can be written as cM ≤ B29C,F , γ7 =
φ
(αQ−2cRC+cC−cR)
2α
which can be written as cR < αQ − 2cRC + cC , and q2C − βq1M =
(1−β)αQ+βαcM−cR−c
R
C
2α
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B28C,F .
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OCs for Partial Regulation: Policy C where p∗2S > c
R
C :
In this region q2C = q1M by Proposition 4. The remaining regions and the corresponding
OCs are provided below:
Region C1 (0 = q2S < q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φcD−φcC
2
≥ 0
is redundant because it is satisfied as long as γ1 > 0 is satisfied. In addition, q2M =
Q−cM−βφ(cD+cC)
2
≥ 0 and γ1 = φ (αQ−αcM−(2+αβφ)(cC+cD))2 = φ (p2S − cC) > φ
(
p2S − cRC
) ≥
0 are also redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ4 = φ (cR − cD − αcM − αβφ (cC + cD)) ≥ 0 which can be writ-
ten as cM ≤ B2C,P and p2S−cRC = αQ+αcM+αβφ(cC+cD)−2cR−2c
R
C
2
≥ 0 which can be written as
cM ≥ B3C,P . In order for this region to be feasible B2C,P −B3C,P = (αQ−2c
R
C
−cR−cD)
α
> 0
and thus αQ− 2cRC − cD > cR should be satisfied.
Region C2 (0 < q2S < q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M =
Q−cM−φ(cD+cC)
2
is re-
dundant because q1M−q2S ≥ 0 holds. In addition, q2M = (2−α)Q−2cM−(1+2βφ)cD−2βφcC+cR2(2−α) =
q1M − αq2S + (1 − β)φ(cC + cD)/2 ≥ 0 and γ1 = φ(αQ−cD−2cC−cR)2 = φ (p2S − cC) >
φ
(
p2S − cRC
) ≥ 0 are also redundant
Remaining OCs are q2S =
αcM+(1+αβφ)cD+αβφcC−cR
2α(2−α)
which can be written as cM ≥
B2C,P and q1M − q2S = (2α−α
2)Q+(α2−3α)cM+(φα2−2φα−αβφ−1)cD+(φα2−2φα−αβφ)cC+cR
2α(2−α)
which
can be written as cM ≤ B33C,F . Besides, p2S − cRC = αQ−cR−cD−2c
R
C
2
> 0 is satisfied when
αQ− cD − 2cRC > cR.
Region C5 (q2S = q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M ≥ 0 is redundant because
∂q1M
∂cM
< 0 and ∂q1M
∂cR
< 0 and q1M (cM = c
max
M , cR = c
max
R ) =
φβ(cC+cD)
2(1+2φα−φα2)
> 0. Besides,
γ1 ≥ 0 as long as p2S − cRC > 0 is satisfied.
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Remaining OCs are q2M =
(1−α+φα(2−α))Q−(1+2φα)(cM+(cC+cD))+α(cM+φ(cC+cR))
2(1+2φα−φα2)
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≤ B11C,F , γ2 = (−2α+α
2)φQ−φcR+(3α−α
2)φcM+(2α−α
2+αβ)φ2(cC+cD)+φcD
1+2φα−φα2
≥
0 which can be written as cM ≥ B33C,F , and finally p2S − cRC ≥ 0 which can be written
as cM ≥ B12C,F .
Region C8 (q2S = q2C = q1M , q2M = 0): Under this region, q1M =
(1+φα)Q−cM−φ(cC+cR)
2(2φα+1)
≥
0 is redundant because ∂q1M
∂cM
< 0 and ∂q1M
∂cR
< 0 and q1M(cM = c
max
M , cR = c
max
R ) =
φβ(cC+cD)
2(2φα+1)
> 0. In addition, γ2 =
φ(−αQ+2αcM+(1+2αφ)cD−cR+2αφcC)
(1+2φα)
= 2(1− α)q1M + γ3/φ+
(1− β)(cC + cD)φ ≥ 0 is redundant and γ1 = φ
2α2Q+φαcM−φ(φα+1)cC−φ(φα+1)cR
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 as long
as p2S − cRC ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Remaining OCs are γ3 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B11C,F and p2S − cRC =
φα2Q+αcM+αφcC−(1+αφ)cR−(1+2φα)c
R
C
(1+2φα)
≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B19C,F .
216
Bound Expression
B2C,P
cR−cD−αβφ(cC+cD)
α
B3C,P
2cR
C
−αQ+2cR−αβφcC−αβφcD
α
B5C,F
(2−α)βαQ−(β(2−α)+1)βαφcC−((2−α)β2αφ+βαφ+1)cD+cR
(β(2−α)+1)α
B6C,F
−(βα−1−2β2φα+β2φα2)Q−(1−βα+2β2φα)βφcC−(1+2β2φα)βφcD+β2φαcR
(1+2β2φα−βα)
B7C,F
φβα(2−α)Q+φ(1−βαφ)cC−φ
2βαcD+φcR
φα(1+β(2−α))
B8C,F
(−1+β(1−φβα)(2−α))αQ−(1+β(2−α))φαβcC−βαφcD+(2+φβ2α(2−α))cR+2(1+φβ2α(2−α))cRC
(1+β(2−α))α
B9C,F
(2−α)Q−2βφ(cC+cD)+cC+cR
2
B10C,F
α(2−α)Q+(1−αβφ)cC−αβφcD+cR
α(3−α)
B11C,F
(1−α+φα(2−α))Q−(1+2φα)βφ(cC+cD)+φα(cC+cR)
(1−α+2φα)
B12C,F
(1−α−φα(2−α))αQ+(2+φα(2−α))cR+2(1+φα(2−α))c
R
C
−(φ(2−α)+βφ)αcC−αβφcD
(3−α)α
B16C,F
−α(1−2β)Q+cR+cC
2αβ
B17C,F
−(α2β2φ+α−αβ)Q−αβ2φcC+(1+αβ2φ)cR+(1+2αβ2φ)cRC
βα
B18C,F
αQ+cC+cR
2α
B19C,F
(2αφ+1)cR
C
−α2φQ+(1+αφ)cR−αφcC
α
TABLE B2: Bounds characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM facing competition
under partial regulation (where p2S < c
R
C)
Bound Expression
B21C,P
−α(2−α)Q+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C
−α(2βφ+1)cD−2αβφcC
2α
B23C,F
α(2β−1)(2−α)Q+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C
−2αβφ(1+(2−α)β)cC−α(1+2βφ+β2φ2(2−α))cD
2α(1+(2−α)β)
B24C,F
−α(1−β+φβ2(2−α))Q+cRC+(1−φβ
2α)cR+2φ2β3αcD−φαβ2(1−2βφ)cC
βα(2φβ−1)
B25C,F
α(2β−1)(2−α)Q+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C
+α(1−2βφ)cC−2αβφcD
2α(1+(2−α)β)
B27C,F
Qα(2−α)+(4−α)cR+2(2−α)c
R
C
+α(1−2βφ)cC−2αβφcD
2α(3−α)
B28C,F
−(1−β)αQ+cR+c
R
C
βα
B29C,F
cR+c
R
C
α
B33C,F
(2α−α2)Q+(φα2−2φα−αβφ−1)cD+(φα2−2φα−αβφ)cC+cR
α(3−α)
TABLE B3: Bounds characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM facing competition
under partial regulation
Full regulation: Problem Formulation
Given the remanufacturer plays R4 (see Table A5), the OEM’s problem is the same as
the one under partial regulation with the additional constraint that q2S + q
R
2C ≥ βRq1M .
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Then the Lagrangian function is ΠLagrOEM = ΠOEM+γ1(q1M−q2C)+γ2(q2C−q2S)+γ3q2M+
γ4(q
R
2C + q2C − βq1M) + γ5(qR2C + q2S − βRq1M) + γ7(cRC − p2S). Plugging in qR2C and q2S in
the Lagrangian function and taking the first order derivatives, we obtain the following
OCs:
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q1M
= Q− cM − γ5βR − γ4β + γ1 − 2q1M = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2M
=
[φ((2− α)Q− 2cM − 2βφ(cC + cD))
+φ(cR − cD − 2 (2− α) q2M) + 2γ3 + γ2 − γ5]
2
= 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2C
= γ2 − γ1 + γ4 − φ (cC + cD) = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂p2S
=
φ (αQ− cR − cD − 2p2S)− 2αγ7 + γ2 − γ5
2α
= 0 .
The Hessian is negative semidefinite, so first order conditions ensure optimality. From
the first order conditions, q2C = max(q2S, βq1M). Following the same arguments as under
partial regulation, we can show that q1M > q2C > q2R cannot be optimal if there is no
second period manufacturing. Using these properties we solve the OEM’s problem under
full regulation for each region. As before, when cRC > p
∗
2S we obtain Policy A solutions
whereas when the constraint is tight, i.e. cRC = p
∗
2S we obtain Policy B solutions.
Given the remanufacturer plays R5 (see Table A5), the OEM’s problem is the same
as the one under partial regulation with the additional constraint on the lower bound of
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remanufacturing level, i.e. q2S + q
R
2C ≥ βRq1M . Then the Lagrangian function is
ΠLagrOEM = ΠOEM + γ1(q1M − q2C) + γ2(q2C − q2S) + γ3q2M + γ4(qR2C + q2C − βq1M )
+γ5(q
R
2C + q2S − βRq1M ) + γ7(p2S − cRC) . (B-3)
Plugging in qR2C and q2S in the Lagrangian function and taking the first order derivatives,
we obtain the following OCs:
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2M
=
φ ((2− α)Q− 2cM − 2φβ(cC + cD))
+φ (cR − cD − 2 (2− α) q2M) + 2γ3 + γ2 − γ5
2
= 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q1M
= Q− cM + γ1 − 2q1M − φp2S − φcD + γ2 − βRγ5 + γ4 − βγ4 = 0 , (B-4)
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂q2C
= −γ1 + φ (p2S − cC) = 0 ,
∂ΠLagrOEM
∂p2S
=
φ (αQ− cR − cD − 2p2S) + 2αγ7 + γ2 − γ5 − 2α(q1M − q2C)
2α
= 0(B-5)
The new bounds on cM characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM facing compe-
tition under full regulation are provided in Table B4. Under full regulation the regions
3-8 are the same as the corresponding ones under partial regulation. Solving the OEM’s
problem under full regulation for regions 1 and 2 the following OCs are obtained.
OCs for Full Regulation: Policy A where p∗2S < c
R
C:
Region A1 (βRq1M = q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M ≥ 0 is redundant
because ∂q1M
∂cM
< 0 and ∂q1M
∂cR
< 0 and q1M (cM = c
max
M , cR = c
max
R ) =
φβR(cC+cD)
2(1+φβ2Rα(2−α))
> 0. In
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addition, q2M = (1− βRα) q1M + βRγ5/2 ≥ 0 is also redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ5 =
(βRα(2−α))φQ+φ(cR−cD)−((2−α)βR+1)αφ(cM+φβ(cC+cD))
(1+φβ2Rα(2−α))
≥ 0 which
can be written as cM ≤ B2C,F and cRC−p2S ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B3C,F . As
B3C,F −B2C,F = (1+φβ
2
R
α(2−α))(cR−αQ+2cRC+cD)
α(1+2βR−βRα)
, if cR > αQ− 2cRC − cD then cRC − p2S > 0
is redundant. On the other hand, when cR < αQ− 2cRC − cD, γ5 ≥ 0 is redundant.
Region A2 (βRq1M < q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): The OCs are the same as the ones in
Region 2 under partial regulation except q2S ≥ 0. Under full regulation q2S − βRq1M ≥ 0
can be written as cM ≥ B2C,F .
OCs for Full Regulation: Policy B where p∗2S = c
R
C:
Region B1 (βRq1M = q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M ≥ 0 is redundant
because ∂q1M
∂cR
< 0 and q1M is positive at both extreme points, i.e. q1M (cM = B21C,F , cR =
αQ−cD−2cRC) = q1M(cM = B3C,F , cR = αQ−cD−2cRC) = (c
R
C+cD)
α(1+2βR−αβR)
> 0. In addition
q2M = (1− βRα) q1M + βRγ5/2 + αγ7/ (2φ) ≥ 0 is also redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ5 =
2α(1+βR(2−α))(Q−cM−βφ(cC+cD))−(4−α)(αQ−cR−cD)−4cD+2(2−α)cC
(1+2φβ2R(2−α))α
≥
0 which can be written as cM ≤ B21C,F and γ7 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≥ B3C,F .
In order for this region to be feasible B21C,F−B3C,F = ((1+2φβ
2
R
(2−α)))(αQ−2cRC−cR−cD)
1+βR(2−α)
>
0 and thus cR < αQ− cD − 2cRC should be satisfied.
Region B2 (βRq1M < q2S < βq1M = q2C , q2M > 0): The OCs are the same as the ones
in Region 2 under Partial regulation except q2S > 0. The new OC q2S − βRq1M ≥ 0 can
be written as cM ≥ B21C,F .
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OCs for Full Regulation: Policy C where p∗2S > c
R
C:
In this region q2C = q1M by Proposition 4. The remaining regions and the corresponding
OCs are provided below:
Region C1 (q2S = βRq1M < q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): In this region, q1M ≥ 0 is redundant
because ∂q1M
∂cM
< 0 and ∂q1M
∂cR
< 0 and q1M(cM = B30C,F , cR = c
max
R ) =
(1−αφ+φβα)(cC+cD)
2α(1+2βR−αβR)
>
0. In addition, q2M = (1 − βRα)q1M + βRγ5/2 + (cD + cC)(1 − β)φ/2 ≥ 0 and γ1 =
φ (p2S − cC) > φ
(
p2S − cRC
) ≥ 0 are also redundant.
Remaining OCs are γ5 ≥ 0 which can be written as cM ≤ B30C,F and p2S − cRC ≥ 0
which can be written as cM ≥ B31C,F . In order for this region to be feasible B30C,F −
B31C,F =
(1+φβ2Rα(2−α))(αQ−2cRC−cR−cD)
α(1+2βR−βRα)
> 0 and thus αQ − 2cRC − cD > cR should be
satisfied.
Region C2: (βRq1M < q2S < q2C = q1M , q2M > 0): The OCs are the same as the ones in
Region 2 under Partial regulation except q2S > 0. The condition on q2S, q2S−βRq1M ≥ 0
can be written as cM ≥ B30C,F .
Comparison of Profits from Policy A and Policy C:
Feasible regions of Policy A and Policy C may overlap. If this happens the profit from
Policy A is always higher. Consider the problem formulation for Policy A. When region
A is feasible p2S < c
R
C holds. On the other hand, when Policy C is feasible p2S > c
R
C holds.
Compare the two problem formulations ignoring the constraint on p2S, because we know
that p2S will satisfy the constraint in the feasible region anyway. Then the formulation
of Policy C is same as the formulation of Policy A with the exception of an additional
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constraint which is q2C = q1M . Hence profit cannot be higher under Policy C.
Comparison of Profits from Policy B and Policy C:
As long as C5 or C8 is feasible, the profit from that region will be higher than the profit
under any other possible feasible region (a region of Policy B) at the same point. Hence
we compare the profits from regions B1, B2, B3, B4, B6, and B7 with the profit from
regions C1 and C2:
Under Policy B, the optimal production levels can be calculated in terms of the
Lagrangian multipliers as follows:
qB1M =
Q− cM − φβcD − φβcC + βγB2 − βRγB5
2
,
qB2M =
2φQ− φαQ+ φcR − 2φcM − φcD + 2γB3 − γB5 + γB2 − 2φ2βcD − 2φ2βcC
2φ (2− α) ,
qB2S =
φαQ (2− α) + 2φα(φβcC + φβcD + cM) + φα(cR + cD + 2cRC)
−γB2 α + γB5 α− 2γB3 α− 4φ(cR + cRC)
4αφ (2− α) .
Note that qB2C = max
(
qB2S , βq
B
1M
)
. When qB2C = max
(
qB2S, βq
B
1M
)
= qB2S we can easily
calculate
ΠB
unc
OEM = ΠOEM
(
q1M = q
B
1M , q2M = q
B
2M , q2S = q
B
2S , q2C = q
B
2S, p2S = c
R
C
)
.
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On the other hand, when qB2C = max
(
qB2S, βq
B
1M
)
= βqB1M , the profit can be written as
ΠB
cons
OEM = ΠOEM
(
q1M = q
B
1M , q2M = q
B
2M , q2S = q
B
2S, q2C = βq
B
1M , p2S = c
R
C
)
= ΠB
unc
OEM − φ (cC + cD)
(
βqB1M − qB2S
)
.
Hence, in general ΠBOEM = Π
Bunc
OEM − φ (cC + cD)
(
βqB1M − qB2S
)+
. Let us define ΠB
R
OEM =
ΠB
cons
OEM(γ
B
2 = 0, γ
B
3 = 0, γ
B
5 = 0). Under Policy C, we know that p2S = c
R
C + δ where
δ > 0. Then the optimal amount of production quantities can be written in terms of the
Lagrangian multipliers as follows:
qC1M =
Q− cM − φcC − φcD − βRγC5
2
,
qC2M =
2φQ− φαQ+ φcR − 2φcM − φcD + 2γC3 − γC5 − 2φ2βcD − 2φ2βcC
2φ (2− α) ,
qC2S =
φαcM + γ
C
5 + φ
2αβcD − γC3 α− φcR + φcD + φ2αβcC
2αφ (2− α) ,
δ =
φαQ− φcD − φcR − 2φcRC − γC5
2φ
.
Under Policy C all the available cores are collected, i.e. q2C = q1M , hence we can calculate
ΠCOEM = Π
(
q1M = q
C
1M , q2M = q
C
2M , q2S = q
C
2S, q2C = q
C
1M , p2S = c
R
C + δ
)
.
Let us define ΠC
R
OEM = Π
C
OEM
(
γC3 = 0, γ
C
5 = 0
)
. Then we can calculate the difference as
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follows:
ΠBOEM −ΠCOEM =
γC
3
2
−γB
3
2
2φ(2−α)
− γC5 γC3
2φ(2−α)
+
(1+φαβ2R(2−α))γC5
2
4αφ(2−α)
− (1+2φβ
2(2−α))γB2
2
8φ(2−α)
+
(
− γB3
2φ(2−α)
+
(1+2φββR(2−α))γ
B
5
4φ(2−α)
)
γB2 +
γB
5
γB
3
2φ(2−α)
− (1+2φβ
2
R(2−α))γB5
2
8φ(2−α)
+
(
ΠB
R
OEM − ΠCROEM
)
+ φ (cC + cD)
(
βqB1M − qB2S
)+
Note that γB5 is positive only in region B1 where both γ
B
2 and γ
B
3 are zero. Besides both
under regions C1 and C2, γ
C
3 = 0. Hence the difference can be written as follows:
ΠBOEM − ΠCOEM =
−γB
3
2
2φ(2−α)
+
(1+φαβ2R(2−α))γC5
2
4αφ(2−α)
− (1+2φβ
2(2−α))γB2
2
8φ(2−α)
− γB3 γB2
2φ(2−α)
− (1+2φβ
2
R
(2−α))γB5
2
8φ(2−α)
+
(
ΠB
R
OEM − ΠCROEM
)
+φ (cC + cD)
(
βqB1M − qB2S
)+
= KB,C
(
α,Q, cM , cR, cC , cD, c
R
C , φ, β, βR
)
where
ΠB
R
OEM −ΠC
R
OEM =
φ (cC + cD) (1− β) (2(Q− cM)− φ(1 + β) (cC + cD))
4
−φ (αQ− cD − 2cC − cR)
2
8α
=
φ (cC + cD) (1− β)
(
qB
R
1M + q
CR
1M
)
4
− φ (αQ− cD − 2cC − cR)
2
8α
.
We can deduce that for higher values of cC + cD preemptive collection, i.e. Policy C
is less likely to be optimal, whereas for lower values of cR Policy B is less likely to be
optimal.
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Bound Expression
B2C,F
(2βRα−βRα2)Q+cR+(−αβ−2φβRαβ+φβRα2β)cC+(−2φβRαβ−αβφ+φβRα2β−1)cD
(2βRα+α−βRα2)
B3C,F
−(α−βRα(1−φβRα)(2−α))Q+(2+φβ2Rα(2−α))cR−φ(2βRα(β−βR)(2−α)+αβ)cD+2(1+φβ
2
R
α(2−α))cRC−φ(αβ+βRαβ(2−α))cC
(1+βR(2−α))α
B21C,F
2(2−α)cR
C
+(4−α)cR+α(−2βφ−4φβRβ−1+2φβRαβ)cD−α(1−2βR)(2−α)Q−2αβφ(1+βR(2−α))cC
2α(1+βR(2−α))
B30C,F
βRα(2−α)Q+cR+(−2βRαφ−1+βRα2φ−αβφ)cD+α(βRα−2βR−β)φcC
α(1−βRα+2βR)
B31C,F
α(−βRα+β2Rα2φ−1+2βR−2φβ2Rα)Q−(β2Rα2φ−2φβ2Rα−2)cR−α(−βRα+β+2βR−2β2R+β2Rα)φcD+2(1+φβ2Rα(2−α))cRC+αφ(−β−βR(2−α))cC
α(1−βRα+2βR)
TABLE B4: Bounds characterizing the optimal policies for the OEM facing competition under full regulation
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C1 Appendix for Chapter 3
Lemma C1 Assume that the following cost structures hold under individual compliance
scheme: ( i) Cost of maintaining a collection rate of τ + τ0, TCC
I(τ, τ0) is a convex
and increasing function of τ ; and base collection rate and additional collection rate are
complementary:
TCCIτ (τ, τ0) ≥ 0 TCCIττ(τ, τ0) ≥ 0 TCCIττ0(τ, τ0) ≥ 0
( ii)Cost of collection and sorting, TCCII(τ, τ0) is an increasing and linear function of τ
and τ0:
TCCIIτ (τ, τ0) ≥ 0 TCCIIττ (τ, τ0) = 0 TCCIIτ0 (τ, τ0) ≥ 0 TCCIIτ0τ0(τ, τ0) = 0
( iii)Cost of treatment TCT (τ, τ0) benefits from economies of scale and from treatability.
Hence we assume that TCT (τ, τ0) = TCT
I(τ, τ0) + TCT
II(τ, τ0, ξ) where TCT
I(τ, τ0)
captures the economies of scale effect while TCT II(τ, τ0, ξ) captures the benefit from
higher treatability levels. Note that TCT I(τ, τ0) is a concave and increasing function
of τ and TCT IIτ (τ, τ0, ξ) is decreasing in τ (because it depends on total volume) and ξ
linearly:
TCT Iτ (τ, τ0) ≥ 0 TCT Iττ (τ, τ0) ≤ 0 TCT Iττ0(τ, τ0) ≤ 0
TCT IIτ (τ, τ0, ξ) ≤ 0 TCT IIξ (τ, τ0, ξ) ≤ 0 TCT IIξτ (τ, τ0, ξ) ≤ 0
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( iv) Cost of increasing product’s treatability level, TCG(ξ) is convex and increasing in
the product’s treatability level:
TCGξ(ξ) ≥ 0 TCGξξ(ξ) ≥ 0
When producer i minimizes the total compliance cost
Min
1−τ0≥τ≥0, ξ≥0
TC(τ0, τ, ξ) = TCC
I(τ, τ0) + TCC
II(τ, τ0) + TCT
I(τ, τ0)
+TCT II(τ, τ0, ξ) + TCG(ξ)
then (i) if τ0 is small then τ
∗ = 0; (ii) if τ0 of moderate values then τ
∗(τ0) is an increasing
function of τ0 and (iii) if τ0 is high then τ
∗ = 1− τ0.
Proof of Lemma C1. First, consider the unconstrained problem. The first order
conditions are
∂TC
∂τ
= TCCIτ (τ, τ0) + TCC
II
τ (τ, τ0) + TCT
I
τ (τ, τ0) + TCT
II
τ (τ, τ0, ξ) = 0, (C-1)
∂TC
∂ξ
= TCT IIξ (τ, τ0, ξ) + TCGξ(ξ) = 0. (C-2)
For the Hessian,
( TCGξξ(ξ) TCT IIξτ (τ,τ0,ξ)
TCT II
ξτ
(τ,τ0,ξ) TCCIττ (τ,τ0)+TCT
I
ττ (τ,τ0)
)
, to be positive semidefinite
(TCGξξ(ξ))(TCC
I
ττ(τ, τ0) + TCT
I
ττ (τ, τ0))− (TCT IIξτ (τ, τ0, ξ))2 ≥ 0,
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which also implies that G1 = TCC
I
ττ(τ, τ0) + TCT
I
ττ (τ, τ0) ≥ 0, should hold.
Let subscript UC denote solution to unconstrained problem. From (C-2), ξ∗UC(τ) is
solution to TCGξ(ξ) = −TCT IIξ (τ, τ0, ξ). Note that TCT IIξ (τ, τ0, ξ) depends on τ and τ0
but not ξ. In addition,
∂2TC
∂τ∂τ0
= TCCIττ0(τ, τ0) + TCT
I
ττ0
(τ, τ0) + TCT
II
ττ0
(τ, τ0, ξ = ξ
∗
UC(τ)) = G2
Note that (C-1) might be rewritten as ∂TC
∂τ
=
∫ τ
0
G1dτ +
∫ τ0
0
G2τ0 + C1 = 0 where
C1 = TCC
II
τ is a positive constant. Note that G1 is positive (due to convexity) and
this implies that G2 is negative. Therefore, τ
∗
UC(τ0) increases as τ0 increases. Since there
is a linear lower bound and a linear upper bound on τ ∗ under the original constrained
problem, τ ∗ might take one of three values depending on τ0: (i) if τ
∗
UC ≤ 0 (could be
the case when τ0 is small) then τ
∗ = 0; (ii) if 0 ≤ τ ∗UC ≤ 1 − τ0 (could be the case for
moderate values of τ0) τ
∗ = τ ∗UC(τ0) is an increasing function of τ0 and (iii) if τ
∗
UC ≥ 1−τ0
(could be the case for high values of τ0) then τ
∗ = 1− τ0.
Proof of Proposition 14. From the Lagrangian function L = E(TCS)−γ1ξS−γ2τS−
γ3(1− τ0 − τS), we get the first order conditions
∂L
∂τS
= 2η(τ0 + τS) + (cC + cR − βξS)αiQµ− 2θα2iQ2(µτ0 + τS(µ2 + σ2)) (C-3)
−γ2 + γ3 = 0, (C-4)
∂L
∂ξS
= −βαiQ(µτS + τ0) + 2kαiQξS − γ1 = 0. (C-5)
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For the Hessian,
( 2kαiQ −αiβQµ
−αiβQµ 2(η−θα
2
iQ
2(µ2+σ2))
)
, to be positive semidefinite 4k(η−θα2iQ2(µ2+
σ2))−αiQβ2µ2 ≥ 0 should hold. To ensure positive semidefiniteness we impose assump-
tion (A1) and thus first order conditions guarantee optimality. Solving the optimality
conditions (C-4)-(C-5) we find the optimal ξ∗S and τ
∗
S as functions of the base collection
rate τ0:
Region 1 (τ ∗S = 0): The optimality condition
γ∗2 =
−τ0(αiQµ(4kθαiQ+ β2)− 4ηk) + 2kαiQµ(cC + cR))
2k
≥ 0
can be written as τ0 ≤ κIS where
κIS =
2kαiQµ(cC + cR)
4kθα2iQ
2µ+ αiQµβ2 − 4kη .
The optimal treatability level is ξ∗S =
βτ0
2k
≥ 0. In this region ξ∗S > 0 unless τ0 = 0.
Region 2 (0 < τ ∗S < 1− τ0): The decision variables are
ξ∗S =
β(2τ0(η − µη − σ2Q2α2i θ)− αiQµ2(cC + cR))
4k(η − θα2iQ2(µ2 + σ2))− αiQµ2β2
,
τ ∗S =
τ0(4kθα
2
iQ
2µ+ αiQµβ
2 − 4kη)− 2kαiQµ(cC + cR)
4k(η − θα2iQ2(µ2 + σ2))− αiQµ2β2
.
The optimality conditions 0 ≤ τ ∗S = τ0(4kθα
2
iQ
2µ+αiQµβ
2−4kη)−2kαiQµ(cC+cR)
4k(η−θα2iQ
2(µ2+σ2))−αiQµ2β2
≤ 1− τ0 can
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be written as κIS ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS where
κ2 =
4k(η − θα2iQ2(µ2 + σ2))− αiQµ2β2 + 2Qkαiµ(cC + cR)
αiQ(4kθαiQ(µ− µ2 − σ2) + µβ2(1− µ)) .
Since
τ∗S
2k
− ξ∗S
µβ
= − τ0
2µk
≤ 0, ξ∗S > 0 as long as 0 < τ ∗S < 1− τ0.
Region 3 (τ ∗S = 1− τ0): The optimality condition
γ∗3 =
αiQ(4kαiθQ(µ− µ2 − σ2) + µβ2(1− µ))τ0
−4k(η − θα2iQ2(µ2 + σ2)) + αiQµ2β2 − 2αiQµk(cC + cR)
2k
≥ 0
can be written as τ0 ≥ κIIS . Optimal treatability level ξ∗S = β(µ−µτ0+τ0)2k is always positive
in this region.
Note that in each region optimal treatability level is ξ∗S =
β(τ0+µτ∗S)
2k
. Finally, when
−4k(η − θα2iQ2µ) + αiQµβ2 − 2kQµαi(cR + cC) ≤ 0, i.e. η ≥ ηUBS , τ ∗S = 0 regardless of
τ0.
Proof of Corollary 2. If η ≤ ηUBS and κIS ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS (region 2 in the proof
of Proposition 14) then
∂τ∗
S
∂τ0
=
(4kθα2iQ
2µ+αiQµβ2−4kη)
4k(η−θα2
i
Q2(µ2+σ2))−αiQµ2β2
=
4k(ηUB
S
−η)+2kαiQµ(cC+cR)
4k(η−ηLB
S
)
≥ 0,
because ηUBS ≥ η ≥ ηLBS in the region of interest. The sign of ∂τ
∗
S
∂τ0
in regions 1 and 3
follows from their definitions provided in the proof of Proposition 14.
Proof of Corollary 3. From Proposition 14, as η increases κIS and κ
II
S increases. In
addition, in Region 2,
∂τ∗
S
∂η
=
−(τ0+τ∗S)
η−ηLB
S
≤ 0.
From Proposition 14, as σ increases τ ∗S increases in Region 2, while κ
I
S remains the
same. On the other hand ∂κ2
∂σ
= − 32k2θσ(ηUBS −η)
(4kθαiQ(µ−µ2−σ2)+µβ2(1−µ))2
≤ 0.
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From Proposition 14, the denominator of τ ∗S in Region 2 is decreasing in αi. The
direction of change in numerator = τ0(4kθα
2
iQ
2µ + µβ2αiQ − 4kη) − 2kµQαi(cC + cR)
is positive: ∂numerator
∂αi
= Qµ(8kθαiτ0Q − 2k(cC + cR) + β2τ0) is positive because τ0 ≥
2k(cC+cR)
(8kθαiQ+β2)
as τ0 ≥ κIS. Thus ∂τ
∗
S
∂αi
≥ 0 which also implies that ∂κ2
∂αi
≤ 0. In addition
∂κIS
∂αi
=
−8Qµk2(cC+cR)(η+θα
2
iQ
2µ)
(−4kη+4kθα2iQ
2µ+αiQµβ2)2
< 0.
Finally, in regions 1 and 3, τ ∗S does not depend on η, σ, or αi.
Proof of Proposition 15. The sequence of events are as follows: (i) Each firm decides
on the treatability ξi (Game R), (ii) the PRO decides on τ on behalf of members (Game
C), (iii) total compliance cost is realized and divided among the members of the collective
scheme according to their market shares. We solve the problem by backwards induction.
First the collective scheme finds the optimal τC by minimizing the total collection and
treatment cost (Game C). The total collection and treatment cost is
E (TCCCT + TCTCT ) =
(
η −XA2n
)
τ 2C + (2τ0(η − ZA2n)−QµβWn + Y An)τC
+
(Y An − ZA2nτ0 −QβµWn)τ0
µ
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where
Y = Qµ(cR + cC)
Z = θQ2µ
X = θQ2(µ2 + σ2)
T = Qµβ2
Wn =
n∑
i=1
αiξi.
The Lagrangian function is L = E (TCCCT + TCTCT )−ζ1τC−ζ2(1−τ0−τC). Convexity
is ensured as long as ∂
2L
∂τ2
C
= 2η − 2θA2nQ2(µ2 + σ2) = 2(η −XA2n) ≥ 0. Solving the FOC,
∂L
∂τC
= 0 we find the optimal τ ∗C in terms of ξjs. Next we characterize three possible
policies:
Region 1 (τ ∗C = 0): Solving the FOC when τC = 0, ζ2 = 0, and ζ1 > 0 we get the
optimality condition ζ∗1 = −Qµβ
∑n
i=1 (αiξi) + Y An + 2τ0(η − ZA2n) ≥ 0. Plugging in
τ ∗C = 0 in E(TCCCT + TCTCT ), the total collection and treatment cost is
E (TCCCT + TCTCT ) =
(Y An − ZA2nτ0 −Qβµ
∑n
i=0 (αiξi))τ0
µ
= Γ(~ξ). (C-6)
When n firms acts collectively, they play the Nash game and each firm decides on optimal
treatability level by minimizing her expected compliance cost E(TCC):
Min
ζ∗
1
≥0, ξi≥0
E(TCC)(τ
∗
C = 0) =
αi
An
Γ(~ξ) + kQαiξ
2
i
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For firm i the Lagrangian is written as Li = E(TCC) − νi1ξi − νi2ζ∗1 . Solving the first
order conditions ∂Li
∂ξi
= 0 for νi1 = 0 and νi2 = 0, we find that the optimal treatability
level is
ξi =
τ0βαi
2kAn
, ∀i.
Plugging optimal values in, optimality condition is ζ∗1 =
−Tτ0S2n
2kAn
+Y An+2τ0(η−ZA2n) ≥ 0
which can be written as
τ0 ≤ 2kY A
2
n
S2nT − 4k(η − ZA2n)An
= κIC .
Under this region it is trivial to show that the problem is submodular with linear
constraints and thus there exists a pure strategy NE. It is also trivial to show that the
solution is unique here. Note that when ζ∗1 ≥ 0, ξ∗i cannot be zero unless τ0 = 0.
Region 2 (0 < τ ∗C < 1 − τ0): Solving the FOC when ζ1 = 0 and ζ2 = 0, we get the
conditions under which τ ∗C > 0. The optimal τ
∗
C is given by
τ ∗C =
QµβWn − Y An − 2τ0(η − ZA2n)
2(η −XA2n)
. (C-7)
Note that τ ∗ increases as the weighted treatability Wn increases. Plugging in τ
∗
C in
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E(TCCCT + TCTCT ) we obtain the total cost as
E (TCCCT + TCTCT ) = −
(2τ0(η − ZA2n)−Qµβ
∑n
i=0 (αiξi) + Y An)
2
4(η −XA2n)
+
(Y An − ZA2nτ0 −Qβµ
∑n
i=0 (αiξi))τ0
µ
= Γ(~ξ) (C-8)
Then each firm decides on the level of treatability by minimizing his total cost:
(P2) Min
1−τ0≥τ∗C≥0, ξi≥0
E(TCC)(τ = τ
∗
C) =
αi
An
Γ(~ξ) + kαiQξ
2
i
For firm i the Lagrangian is written as Li = E(TCC)−γi1ξi−γi2τ ∗C−γi3(1−τ0−τ ∗C).
The first order conditions ∂Li
∂ξi
= 0 should be satisfied at the optimality.
Now let us show that problem (P2) is submodular with linear constraints. Assume
ξ1 and ξ2 are two feasible vectors such that:
ξ1 =


ξ11
ξ12
...
ξ1n


, ξ2 =


ξ21
ξ22
...
ξ2n


.
Then it is easy to show that
E(TCC)(ξ
1) + E(TCC)(ξ
2) ≥ E(TCC)(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) + E(TCC)(ξ1 ∨ ξ2)
Γ(ξ1)
αi
An
+ kαiQ(ξ
1
i )
2 + Γ(ξ2)
αi
An
+ kαiQ(ξ
2
i )
2 ≥
Γ(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) αi
An
+ kαiQ(ξ
1
i ∧ ξ2i )2+
Γ(ξ1 ∨ ξ2) αi
An
+ kαiQ(ξ
1
i ∨ ξ2i )2
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Keeping in mind that (ξ1i ∨ξ2i )+(ξ1i ∧ξ2i ) = ξ1i +ξ2i and (ξ1i ∨ξ2i )2+(ξ1i ∧ξ2i )2 = (ξ1i )2+(ξ2i )2
for every i, the above condition simplifies to
(
n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
1
j ∨ ξ2j )
)2
+
(
n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
1
j ∧ ξ2j )
)2
≥
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j
)2
+
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j
)2
.
Let (ξ1i ∨ ξ2i ) = ξmaxi and (ξ1i ∧ ξ2i ) = ξmini . Then we have
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
min
j
)2
−
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j
)2
≥
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j
)2
−
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
max
j
)2
which is rewritten as
(
n∑
j=1
αj
(
ξminj − ξ2j
))( n∑
j=1
αj
(
ξminj + ξ
2
j
))
≥
(
n∑
j=1
αj
(
ξ1j − ξmaxj
))( n∑
j=1
αj
(
ξ1j + ξ
max
j
))
Without loss of generality we define sets N = {j : ξmaxj = ξ1j} = {j : ξminj = ξ2j } and
K = {j : ξminj = ξ1j } = {j : ξmaxj = ξ2j }. Then we can rewrite the above inequality as
follows:
(∑
j∈K
αj
(
ξminj − ξmaxj
))(∑
j∈N
2αjξ
min
j +
∑
j∈K
αj
(
ξminj + ξ
max
j
))
≥
(∑
j∈K
αj
(
ξminj − ξmaxj
))(∑
j∈N
2αjξ
max
j +
∑
j∈K
αj
(
ξminj + ξ
max
j
))
Note that the above inequality always holds, therefore we can conclude that the game is
submodular and thus pure strategy NE exists.
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For the uniqueness of the equilibrium we use the dominant diagonal condition in
Milgrom and Roberts (1990). For our problem the dominant diagonal condition is written
as
∂2E(TCC)
∂ξ2i
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2E(TCC)
∂ξj∂ξi
∣∣∣∣∣
4k(η −XA2n)An − α2iµT
2(η −XA2n)An
≥
∑
j 6=i
Tµαjαi
2(η −XA2n)An
=
Tµ(An − αi)αi
2(η −XA2n)An
Therefore as long as the following condition holds
4k(η −XA2n)− Tµαi ≥ 0 (A2)
for every i, we guarantee uniqueness. In the rest of the analysis we assume that condi-
tion (A2) holds. Note that this condition also guarantees the convexity of E(TCCCT +
TCTCT ). For convexity of E(TCC) we need to have
∂2E(TCC)
∂ξ2i
=
αiQ(4k(η −XA2n)An − α2iµT )
2(η −XA2n)An
≥ 0
for every i which already holds under assumption (A2). Assumption (A2) also guarantees
that 4k(η −XA2n)An − TµS2n ≥ 0.
When 0 < τ ∗ < 1− τ0, the optimal treatability level is
ξ∗i =
βαi (2(η(1− µ) + (Zµ−X)A2n)τ0 − µY An)
4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n
(C-9)
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where S2n =
∑n
i=1 α
2
i . Note that firms with higher αi choose higher treatability level. If
(η(1 − µ) + (Zµ − X)A2n) ≤ 0 then ξ∗i = 0 and therefore τ ∗ = 0 from equation (C-7).
Also note that (η(1− µ) + (Zµ−X)A2n) ≥ 0 implies that µ ≤ 1.
As ξ∗i increases, the optimal treatability level of the other members increase too, i.e.
∂2E(TCC)
∂ξi∂ξj
= − Q2µ2β2αjα2i
2(η−XA2n)An
≤ 0 ∀j.
Weighted treatability level is
Wn =
n∑
j=1
αjξ
∗
j =
βS2n (2(η(1− µ) + (Zµ−X)A2n)τ0 − µY An)
4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n
.
and thus the optimal collection rate is
τ ∗C =
(TS2n − 4k(η − ZA2n)An)τ0 − 2kY A2n
4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n
.
Hence 0 < τ ∗ < 1− τ0 when τ0 is in the following interval:
κIC =
2kY A2n
TS2n − 4k(η − ZA2n)An
< τ0 <
4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n + 2kY A2n
4k(Z −X)A3n + (1− µ)TS2n
= κIIC .
Here note that for any firm ξj =
ξi
αi
αj and therefore Wn =
ξi
αi
S2n. Besides we have
ξj =
βαj(τ0+µτ∗C)
2kA
∀j and thus Wn = βS2n(τ0+µτ
∗
C
)
2kA
.
Region 3 (τ ∗C = 1− τ0): Solving the FOC when τ ∗C = 1− τ0, ζ2 > 0, and ζ1 = 0, we
get the conditions under which τ ∗C = 1− τ0:
ζ∗2 = −2η + 2XA2n(1− τ0) + 2τ0ZA2n +Qβµ
n∑
i=0
(αiξi)− Y An ≥ 0 (C-10)
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Plugging in τ ∗C = 1 − τ0 in E(TCCCT + TCTCT ) we obtain the total collection and
treatment cost as
E (TCCCT + TCTCT ) = (η −XA2n)(1− τ0)2 + 2(η − ZA2n)τ0(1− τ0)
−Qβ(τ0 + µ− µτ0)
n∑
i=0
(αiξi)
+
Y An(τ0 + µ− µτ0)− ZA2nτ 20
µ
Then each firm decides on the level of treatability by minimizing her total cost:
Min
ζ∗
2
≥0, ξi≥0
E(TCC)(τ
∗
C = 1− τ0) =
αi
An
Γ(~ξ) + kαiQξ
2
i
For firm i the Lagrangian is written as Li = E(TCC)−ν1ξi−ν2ζ∗2 . Solving the first order
conditions ∂Li
∂ξi
= 0 for ν1 = 0 and ν2 = 0, we find the optimal treatability level as
ξ∗i =
αiβ(µ− µτ0 + τ0)
2kAn
, ∀i.
Then ζ∗2 = −2η + 2XA2n(1− τ0) + 2τ0ZA2n + TS2n(µ−µτ0+τ0)2kAn − Y An ≥ 0 which we rewrite
as 1
κIIC =
4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n + 2kY A2n
4k(Z −X)A3n + (1− µ)TS2n
< τ0 < 1.
In this region it is trivial to show that the problem is submodular with linear con-
straints and thus there exists a pure strategy NE. It is also trivial to show that the
1η ≤ ηUBC together with Condition (A2) ensure that 4k(Z −X)A3n + (1− µ)TS2n ≥ 0.
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solution is unique here.
Note that when ζ∗2 ≥ 0, ξ∗i cannot be zero because µ− µτ0 + τ0 ≥ 0.
In order these regions to be meaningful we need to ensure that κi’s are no greater
than 1. We write the differences as
1− κIC =
D0C
DIIC
1− κIIC =
D0C
DIC +D
II
C
κIIC − κIC =
D0CD
I
C
DIIC (D
I
C +D
II
C )
,
where
D0C = TS2n − 4k(η − ZA2n)An − 2Y kAn
DIC = 4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n
DIIC = TS2n − 4k(η − ZA2n)An.
Note that DIC is positive due to (A2). On the other hand, when D
0
C is negative, i.e.
η ≥ 4kZA3n+S2nT−2Y kAn
4k
= ηUBC then τ
∗ = 0 regardless of τ0 (and regardless of the sign of
DIIC ).
When D0C is nonnegative (which also implies that D
II
C is nonnegative), i.e. η ≤ ηUBC
then 0 ≤ κ1 ≤ κ2 ≤ 1 in the interval of interest, i.e. where 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 16. The sequence of events are as given in the proof of
Proposition 15. We solve the problem by backwards induction. The collective scheme
finds the optimal τF by minimizing the total collection and treatment cost as in the proof
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of Proposition 15. We next characterize three possible policies:
Region 1 (τ ∗F = 0): In this region, total cost of collection and treatment for firm i is
Ex (TCCF (τ
∗
F ) + TCTF (τ
∗
F , ξ)) =
τ0αi(Y − ZAnτ0 − βξiQµ)
µ
= Γ(ξi) (C-11)
When n firms form a collaboration, they play a Nash game and each firm decides on
optimal treatability level by minimizing her compliance cost:
Min
ζ∗
1
≥0, ξi≥0
E(TCF )(τ
∗
F = 0) = Γ(ξi) + kQαiξ
2
i
For firm i the Lagrangian is written as Li = E(TCF ) − νi1ξi − νi2ζ∗1 . Solving the first
order conditions ∂Li
∂ξi
= 0 for νi1 = 0 and νi2 = 0, we find the optimal treatability level as
ξi =
τ0β
2k
, ∀i.
Plugging optimal values in, optimality condition is ζ∗1 = −Tτ0An2k +Y An+2τ0(η−ZA2n) ≥ 0
which can be written as
τ0 ≤ 2kY An
AnT − 4k(η − ZA2n)An
= κIF
In this region we can show that the problem is submodular with linear constraints
and thus there exists a pure strategy NE. We can also show that the solution is unique
here.
Note that when ζ∗1 ≥ 0, ξ∗i cannot be zero unless τ0 = 0.
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Region 2 (0 < τ ∗C < 1− τ0): The optimal collection rate τ ∗F is given in (C-7). We plug
τ ∗F in Γ(
~ξ) = Ex (TCCF (τ
∗
F ) + TCTF (τ
∗
F , ξ)) and get
Γ(~ξ) =
αi(η −XA2n)(τ∗C)2
A
+
((2η − 2ZA2n)τ0 −QµβξiAn + Y An)αi(τ∗C)
A
−τ0αi(τ0ZAn − Y +Qµβξi)
µ
=
αi(Qµβ
∑n
j=1 αjξj − Y An − 2(η − ZA2n)τ0)2
4(η −XA2n)An
+
(2(η − ZA2n)τ0 −QµβξiAn + Y An)αi(Qµβ
∑n
j=1 αjξj − Y An − 2(η − ZA2n)τ0)
2(η −XA2n)An
−τ0αi(τ0ZAn − Y +Qµβξi)
µ
Each firm decides on the level of treatability by minimizing her total cost simultaneously:
Min
1−τ0≥τ∗F≥0, ξi≥0
E(TCF )(τ = τ
∗
F ) = Γ(
~ξ) + kαiQξ
2
i
For firm i the Lagrangian is written as Li = E(TCF )−γi1ξi−γi2τ ∗−γi3(1− τ0− τ ∗).
The first order conditions ∂Li
∂ξi
= 0 should be satisfied at the optimality.
Now let us show that the problem is submodular with linear constraints. Assuming
that ξ1 and ξ2 are two feasible vectors, it is easy to show that
E
(
TCCF (ξ
1)
)
+ E
(
TCTF (ξ
1)
)
+ kαiQ(ξ
1
i )
2 +
E
(
TCCF (ξ
2)
)
+ E
(
TCTF (ξ
2)
)
+ kαiQ(ξ
2
i )
2 ≥
E
(
TCCF (ξ
1 ∧ ξ2))+ E (TCTF (ξ1 ∧ ξ2))+ kαiQ((ξ1i ∧ ξ2i ))2 +
E
(
TCCF (ξ
1 ∨ ξ2))+ E (TCTF (ξ1 ∨ ξ2))+ kαiQ((ξ1i ∨ ξ2i ))2
Keeping in mind that (ξ1i ∨ξ2i )+(ξ1i ∧ξ2i ) = ξ1i +ξ2i , (ξ1i ∨ξ2i )2+(ξ1i ∧ξ2i )2 = (ξ1i )2+(ξ2i )2,
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and
(∑n
j=1 αj(ξ
1
j ∨ ξ2j )
)
+
(∑n
j=1 αj(ξ
1
j ∧ ξ2j )
)
=
∑n
j=1 αjξ
1
j +
∑n
j=1 αjξ
2
j for every i, the
above condition simplifies to



 n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j

2 − 2ξ1iAn n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j

+



 n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j

2 − 2ξ2iAn

 n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j



 ≥



 n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
1
j ∨ ξ2j )

2 − 2(ξ1i ∨ ξ2i )An

 n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
1
j ∨ ξ2j )




+



 n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
1
j ∧ ξ2j )

2 − 2(ξ1i ∧ ξ2i )An

 n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
1
j ∧ ξ2j )



 .
Let (ξ1i ∨ ξ2i ) = ξmaxi and (ξ1i ∧ ξ2i ) = ξmini . Then we have
2ξmaxi An
n∑
j=1
αjξ
max
j + 2ξ
min
i An
n∑
j=1
αjξ
min
j − 2ξ1iAn
n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j − 2ξ2iAn
n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j ≥
+
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
max
j
)2
+
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
min
j
)2
−
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j
)2
−
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j
)2
.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that ξ1i = ξ
max
i . Then the inequality further
simplifies to
2ξmaxi An
n∑
j=1
αjξ
max
j + 2ξ
min
i An
n∑
j=1
αjξ
min
j − 2ξ1iAn
n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j − 2ξ2iAn
n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j ≥
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
max
j
)2
+
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
min
j
)2
−
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
2
j
)2
−
(
n∑
j=1
αjξ
1
j
)2
,
which is rewritten as
2(ξmaxi − ξmini )An ≥
n∑
j=1
αj(ξ
max
j + ξ
1
j − ξminj − ξ2j ) = 2
∑
j∈N
αj(ξ
max
j − ξminj )
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where N = {j : ξmaxj = ξ1j }. Note that the above inequality holds for every i on a lattice
S that is a subset of Rn where ξi = ξj ∀i, j. Therefore the game is submodular on lattice
S and pure strategy NE exists.
For the uniqueness of the equilibrium we use the dominant diagonal condition in
Milgrom and Roberts (1990). In our problem the dominant diagonal condition can be
written as
∂2E(TCF )
∂ξ2i
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2E(TCF )
∂ξj∂ξi
∣∣∣∣∣
4k(η −XA2n)An − (2Anαi − α2i )µT
2(η −XA2n)An
≥
∑
j 6=i
Tµαj(An − αi)
2(η −XA2n)An
=
Tµ(An − αi)2
2(η −XA2n)An
Therefore as long as the condition
4k(η −XA2n)− TµAn ≥ 0 (A3)
holds we guarantee uniqueness. In the rest of the analysis we assume that (A3) holds.
When 0 < τ ∗ < 1− τ0, the optimal treatability level is
ξ∗i =
β (2(η(1− µ) + (Zµ−X)A2n)τ0 − µY An)
4k(η −XA2n)− µTAn
(C-12)
and the optimal collection rate is
τ ∗F =
(TAn − 4k(η − ZA2n))τ0 − 2kY An
4k(η −XA2n)− µTAn
.
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Hence we have 0 < τ ∗F < 1− τ0 when τ0 satisfies
κIF =
2kY An
TAn − 4k(η − ZA2n)
< τ0 <
4k(η −XA2n)− µTAn + 2kY An
4k(Z −X)A2n + (1− µ)TAn
= κIIF
Region 3 (τ ∗F = 1−τ0): Solving the FOC when τ ∗F = 1−τ0, ζ2 > 0, and ζ1 = 0 we get
optimality condition (C-10). We plug τ ∗F = 1−τ0 in Γ(~ξ) = Ex (TCCF (τ ∗F ) + TCTF (τ ∗F , ξ))
and get
Γ(~ξ) =
αi ((η −XA2n)(1 + τ0)2 + (2η − ZA2n))τ0(1− τ0))
An
−αiQξiβ(µ− µτ0 − τ0) + αi(Y (µ− µτ0 − τ0)− τ
2
0ZAn)
µ
Then each firm decides on the level of treatability by minimizing her total cost:
Min
ζ∗
2
≥0, ξi≥0
E(TCF )(τ
∗
F = 1− τ0) = Γ(~ξ) + kαiQξ2i
For firm i the Lagrangian is written as Li = E(TCF )−ν1ξi−ν2ζ∗2 . Solving the first order
conditions ∂Li
∂ξi
= 0 for ν1 = 0 and ν2 = 0, we find the optimal treatability level as
ξ∗i =
β(µ− µτ0 + τ0)
2k
, ∀i.
Then ζ∗2 =
(4kA2n(Z−X)+TAn(1−µ))τ0−2Y kAn−4ηk+4XA
2
nk+µTAn
2k
≥ 0 which we rewrite as
κIIF =
4k(η −XA2n)− µTAn + 2kY An
4k(Z −X)A2n + (1− µ)TAn
< τ0 < 1.
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In this region we show that the problem is submodular with linear constraints and
thus there exists a pure strategy NE. The solution is also unique here. Note that when
ζ∗2 ≥ 0, ξ∗i cannot be zero because µ− µτ0 + τ0 ≥ 0.
In order these regions to be meaningful we need to ensure that κiF ’s are no greater
than 1. We write the differences as
1− κIF =
DF3
DF2
1− κIIF =
DF3
DF1 +D
F
2
κIIF − κIF =
DF3 D
F
1
DF2 (D
F
1 +D
F
2 )
,
where
DF1 = 4k(η −A2nX)− AnµT
DF2 = 4ZkA
2
n + AnT − 4kη
DF3 = 4ZkA
2
n + AnT − 4kη − 2AnY k.
Note that DF1 is positive due to (A3). On the other hand, when D
F
3 is negative, i.e.
η ≥ 4kZA2n+AnT−2Y kAn
4k
= ηC τ
∗ = 0 regardless of τ0. When D
F
3 is nonnegative, i.e. η ≤ ηC
then 0 ≤ κ1 ≤ κ2 ≤ 1 in the interval of interest, i.e. where 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ 1.
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Proof of Proposition 17. Let us define
DF1 = 4k(η −XA2n)− µTAn
DF2 = TAn − 4k(η − ZA2n)
GF1 = 4ZkA
2
n + TAn .
Then total cost is written in terms of τ as
E(TCF ) =
(DF1 µτ
2 − 2µ(DF2 τ0 − 2Y Ank)τ − τ0(GF1 τ0 − 4Y Ank))αi
(4kmuAn)
(C-13)
The total cost under individual scheme E(TCS) is given in (C-14) (see the proof of
Proposition 18). Then the difference
E(TCF )− E(TCS) = −(An − αi)(Anαiτ
2
0Z + 2µτ(AnαiZ + η)τ0 + µτ
2(XαiAn + η))
µAn
is always negative. Therefore E(TCF )(τ
∗ = τ ∗F ) < E(TCF )(τ
∗ = τ ∗S) < E(TCS)(τ
∗ =
τ ∗S).
The difference between the total cost for firm i under individual financial responsibility
E(TCF ) and the total cost under collective financial responsibility E(TCC) (see (C-15)
in the proof of Proposition 18) is
E(TCF )− E(TCC) = αiT (µτ + τ0)
2(2S2n − A2n − α2i )
4kµA2n
.
The difference is calculated at the same τ and it is always positive as long as (2S2n −
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A2n − α2i ) ≥ 0. Thus E(TCF )(τ ∗ = τ ∗F ) > E(TCC)(τ ∗ = τ ∗F ) > E(TCC)(τ ∗ = τ ∗C) if
(2S2n −A2n − α2i ) ≥ 0 and E(TCF )(τ ∗ = τ ∗F ) < E(TCC)(τ ∗ = τ ∗C) < E(TCC)(τ ∗ = τ ∗C) if
(2S2n − A2n − α2i ) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 18. Let us define
DIS = 4k(η −Xα2i )− µTαi
DIIS = Tαi − 4k(η − Zα2i )
GIS = 4Zkαi + T .
For a firm following individual scheme we show in Proposition 14 that ξ∗S =
β(τ0+µτ)
2k
for any τ (in all three regions). Thus the expected total cost can be written in terms of
any given τ (and also for τ ∗) as
E(TCS) =
(DISµτ
2 + (4µY αik − 2µτ0DIIS )τ − αiτ0(GISτ0 − 4kY ))
4kµ
. (C-14)
Under collective scheme we show in Proposition 15 that ξ∗C =
βαi(τ0+µτ)
2kAn
for any τ (in
all three regions). Thus if the same firm decides to join a collaboration of size An − αi
with n − 1 members then her expected total cost in terms of any given τ (and also for
τ ∗) is
E(TCC) =
αi

 −2µ((D2 + T (S2n − α
2
i ))τ0 − 2Y A2nk)τ
+(D1 − Tµ(S2n − α2i ))µτ 2 − τ 20G1 + 4Y A2nkτ0


4kA2nµ
(C-15)
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where
D1 = 4k(η −XA2n)An − µTS2n
D2 = TS2n − 4k(η + ZA2n)An
G1 = 4kA
3
nZ + (2S2n − α2i )T
S2n =
n−1∑
j=0
α2j + α
2
i .
Calculating ∆0 = E(TCC)(τ)− E(TCS)(τ) at the same τ level we get
∆0 =
µaτ 2 + 2µτ0bτ + αiτ
2
0 c
4kA2nµ
(C-16)
where
c = A2nG
I
S −G1
b = Tα3i − αiD2 + A2nDIIS − αiS2nT = αic− 4kAnη(An − αi) (C-17)
a = µTα3i + αiD1 − A2nDIS − µαiS2nT = αiµc− 4kAn(An − αi)(η + αiAn(X − µZ))
= αiµc− 4kAn(An − αi)(η + αiAnθQ2σ2). (C-18)
Let us denote the optimal individual collection rate as τS and the optimal collective
collection rate as τC . Consider the regions provided in Proposition 14 and 15. There
are three regions under both collective and individual schemes. When τ0 ≤ min{κIS, κIC},
both τC = 0 and τS = 0. In this region the difference between the optimal total costs of
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firm i is
E(TCC)(τ = τC = 0)−E(TCS)(τ = τS = 0) = ∆0(τ = 0) = αiτ
2
0 (A
2
nG
I
S −G1)
4kA2nµ
=
αiτ
2
0 c
4kA2nµ
Let us analyze the following cases with respect to the sign of c = (A2nG
I
S − G1). In
the rest of the analysis we denote the difference between the optimal cost values as
∆ = E(TCC)(τ = τC)− E(TCS)(τ = τS).
Case 1. If c = (A2nG
I
S − G1) ≤ 0 then both b ≤ 0 and a ≤ 0 and thus ∆0 ≤ 0
for every τ . Therefore, if τ ∗C = τ
∗
S = 0 or τ
∗
C = τ
∗
S = 1 − τ0 then ∆ = ∆0 ≤ 0.
First let us identify the possible cases where τ ∗C 6= τ ∗S: If c ≤ 0 then N2 ≤ 0 (for
the definition of N1 and N2 please see the proof of Proposition 20) because αµc−N2 =
4kAn(An−αi)(η+Anαi(X−µZ))−αiTµ(S2n−α2i ) ≥ 0. The last inequality holds because
under the initial collaboration (with total market share An−αi) in order to have a unique
solution 4k(An−αi)(η−X(An−αi)2)−(S2n−α2i )Tµ ≥ 0 (corresponding to the assumption
(A2)) should already be satisfied and therefore 4k(An − αi)Anη − (S2n − α2i )Tµαi ≥
4k(An − αi)η − (S2n − α2i )Tµ ≥ 0. On the other hand N1 can take both positive and
negative values. Hence we can observe either Case 2 (i.e. N1 ≥ 0 and N2 ≤ 0) or Case 3
(i.e. N1 ≤ 0 and N2 ≤ 0) provided in the proof of Proposition 20. Let us analyze these
two cases:
Case 1.1. If both N1 ≤ 0 and N2 ≤ 0, then we know that τS ≤ τC . Then along the span
of τ0 we can observe two different regions where τS 6= τC : (i)1− τ0 ≥ τC > 0 and τS = 0,
and (ii) 1 − τ0 ≥ τC > 0 and 1 − τ0 > τS > 0. Let us analyze the two cases keeping
in mind that the optimal collection rate can be written as τC =
DII
C
τ0−2Y A2nk
DI
C
− x where
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x = 0 in Region 2 and x > 0 in Region 3.
Case 1.1.i. The expected cost of collaborative compliance for firm i in terms of τC and
DIC is
E(TCC) =
αi

 µ(−Tµ(S2n − α
2
i )−DIC)(τC)2 − 2µ(xDIC + Tτ0(S2n − α2i ))τC
+τ0(−GICτ0 + 4Y A2nk)


4kA2nµ
.
while the expected cost of individual compliance at τS = 0 (in Region 1), is E(TCS)(τ =
τS = 0) =
αiτ0(4kY−G
I
Sτ0)
4kµ
. Thus the difference between the optimal compliance costs, i.e.
∆ = E(TCC)(τ = τC)− E(TCS)(τ = 0) is
αi(µ(−µT (S2n − α2i )−DIC)(τC)2 + 2µ(−Tτ0(S2n − α2i )− xDIC)τC + τ 20 (A2nGIS −G1))
4kA2nµ
.
The difference is negative because DIC ≥ 0, S2n ≥ α2i and c = (A2nGIS −G1) ≤ 0.
Case 1.1.ii. The expected cost of collaborative compliance for firm i in terms of τC and
DIIC is
E(TCC) =
αi


−TτCµ(2τ0 + τCµ)(x+ τC)(S2n − α2i )
−τ0(GICτ0(x+ τC) + τCµDIIC (τC + 2x))
+2kτCµY A
2
n(τC + 2x) + 4kY A
2
nτ0(x+ τC)


4(x+ τC)kA2nµ
.
On the other hand when 0 < τS =
τ0DIIS −2αiY k
DI
S
< 1− τ0 (in Region 2), the expected cost
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of individual compliance in terms of DIIS and τS is
E(TCC) =
((−τ0DIIS + 2αiY k)τSµ− αiτ0(GISτ0 − 4kY ))
4kµ
.
Thus the difference between optimal compliance costs in terms of τS is
∆ =
αiτ
2
0 (x+ τS + δ)c− αiµ2T (S2n − α2i )(τS + δ)3
+µ(−Tαi(S2n − α2i )(µx+ 2τ0) + τ0N1)(τS + δ)2 − µA2nDISτSδ2
+µ(2αi(−τ0DIIC + 2Y A2nk − τ0T (S2n − α2i ))x−A2nτSDISτS)δ
τSxµ(−2αiTτ0(S2n − α2i ) + αi(−τ0DIIC + 2Y A2nk) + τ0N1)
(4(x+ τS + δ))kA2nµ
. (C-19)
The difference is negative because c < 0, S2n > α
2
i , N1 < 0,D
I
S > 0, and τ0D
II
C −2Y A2nk >
0.
Hence we conclude that if bothN1 ≤ 0 andN2 ≤ 0, then E(TCC)(τC)−E(TCS)(τS) ≤
0.
Case 1.2. If N1 ≥ 0 and N2 ≤ 0, then we know that τS ≥ τC if κIIC ≥ κIIS . On the other
hand, if κIIC ≤ κIIS then τS ≥ τC (τS ≤ τC) if τ0 ≤ κ3 (τ0 ≥ κ3). Thus we can observe the
following cases:
1. If 0 ≤ κIS ≤ κIIS ≤ 1 ≤ min{κIC , κIIC } (i.e. τC = 0 for every τ0) then see Case 1.2.ii.
and Case 1.2.iii.
2. If 0 ≤ κIS ≤ κIC ≤ κIIS ≤ κIIC ≤ 1 then see Case 1.2.ii., Case 1.2.iv., and Case 1.2.v.
3. If 0 ≤ κIS ≤ κIIS ≤ κIC ≤ κIIC ≤ 1 then see Case 1.2.ii., Case 1.2.v., and Case 1.2.v.
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4. If 0 ≤ κIS ≤ κIC ≤ κ3 ≤ κIIC ≤ κIIS ≤ 1 then see Case 1.2.ii., Case 1.2.iv., Case
1.2.i.
It is easy to show that ∆ is a piecewise function of τ0 and continuous at the endpoints
of subdomains. Next we analyze how ∆ changes in the remaining subdomains:
Case 1.2.i. (The case where τC ≥ τS) First consider the region where τ0 ∈ [κ3, κIIS ] under
ordering 4. Since 0 < τC ≤ 1− τ0 (in Region 2 or 3), 0 < τS = τ0D
II
S
−2αiY k
DI
S
< 1− τ0 (in
Region 2) and τC = τS + δ the difference between the optimal compliance costs, ∆ is as
given in (C-19). Since αic− 4kηAn(An − αi) = N1 − αiT (S2n − α2i ) ≤ 0, the expression
in equation (C-19) is negative.
On the other hand, if 0 ≤ τ0 ≤ κIS or max{κIIS , κIIC } ≤ τ0 ≤ 1 then τS = τC and thus
∆ ≤ 0. Therefore we conclude that if τC ≥ τS then E(TCC)(τC)−E(TCS)(τS) ≤ 0.
If τC < τS then the sign of ∆ depends on τ0. Next, we analyze the sign of ∆ in each
possible region of τ0:
Case 1.2.ii. Consider the region where τ0 ∈ [κIS,min{κIIS , κIC}]. Since τC = 0 (in Region
1) and 0 < τS < 1− τ0 (in Region 2) the difference between the optimal compliance costs
in terms of τ0 is
∆1 =
(αiD
I
S(G
I
SA
2
n −GIC) + A2nµ(DIIS )2)τ 20 + 4kA2nµαiY (Y kαi − τ0DIIS )
4kA2nµD
I
S
= a1(τ0)
2 + b1τ0 + c1
where b1 ≤ 0 and c1 ≥ 0.
• If a1 ≤ 0 then ∆1 has one positive and one negative root. Since ∆1(τ0 = 0) ≥ 0
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and ∆1(τ0 = κ
I
S) = ∆0(τ = 0, τ0 = κ
I
S) ≤ 0, the positive bound is smaller than κIS.
Thus ∆1 ≤ 0 for every τ0 ∈ [κIS, 1].
• If a1 ≥ 0 then ∆1 has two positive roots. Since ∆1(τ0 = 0) ≥ 0 and ∆1(τ0 = κIS) =
∆0(τ = 0, τ0 = κ
I
S) ≤ 0, the smaller bound is smaller than κIS. Thus ∆1 ≤ 0 if and
only if τ0 ≤ max{B1 = −b1+
√
b2
1
−4a1c1
2a1
,min{κIIS , κIC}}.
Case 1.2.iii. Consider the region where τ0 ∈ [κIIS , 1] under ordering 1 or the region where
τ0 ∈ [κIIS , κIC ] under ordering 3. Since τC = 0 (in Region 1) and τS = 1− τ0 (in Region 3)
the difference between the optimal compliance costs in terms of τ0 is
∆2 =
(−A2nµ(DIS + 2DIIS ) + αi(GISA2n −GIC))τ 20
+2A2µ(DIS + 2Y kαi +D
II
S )τ0 −A2nµ(4Y kαi +DIS)
4kA2nµ
= a2(τ0)
2 + b2τ0 + c2
where a2 ≤ 0, b2 ≥ 0, and c2 ≤ 0. Hence ∆2 has two positive roots. Also note that
∆2 −∆1 = −(D
I
S
+2Y kαi−τ0(DIS+D
II
S
))2
4kDI
S
≤ 0.
• If a1 ≤ 0 then ∆1 ≤ 0 and thus ∆2 ≤ 0 as well. Hence ∆ ≤ 0 for every τ0 under
ordering 1.
• If a1 ≥ 0 and B1 ≤ κIIS then ∆1(τ0 = κIIS ) = ∆2(τ0 = κIIS ) ≥ 0. We also know
that ∆2(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0 and ∆2(τ0 = 1) = αic(4kµA2n ≤ 0. Thus the larger bound of
the polynomial ∆2, B2 =
−b2−
√
b2
2
−4a2c2
2a2
∈ [κIIS , 1]. Hence under ordering 1, ∆ is
positive if B1 ≤ τ0 ≤ B2 and negative otherwise. For ordering 3, ∆2 is positive if
B1 ≤ τ0 ≤ min{B2, κIC} and negative otherwise.
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• If a1 ≥ 0 and B1 ≥ κIIS then ∆1 ≤ 0 in the region where τ0 ∈ [κIS, κIIS ]. Then
∆2(τ0 = κ
II
S ) = ∆1(τ0 = κ
II
S ) ≤ 0. Keeping in mind that ∆2(τ0 = 1) ≤ 0 and
∆2 ≤ ∆1, we conclude that under ordering 1, ∆ ≥ 0 if B′2 ≤ τ0 ≤ B2 where
B′2 =
−b2+
√
b2
2
−4a2c2
2a2
and negative otherwise. Under ordering 3, ∆2 ≥ 0 if B′2 ≤ τ0 ≤
min{B2, κIC} and negative otherwise.
Case 1.2.iv. Consider the region where τ0 ∈ [κIC , κIIS ] under ordering 2 or the region
where τ0 ∈ [κIC , κ3] under ordering 4. Since 0 < τC = τ0D
II
C
−2Y A2nk
DI
C
< τS (in Region 2) and
0 < τS =
τ0DIIS −2αiY k
DI
S
< 1− τ0 (in Region 2) the difference between the optimal costs is
∆3 =
a3τ
2
0 + 4kA
2
nµαiY b3τ0 + 4k
2A2nαiµY
2c3
4(DIC)
2A2nkµD
I
S
(C-20)
where
a3 =
−µTαiDIIC DIS(µDIIC + 2DIC)(S2n − α2i )
+µDIC((D
II
S )
2A2nD
I
C − αiDIS(DIIC )2) + (DIC)2αiDIS(A2nGIS −GIC)
b3 = TD
I
S(µD
II
C +D
I
C)(S2n − α2i )−DIC(−DISDIIC +DICDIIS )
c3 = −TA2nDISµ(S2n − α2i )−DIC(A2nDIS − αiDIC) = −TA2nDISµ(S2n − α2i ) +DICN2
Note that b3 ≥ 0 (see the proof of Proposition 20 for the discussion regarding the sign of
(−DISDIIC +DICDIIS )) and c3 ≤ 0. Also note that
∆1 −∆3 = αi(τ0D
II
C − 2Y kA2n)
4(DIC)
2A2nk

 2TD
I
C(S2n − α2i )τ0
+(DIC + Tµ(S2n − α2i ))(τ0DIIC − 2Y kA2n)

 ≥ 0
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as long as τ0 ≥ κIC .
• If a1 ≤ 0 then ∆1 ≤ 0 and then ∆3 ≤ 0 as well. Thus ∆ ≤ 0 for every τ0 under
ordering 4.
• If a1 ≥ 0 and ∆1(τ0 = κIC) = ∆3(τ0 = κIC) ≥ 0 then we observe one of the following
two situations depending on the sign of a3:
– If a3 ≥ 0 then ∆3 has one positive and one negative root. Since ∆3(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0,
the positive root of the polynomial ∆3, i.e. B3 =
−b3+
√
b2
3
−4a3c3
2a3
is less than
κIC . Thus ∆3 ≥ 0 in the region where τ0 ∈ [κIC , κIIS ] under ordering 2. On the
other hand this situation cannot occur under ordering 4, because κ3 ≥ κIC and
∆3(κ3) ≤ 0 (due to continuity and the discussion under case Case 1.2.i.).
– If a3 ≤ 0 then ∆3 has two positive roots. Since ∆3(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0, the smaller
root of the polynomial ∆3 is less than κ
I
C . Thus ∆3 ≥ 0 if and only if κIC ≤
τ0 ≤ min{κIIS , B′3} (where B′3 = −b3−
√
b2
3
−4a3c3
2a3
) and ∆3 ≤ 0 otherwise.
• If a1 ≥ 0 and ∆1(τ0 = κIC) = ∆3(τ0 = κIC) ≤ 0 then we observe one of the following
two situations depending on the sign of a3:
– If a3 ≥ 0 then ∆3 ≤ 0 if and only if τ0 ≤ min{B3, κIIS } under ordering 2. On
the other hand ∆3 ≤ 0 under ordering 4 in the region of interest.
– If a3 ≤ 0 then ∆3 ≥ 0 if and only if max{B3, κIC} ≤ τ0 ≤ min{κIIS , B′3} and
∆3 < 0 otherwise. (Under ordering 4, ∆3 ≥ 0 if and only if max{B3, κIC} ≤
τ0 ≤ min{κ3, B′3} and ∆3 < 0 otherwise.)
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Case 1.2.v. Consider the region where max{κIC , κIIS } ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIC under ordering 2 and
3. Since 0 < τC =
τ0DIIC −2Y A
2
nk
DI
C
< 1− τ0 (in Region 2) and τS = 1− τ0 (in Region 3) the
difference between the optimal costs is
∆4 =
a4τ
2
0 + 2A
2
nµb4τ0 + A
2
nµc4
4(DIC)
2A2nkµ
(C-21)
where
a4 = µ(αiTD
II
C (µD
II
C + 2D
I
C)(−S2n + α2i )−DIC(A2DISDIC + 2DICA2DIIS + αi(DIIC )2))
+(DIC)
2αi(A
2GIS −GIC)
b4 = 2Y kαi(T (µD
II
C +D
I
C)(S2n − α2i ) +DICDIIC + (DIC)2) + (DIC)2(DIS +DIIS )
c4 = 4Tk
2A2αiµY
2(−S2n + α2i )− 4kαiDICY (DIC + Y kA2)− (DIC)2DIS
where a4 ≤ 0, b4 ≥ 0 and c4 ≤ 0. Thus the polynomial ∆4 has two positive roots. Note
that ∆4(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0 and ∆4(τ0 = κIIC ) ≤ 0 because ∆4(τ0 = κIIC ) = ∆0(τ = 1− τ0, τ0 =
κIIC ) ≤ 0. Besides ∆4 −∆3 = − (−τ0D
II
S +2Y kαi+D
I
S−D
I
Sτ0)
2
4kDI
S
≤ 0.
• If a1 ≤ 0 then ∆1 ≤ 0, ∆2 ≤ 0, ∆3 ≤ 0 and ∆4 ≤ 0. Thus ∆ ≤ 0 for every τ0 under
ordering 2 and 3.
• If a1 ≥ 0 and ∆4(τ0 = max{κIC , κIIS }) ≥ 0 then the greater root of polynomial ∆4,
i.e. B4 =
−b4−
√
b2
4
−4a4c4
2a4
, is in the interval of max{κIC , κIIS } ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIC . Therefore if
max{κIC , κIIS } ≤ τ0 ≤ B4 then ∆4 ≥ 0, otherwise ∆4 ≤ 0.
• If a1 ≥ 0 and ∆4(τ0 = max{κIC , κIIS }) ≤ 0 then we conclude that ∆4 ≥ 0 if and only
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if max{κIC , κIIS , B′4} ≤ τ0 ≤ min{κIIC , B4}, where B′4 = −b4+
√
b2
4
−4a4c4
2a4
, and ∆4 < 0
otherwise.
Case 2. If c = (A2nG
I
S − G1) ≥ 0 then ∆ = E(TCC)(τC = 0) − E(TCS)(τS = 0) =
αiτ
2
0
c
4kA2nmu
≥ 0 (when both are in Region 1). However knowing that c = (A2nGIS − G1) ≥ 0
does not guarantee any further information regarding the sign of N1 and N2. Also we can
numerically observe every possible combination regarding the sign of N1 and N2 when
c ≥ 0. Hence if c ≥ 0 we can observe every case provided in Proposition 20.
If τ0 ≤ κIC then τC = 0. Note that we can write τS = τ0D
II
S −2αiY k
DI
S
− x where x = 0
in Region 2 and x > 0 in Region 3. Then the difference ∆ = E(TCC)(τC = 0) −
E(TCS)(τS)between the optimal cost values is written in terms of D
II
S and τS as follows:
∆ =
τSA
2
nµ(τ0D
II
S − 2αiY k)(τS + 2x) + αiτ 20 (A2nGIS −GIS)(x+ τS)
4A2nkµ(x+ τS)
The difference is positive because c = (A2nG
I
S − GIC) ≥ 0 and (τ0DIIS − 2αiY k) = (τS +
x)DIS ≥ 0. Thus we show that ∆ ≥ 0 when τC = 0. In order to complete the analysis
we need to identify the sign of ∆ under other possible situations. Next we analyze
signum(∆) in detail with respect to N1.
Case 2.1. When N1 ≤ 0 (we know that N2 ≤ 0 and τC ≥ τS hold when N1 ≤ 0) we
observe one of the following three orderings:
1. If 0 ≤ κIC ≤ κIIC ≤ 1 ≤ min{κIS, κIIS } (i.e. τS = 0 for every τ0) then see Case
2.1.i,Case 2.1.ii.
2. If 0 ≤ κIC ≤ κIS ≤ κIIC ≤ κIIS ≤ 1 then see Case 2.1.i,Case 2.1.iii,Case 2.1.iv,Case
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2.1.v.
3. If 0 ≤ κIC ≤ κIIC ≤ κIS ≤ κIIS ≤ 1 then see Case 2.1.i,Case 2.1.ii,Case 2.1.iv,Case
2.1.v.
Case 2.1.i Consider the region where τ0 ∈ [κIC ,min{κIS, κIIC }]. Since 0 < τC < 1− τ0 (in
Region 2) and τS = 0 (in Region 1) the difference between the optimal costs in terms of
τ0 is
∆5 =
αi


(TµDIIC (α
2
i − S2n)(µDIIC + 2DIC) + (DIC)2(−GIC +GISA2n))τ 20
−4kµA2nY (T (α2i − S2n)(µDIIC +DIC)−DICDIIC )τ0 − µDIC(DIIC )2τ 20
+4µY 2k2A4n(Tµ(α
2
i − S2n)−DIC)


4(DIC)
2A2nkµ
= a5(τ0)
2 + b5τ0 + c5
where b5 ≥ 0 and c5 ≤ 0.
• If a5 ≥ 0 then ∆5 has one positive and one negative root. Since ∆5(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0
and ∆5(τ0 = κ
I
C) = ∆0(τ = 0, τ0 = κ
I
C) ≥ 0, the positive root is smaller than κIC .
Thus ∆5 ≥ 0 for every τ0 ∈ [κIC , 1].
• If a5 ≤ 0 then ∆5 has two positive roots. Since ∆5(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0 and ∆5(τ0 = κIC) =
∆0(τ = 0, τ0 = κ
I
C) ≥ 0, the smaller root is smaller than κIC . Thus ∆5 ≥ 0 in the
region of interest if and only if τ0 ≤ min{B5 = −b5−
√
b2
5
−4a5c5
2a5
, κIS, κ
II
C }}.
Case 2.1.ii. Consider the region where τ0 ∈ [κIIC , 1] under ordering 1 or the region where
τ0 ∈ [κIIC , κIS] under ordering 3. Since τC = 1− τ0 (in Region 3) and τS = 0 (in Region 1)
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the difference between the optimal costs in terms of τ0 is
∆6 =
αi


(Tµ(S2n − α2i )(2− µ) + µ(2DIIC +DIC) +GISA2n −GIC)τ 20
+(−2Tµ(S2n − α2i )(1− µ)− 2µ(DIC +DIIC + 2Y kA2n))τ0
+µ(−Tµ(S2n − α2i ) +DIC + 4Y kA2n)


4kA2nµ
= a6(τ0)
2 + b6τ0 + c6
where a6 ≥ 0, b6 ≤ 0. If c6 ≥ 0 then there are two positive roots, otherwise there is one
positive and one negative root. Also note that
∆6 −∆5 = α1x(x((S2n − αi)Tµ+D
I
C) + 2TD
I
C(−τ0 − µ+ µτ0)(S2n − α21))
4(DIC)
2A2k
≥ 0
where x = (−DICτ0 + 2Y kA2 + DIC − τ0DIIC ) ≤ 0 in the region of interest (because
1− τ0 − τ0D
II
C −2Y A
2
nk
DI
C
= − x
DI
C
≥ 0 in Region 3).
• If a5 ≥ 0 then ∆5 ≥ 0 and thus ∆6 ≥ 0. Hence ∆ ≤ 0 for every τ0 under ordering
1.
• If a5 ≥ 0 and ∆5(τ0 = κIIC ) ≤ 0 then ∆6 ≥ 0 if and only if B6 ≤ τ0 ≤ min{1, κIS}
where B6 =
−b6+
√
b2
6
+4a6c6
2a6
.
• If a5 ≥ 0 and ∆5(τ0 = κIIC ) ≥ 0 then in the region of interest ∆6 ≤ 0 if and only if
B′6 ≤ τ0 ≤ B6 where B′6 = −b6−
√
b2
6
+4a6c6
2a6
. Note that if c6 ≤ 0 then B6 ≤ κIIC and
thus ∆6 ≥ 0 in the region of interest.
Case 2.1.iii. Consider the region where κIS ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIC under ordering 2. Since both τS
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and τC are in Region 2 the difference between optimal compliance costs is given in (C-20)
in terms of τ0.
Note that b3 ≥ 0 and c3 ≤ 0. Also note that
∆3 −∆5 = (τ0D
II
S − 2Y kαi)2
4kDIS
≥ 0
• If a5 ≥ 0 then ∆5 ≥ 0 and thus ∆3 ≥ 0 as well.
• If a5 ≤ 0 and ∆5(τ0 = κIS) = ∆3(τ0 = κIS) ≥ 0 then we observe one of the following
two subcases depending on the sign of a3:
– If a3 ≥ 0 then ∆3 ≥ 0 in the region of interest.
– If a3 ≤ 0 then ∆3 has two positive roots. Since ∆3(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0, the smaller
root of the polynomial ∆3 is less than κ
I
S. Thus ∆3 ≥ 0 if and only if κIS ≤
τ0 ≤ min{κIIC , B′3}.
• If a5 ≤ 0 and ∆5(τ0 = κIS) = ∆3(τ0 = κIS) ≤ 0 then we observe one of the following
two subcases depending on the sign of a3:
– If a3 ≥ 0 then ∆3 ≤ 0 if and only if τ0 ≤ min{B3, κIIC }.
– If a3 ≤ 0 then ∆3 ≥ 0 if and only if B3 ≤ τ0 ≤ B′3 in the region of interest.
Case 2.1.iv. Consider the region where max{κIS, κIIC } ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS under ordering 2 and 3.
Since τC = 1− τ0 (in Region 3) and 0 < τS < 1− τ0 (in Region 2) the difference between
260
optimal compliance costs in terms of τ0 is
∆7 =
a7τ
2
0 + 2µαib7τ0 + µαic7
4A2nkµD
I
S
(C-22)
where
a7 = µ(α1TD
I
S(S2n − α21)(2− µ) + (DIIS )2A2n + 2α1DISDIIC + α1DISDIC)
+α1D
I
S(G
I
SA
2
n −GIC)
b7 = −TDIS(S2n − α21)(1− µ)−DISDIC −DISDIIC − 2Y kA2n(DIS +DIIS )
c7 = −TµDIS(S2n − α21) +DISDIC + 4kA2nY (Y kα1 +DIS)
Note that a7 ≥ 0, b7 ≥ 0 and ∆7−∆3 = αix(x((S2n−α
2
i )Tµ+D
I
C)+2TD
I
C(−τ0−µ+µτ0)(S2n−α
2
i ))
4(DI
C
)2A2nk
≥ 0
where x = −DICτ0 + 2Y kA2n − τ0DIIC +DIC ≤ 0 and ∆7 −∆6 = (−τ0D
II
S
+2Y kαi)2
4kDI
S
≥ 0.
• If a5 ≥ 0 then ∆5 ≥ 0 and thus ∆6 ≥ 0, ∆3 ≥ 0, and ∆7 ≥ 0.
• If a5 ≤ 0 and ∆7(τ0 = max{κIS, κIIC }) ≤ 0 then ∆7 ≤ 0 if and only if τ0 ≤
min{B7, κIIS } where B7 = −b7+
√
b2
7
−4a7c7
2a7
.
• If a5 ≤ 0 and ∆7(τ0 = max{κIS, κIIC }) ≥ 0 then in the region of interest ∆7 ≤ 0
if and only if B′7 ≤ τ0 ≤ B7 where B′7 = −b6−
√
b2
6
+4a6c6
2a6
. Note that if c7 ≤ 0 then
B7 ≤ max{κIS, κIIC } and thus ∆7 is positive in the interval of interest.
Case 2.1.v. Consider the region where κIIS ≤ τ0 ≤ 1 under ordering 2 and 3. Since
τC = τS = 1−τ0 (both are in Region 3) the difference between the optimal costs in terms
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of τ0 is
∆8 =
a8τ
2
0 + 2µb8τ0 + µc8
4A2nkµ
(C-23)
where
a8 = αiTµ(α
2
i − S2n)(µ− 2) + µ(αiDIC − A2nDIS) + 2µ(−A2nDIIS + αiDIIC )
−αi(G1 −GISA2n)
b8 = αiT (S2n − α2i )(µ− 1)− αiDIC + A2nDIIS + A2nDIS − αiDIIC
c8 = αiTµ(α
2
i − S2n) + αiDIC −A2nDIS = αiTµ(α2i − S2n) +N2.
Note that ∆8(τ0 = 0) = c8 ≤ 0 and ∆8(τ0 = 1) = αi(G
I
SA
2
n−G
I
C)
A2nkµ
≥ 0. Therefore ∆8
has only one root, B8 in the interval where τ0 ∈ [0, 1]. Also observe that ∆7 − ∆8 =
(DI
S
−DI
S
τ0−τ0DIIS +2Y kαi)
2
4kDI
S
≥ 0.
• If a5 ≥ 0 then ∆7 ≥ 0 and thus ∆8 ≥ 0. Therefore ∆ ≥ 0 under ordering 2 and 3
for every τ0.
• If a5 ≤ 0 and ∆8(τ0 = κIIS ) ≤ 0 then ∆8 ≤ 0 if and only if τ0 ≤ B8.
• If a5 ≤ 0 and ∆8(τ0 = κIIS ) ≥ 0 then ∆8 is positive in the interval of interest.
Case 2.2.iii. Consider the region where max{κIIS , κIIC } ≤ τ0 ≤ 1 under ordering 2,3 and 4.
Since τC = τS = 1− τ0 (both are in Region 3) the difference between optimal compliance
costs in terms of τ0 is ∆8 as given in equation (C-23).
262
• If ∆8(τ0 = max{κIIS , κIIC }) ≥ 0 then ∆8 ≤ 0 if and only if B′8 ≤ τ0 ≤ B8 in the
region of interest.
• If ∆8(τ0 = max{κIIS , κIIC }) ≤ 0 then ∆8 ≥ 0 if and only if B8 ≤ τ0 ≤ 1.
Case 2.2.iv. Consider the region where κIIC ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS under ordering 4. Since τC = 1−τ0
(in Region 3) and 0 < τS < 1−τ0 (in Region 2) the difference between optimal compliance
costs in terms of τ0 is ∆7 (see equation (C-22)) where a7 ≥ 0 and b7 ≥ 0. Besides ∆7 ≥ ∆3
in the region of interest. Thus we observe one of the following cases:
• If ∆3(τ0 = κIIC ) ≥ 0 then ∆7 ≥ 0 in the region of interest (because ∆7(τ0 = κIIC ) ≥ 0
-continuity– and ∆7 ≥ ∆3)
• If ∆3(τ0 = κIIC ) ≤ 0 then ∆7 ≥ 0 if B7 ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS and ∆8 ≤ 0 otherwise.
Proof of Corollary 4. If c = (A2nG
I
S − GIC) ≥ 0 does not give any information on
the signs of a and b in equation (C-16). Note that a ≥ 0 and b ≤ 0 cannot be observed
simultaneously because a − µb = −4kAn(An − αi)(η(1− µ) + αiAnθQ2σ2) ≤ 0. On the
other hand, if a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 then ∆ ≥ 0 at any τ value. Since ∆ ≥ 0 for every τ , the
following inequality also holds at the optimal collective collection rate:
∆(τ = τC) = E(TCC)(τ = τC)− E(TCS)(τ = τC) ≥ 0
Proof of Proposition 19. If the government imposes a binding lower bound, τT =
τ0 + µτ¯ , on the percentage of items that needs not be collected/treated properly, then
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τS = τC = τ¯ =
τT−τ0
µ
. Firm i as well as the other firms in the collaboration then decide
on their optimal treatment levels. Note that ξ∗S =
β(τ0+µτS)
2k
= βτT
2k
and ξ∗C =
αiβ(τ0+µτC)
2kAn
=
βαiτT
2kAn
. In Proposition 18 we calculate the difference between the cost under individual and
collective schemes under same τ in equation (C-16). Remember that ∆0 = E(TCC)(τ¯ )−
E(TCS)(τ¯ ) =
µaτ¯2+2µτ0bτ¯+αiτ20 c
4kα2i µ
where c = A2nG
I
S − G1, b = αic − 4kAnη(An − αi) and
a = αiµc − 4kAn(An − αi)(η + αiAn(X − µZ)). We need to analyze the two following
cases with respect to c in order to complete the analysis:
Case 1. If c ≤ 0 then both a ≤ 0 and b ≤ 0. Thus ∆0 ≤ 0, i.e. firm i decides to join the
collaboration, as long as c ≤ 0.
Case 2. We write ∆0 in terms of τ0 and τT after plugging in τ¯ =
τT−τ0
µ
as ∆0 =
x1τ
2
0 + x2τ0τT + x3τ
2
T where
x1 = α1Tµ(S2n − α2i ) +N2 − 2µN1 + αiµ(A2nGIS −GIC)
x2 = 2(µN1 −N2)
x3 = N2 − αiTµ(S2n − α2i ).
First note that τ0 ≤ τT and the difference is positive at the lower bound of τT , i.e.
∆0(τT = τ0) = αiµτ0c > 0.
Next we analyze the sign of ∆0 with respect to the possible signs of coefficients. In
Proposition 20 we show that µN1 ≥ N2 and thus x2 ≥ 0. Depending on the sign of x3
we observe two cases:
Case 2.a: x3 ≤ 0 If x1 > 0 then the polynomial ∆0(τT ) has one positive and one
negative root. As ∆(τT = 0) = x1τ
2
0 > 0 and ∆(τT = τ0) > 0 the positive root,
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τ¯T = τ0
−2x2−
√
x2
2
−4x3x1
2x3
, is greater than τ0. Therefore ∆0 ≤ 0, i.e. firm i decides to join if
and only if τ¯T (τ0) ≤ τT .
If x1 < 0 then the polynomial ∆0(τT ) has two positive roots. As ∆(τT = 0) = x1τ
2
0 < 0
and ∆(τT = τ0) > 0 the greater positive root, τ¯T = τ0
−2x2−
√
x2
2
−4x3x1
2x3
, is greater than τ0.
Therefore ∆0 ≤ 0, i.e. firm i decides to join if and only if τ¯T (τ0) ≤ τT .
To summarize our findings, we conclude that if x3 ≤ 0 which is rewritten as
η ≥ η5 = αiQµ
2(α2i − 2S2n + A2n)β2 − 4A2kθQ2αi(µ2 + σ2)(A− αi)
4kAn(An − αi)
then firm i decides to join if and only if τ¯T (τ0) ≤ τT .
Case 2.a: x3 ≥ 0 If x1 > 0 then ∆0(τT ) ≥ 0 regardless of τT and thus the decision is not
to join. If x1 < 0 then the polynomial ∆0(τT ) has one positive and one negative root.
As ∆(τT = 0) = x1τ
2
0 < 0 and ∆(τT = τ0) > 0 the positive root is smaller than the lower
bound of τT , τ0 and thus in the region of interest ∆0(τT ) ≥ 0. Therefore if x3 ≥ 0 which
is rewritten as η ≤ η5 then the decision is not to join.
Proof of Proposition 20. By comparing numerators with numerators and denomi-
nators by denominators we show that κIF < κ
I
S, κ
I
F < κ
I
C , κ
II
F > κ
II
S and κ
II
F > κ
II
C . Then
we compare τ ∗ in the second region of each compliance scheme and find that τ ∗F > τ
∗
S
and τ ∗F > τ
∗
C .
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Next we compare τ ∗C and τ
∗
S. Let us define
κIS =
2Y kαi
DIIS
κIIS =
2Y kαi +D
I
S
DIS +D
II
S
κIC =
2Y kA2n
DIIC
κIIC =
2Y kA2n +D
I
C
DIC +D
II
C
.
The difference between the upper bounds of first regions is κIC − κIS = 2Y kN1DII
C
DII
S
where
N1 = D
II
S A
2
n − αiDIIC = αi(A2n − S2n)T − 4kAn(An − αi)(η + αiAnZ).
Let us denote the optimal collection rate in the second region under individual(collective)
scheme as τS (τC) and ∆ = τC − τS. Then we have ∆(τ0 = 0) = 2Y N2kDI
C
DI
S
where
N2 = αiD
I
C − A2nDIS = µαi(A2n − S2n)T − 4kAn(An − αi)(η + αiAnX).
Note that N2 − µN1 = −4kAn(An− αi)(αiAn(X −Zµ) + η(1− µ)) ≤ 0. Therefore if
N1 ≤ 0 then N2 ≤ 0 should hold.
Case 1. N1 ≥ 0, N2 ≥ 0
Then the slope of τC is smaller than the slope of τS and the lines cross in the fourth
quadrant, thus τS ≥ τC in the region of interest, i.e. the first quadrant. Note that in this
case κIIC ≥ κIIS .
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Case 2. N1 ≥ 0, N2 ≤ 0
In this case we need to compare the upper bounds of the second regions:
Case 2.i. If κIIC ≥ κIIS then it is obvious that τS ≥ τC .
Case 2.ii. If κIIC ≤ κIIS then we need to identify the point where ∆ = 0.
First, let us identify the sign of N1D
I
C +N2D
II
C = A
2(DIIS D
I
C −DISDIIC ) when N1 ≥ 0
and N2 ≤ 0. Observe that N1DIC+N2DIIC is negative (positive) when evaluated at η that
makes N1 = 0 (N2 = 0). Since both N1 and N2 are decreasing in η and N1 ≥ N2, η value
that makesN1 = 0 is greater than the η value that makesN2 = 0. Hence ifN1(η = η1) = 0
and N2(η = η2) = 0 then η1 ≥ η2. Hence as η increases N1DIC + N2DIIC decreases, i.e.
∂(N1DIC+N2D
II
C
)
∂η
≤ 0. Hence N1DIC+N2DIIC = ∂(N1D
I
C
+N2DIIC )
∂η
A2η−4kTαiA2(X−Zµ)(A3n−
S2nαi) ≤ 0.
Note that ∆ =
τ0(−DIIS D
I
C+D
I
SD
II
C )−2kY (−αiD
I
C+A
2
nD
I
S)
DI
C
DI
S
= 0 at τ0 =
2kY N2
DII
S
DI
C
−DI
S
DII
C
= κ3 =
2A2nkY N2
N1DIC+N2D
II
C
(κ3 ≥ 0 because both N2 ≤ 0 and N1DIC+N2DIIC ≤ 0 here). Hence if τ0 ≤ κ3
then τS ≥ τC and if τ0 ≥ κ3 then τS ≤ τC .
Case 3. N1 ≤ 0, N2 ≤ 0
Then the slope of τC is greater than the slope of τS and the lines cross in the fourth
quadrant, thus τS ≤ τC in the region of interest, i.e. in the first quadrant. Note that in
this case κIIC ≤ κIIS .
We can summarize the findings as follows:
i. If N1 ≤ 0 (see Case 3 above), i.e. η ≥ αi(T (A
2−S2n)−4A2nkZ(An−αi))
4kAn(An−αi)
= η1, then τS ≤ τC .
ii. If N1 ≥ 0 and κIIC − κIIS = 2kA
2
n(N1−N2)Y+(N1D
I
C+N2D
II
C )
(DI
C
+DII
C
)(DI
S
+DII
S
)A2n
≤ 0 (see Case 2.ii. above), i.e.
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η2 ≤ η ≤ η1 where
η2 =
αi ((4kA
2
n(X − Z)(A− αi) + T (A2n − S2n)(1− µ))Y + 2T (αiS2n − A3n)(X − Zµ))
2(1− µ)(Anαi − S2n)T − 8kAn(A2 − α2i )(Z −X)
then τC ≥ τS (τC ≤ τS) when τ0 ≥ κ3 (τ0 ≤ κ3).
If N1 ≥ 0 and κIIC ≥ κIIS (see Case 1 and 2.i. above), i.e. η ≤ η2 then τS ≥ τC .
Proof of Proposition 21. From Proposition 14 and 16, ξ∗S(τ
∗) = ξ∗F (τ
∗) = β(τ0+µτ
∗)
2k
whereas from Proposition 15 ξ∗C =
αiβ(τ0+µτ
∗)
2Ank
. These together with the ordering of
optimal collection rates, i.e. τ ∗F > max{τ ∗S, τ ∗C} (see Proposition 16) prove that ξ∗F >
max{ξ∗S, ξ∗C}.
Next we compare ξ∗S and ξ
∗
C . We show that ξ
∗
S =
β(τ0+µτ∗S)
2k
and ξ∗C =
αiβ(τ0+µτ∗C)
2kAn
in
Proposition 14 and Proposition 15 respectively. We analyze the following three cases
depending on η:
Case A: As long as τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C , the optimal treatability level under individual scheme is
higher, i.e. ξ∗S ≥ ξ∗C . In Proposition 20, we show that τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C and thus ξ∗S ≥ ξ∗C regardless
of τ0 as long as η ≤ η2.
Case B:If τ ∗S ≤ τ ∗C regardless of τ0, i.e. η ≥ η1, then we observe one of the following
orderings:
1. If 0 ≤ κIC ≤ κIIC ≤ 1 ≤ min{κIS, κIIS } (i.e. τ ∗S = 0 for every τ0) then see Case
B.1,Case B.4.
2. If 0 ≤ κIC ≤ κIS ≤ κIIC ≤ κIIS ≤ 1 then see Case B.1,Case B.2,Case B.3.
3. If 0 ≤ κIC ≤ κIIC ≤ κIS ≤ κIIS ≤ 1 then see Case B.1,Case B.4,Case B.3.
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Case B.1. If κIC ≤ τ0 ≤ min{κIIC , κIS} then 0 < τ ∗C < 1 − τ0 and τ ∗S = 0. Then
∆1 = ξ
∗
c,i − ξ∗s,i = β((αiD
I
C
−DI
C
An+αiµDIIC )τ0−2αiµY kA
2
n)
2DI
C
kAn
= β(x1τ0−2αiµY kA
2
n)
2DI
C
kAn
≥ 0 if and only if
τ0 ≥ 2αiµY kA2nαiµDIIC −(An−αi)DIC . Keep in mind that ∆1(τ0 = κ
I
C) ≤ 0. If x1 = αiµDIIC − (An −
αi)D
I
C ≤ 0 then ξ∗c,i ≤ ξ∗s,i in the region of interest (or for any τ0 ≥ 0).
Case B.2. If κIS ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIC then 0 < τ ∗S < τ ∗C < 1− τ0. Then
∆2 = ξ
∗
c,i − ξ∗s,i =
β((x1D
I
S −DICAnµDIIS )τ0 − 2Y kαiAnµ(DISAn −DIC))
2DICkAnD
I
S
.
We summarize the findings in the following cases:
• If x1 ≤ 0 (which also implies ∆1(τ0 = κIS) = ∆2(τ0 = κIS) ≤ 0) then the coefficient
of τ0 is negative. If (D
I
SAn − DIC) ≥ 0 then ∆2 ≤ 0 in the region of interest. In
order to understand what happens when (DISAn − DIC) ≤ 0 keep in mind that
∆2(τ0 = κ
I
S) ≤ 0 (because x1 ≤ 0) and ∆2(τ0 = 0) > 0. Thus when x1 ≤ 0, ∆2 ≤ 0
in the region of interest regardless of the sign of (DISAn −DIC).
• If x1 ≥ 0 and ∆1(τ0 = κIS) = ∆2(τ0 = κIS) ≥ 0 then check the sign of (DISAn−DIC).
If it is positive (i.e. ∆2(τ0 = 0) ≤ 0 ) then ∆2 ≥ 0 in the region of interest. If it is
negative then, ∆2 ≥ 0 if and only if τ0 ≤ 2Y kαiAnµ(D
I
SAn−D
I
C)
β((x1DIS−D
I
C
AnµDIIS )
.
• If x1 ≥ 0 and ∆1(τ0 = κIS) = ∆2(τ0 = κIS) ≤ 0 then check the sign of (DISAn−DIC).
If it is positive then ∆2 ≥ 0 if and only if τ0 ≤ 2Y kαiAnµ(D
I
S
An−DIC)
β((x1DIS−D
I
C
AnµDIIS )
. If it is negative
then ∆2 ≤ 0 in the region of interest.
Case B.3. If max{κIS, κIIC } ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS then τ ∗C = 1 − τ0 and 0 < τ ∗S < 1 − τ0. Then
∆3 = ξ
∗
c,i − ξ∗s,i = β(−(D
I
S
(A−αi)+µ(αiDIS+D
II
S
An))τ0+αiµ(DIS+2AnY k))
2AnkDIS
. Note that ∆3(τ0 = 0) ≥ 0
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and ∆3(τ0 = κ
II
S ) ≤ 0 (because of continuity). If ∆3(τ0 = max{κIS, κIIC }) ≤ 0 then
∆3 ≤ 0 in the region of interest. If ∆3(τ0 = max{κIS, κIIC }) ≥ 0 then ∆3 ≥ 0 if τ0 ≤
αiµ(DIS+2AnY k)
DI
S
(A−αi)+µ(αiDIS+D
II
S
An)
.
Case B.4. If κIIC ≤ τ0 ≤ min{κIS, 1} then τ ∗C = 1− τ0 and τ ∗S = 0. Then ∆4 = ξ∗c,i− ξ∗s,i =
β(−(An−(1−µ)αi)τ0+αiµ)
2kAn
. Note that ∆4(τ0 = 0) ≥ 0 and ∆4(τ0 = 1) ≤ 0 (due to continuity).
If ∆4(τ0 = κ
II
C ) ≤ 0 then ∆4 ≤ 0 in the region of interest. If ∆4(τ0 = κIIC ) ≥ 0 then
∆4 ≥ 0 if τ0 ≤ minκIS, αiµ(An−(1−µ)αi) .
Case C: If η2 ≤ η ≤ η1 then we show in Proposition 20 that τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C if and only if
τ0 ≤ κ3. Besides when τ0 ≥ κIIS we have τ ∗S = τ ∗C = 1− τ0. Hence if τ0 ≤ κ3 or τ0 ≥ κIIS
then τ ∗S ≥ τ ∗C and thus ξ∗s,i ≥ ξ∗c,i. For the region where κ3 ≤ τ0 ≤ κIIS see the analysis
under Case B.2 (keep in mind that ∆2(τ0 = κ3) ≤ 0) and B.3.
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D1 Appendix for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 22. Let ∆
(l1−l2)
j represent the difference between the profits for
j(=M,D,R) under channel structure l1 = (S,O,BN,BC) and l2 = (S,O,BN,BC). In
this proof we plot the differences ∆
(l1−l2)
j with respect to γ and θu. If the difference is
always positive or negative, which is immediate from the plots, then the ranking between
l1 and l2 does not depend on γ or θu. If the sign of difference ∆
(l1−l2)
j depends on the
parameters, then we plot the line ∆
(l1−l2)
j = 0 on a γ − θu coordinate in the region of
interest, i.e. 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θu ≤ 1, and identify the points where the line ∆(l1−l2)j = 0
cut the boundaries of the coordinate space.
1. Manufacturer: From Figure D1 we see that (a) ∆
(O−BN)
M = Π
O
1M − ΠBN1M ≥ 0,
(b)∆
(BN−S)
M = Π
BN
1M −ΠS1M ≥ 0, and (c) ∆(S−BC)M = ΠS1M −ΠBC1M ≥ 0.
2. Rental Agency: From Figure D2 we see that (a) ∆
(O−BN)
R = Π
O
1R − ΠBN1R ≥ 0, (b)
∆
(BN−S)
R = Π
BN
1R −ΠS1R ≥ 0 , and (c)∆(O−BC)R = ΠO1R −ΠBC1R ≥ 0.
From Figure D3, on the other hand, we see that ∆
(BC−S)
R = Π
BC
1R − ΠS1R ≤ 0 and
∆
(BC−BN)
R = Π
BC
1R − ΠBN1R ≤ 0 if and only if γ is sufficiently small. We conclude that
ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥ ΠBC1R if and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯1(θu) where γ¯1(θu) is a decreasing
function of θu (see the solid line in Figure D3(c)). There exists a θ¯u = 0.549 such that
γ¯1(θu) = 1 if and only if θu ≤ θ¯u. Note that ∆(BC−S)R (θu = 0.549, γ = 1) = 0.
Similarly, from Figure D3 we see that ∆
(BC−S)
R = Π
BC
1R − ΠS1R ≥ 0 and ∆(BC−BN)R =
ΠBC1R − ΠBN1R ≤ 0 if and only if γ is in moderate levels. We conclude that ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥
ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R if and only if γ¯1(θu) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯2(θu) where γ¯2(θu) is a convex function of θu
(see the dashed line in Figure D3(c)) and γ¯2(θu) = 1 if and only if θu ≤ θ¯u = 0.553. Note
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FIGURE D1: (a) ∆
(O−BN)
M ≥ 0 (b)∆(BN−S)M ≥ 0 (c)∆(S−BC)M ≥ 0
that ∆
(BC−BN)
R (θu = 0.553, γ = 1) = 0.
Finally, from Figure D3 we see that ∆
(BC−S)
R = Π
BC
1R − ΠS1R ≥ 0 and ∆(BC−BN)R =
ΠBC1R −ΠBN1R ≥ 0 if and only if γ is sufficiently large. Therefore ΠO1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R
if and only if γ¯2(θu) ≤ γ ≤ 1 (Figure D3(c)).
3. Dealer: From Figure D4 we see that (a) ∆
(S−O)
D = Π
S
1D − ΠO1D ≥ 0, (b) ∆(BC−O)D =
ΠBC1D − ΠO1D ≥ 0, and (c) ∆(BN−O)D = ΠBN1D − ΠO1D ≥ 0.
From Figure D5, on the other hand, we see that ∆
(BC−S)
D = Π
BC
1D − ΠS1D ≥ 0,
∆
(BN−S)
D = Π
BN
1D − ΠS1D ≥ 0, and ∆(BN−BC)D = ΠBN1D − ΠBC1D ≤ 0 if γ is sufficiently small.
Therefore we conclude that ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ¯1(θu)
where γ¯1(θu) is an increasing function of θu (see the dotted line in Figure D5(d)).
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FIGURE D2: (a) ∆
(O−BN)
R ≥ 0 (b)∆(BN−S)R ≥ 0 (c)∆(O−BC)R ≥ 0
There exits a θ¯u = 0.783 such that γ¯1(θu) = 0 if and only if θu ≤ θ¯u. Note that
∆
(BN−S)
D (θu = 0.783, γ = 0
+) = 0.
For moderate values of γ, from Figure D5 we see that ∆
(BC−S)
D = Π
BC
1D − ΠS1D ≥ 0,
∆
(BN−S)
D = Π
BN
1D − ΠS1D ≤ 0, and ∆(BN−BC)D = ΠBN1D − ΠBC1D ≤ 0. Therefore, we identify
that ΠBC1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if γ¯1(θu) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯2(θu) where γ¯2(θu) is an
increasing function of θu (see the dashed line in Figure D5(d)). There exits a
¯¯
θu ≤ θ¯u
such that γ¯2(θu) = 0 if and only if θu ≤ ¯¯θu.
For higher values of γ, from Figure D5 we see that ∆
(BC−S)
D = Π
BC
1D − ΠS1D ≤ 0,
∆
(BN−S)
D = Π
BN
1D − ΠS1D ≤ 0, and ∆(BN−BC)D = ΠBN1D − ΠBC1D ≤ 0. Therefore, we conclude
that ΠS1D ≥ ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if γ¯2(θu) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯3(θu) where γ¯3(θu) is an
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FIGURE D3: (a) ∆
(BC−S)
R , (b) ∆
(BC−BN)
R , (c) Three regions from left to right are (i)
∆
(BC−S)
R ≤ 0 and ∆(BC−BN)R ≤ 0, (ii) ∆(BC−S)R ≥ 0 and ∆(BC−BN)R ≤ 0, (iii) ∆(BC−S)R ≥ 0
and ∆
(BC−BN)
R ≥ 0
increasing function of θu (see the solid line in Figure D5(d)).
Finally, for even higher values of γ, from Figure D5 we see that ∆
(BC−S)
D = Π
BC
1D −
ΠS1D ≤ 0, ∆(BN−S)D = ΠBN1D − ΠS1D ≤ 0, and ∆(BN−BC)D = ΠBN1D − ΠBC1D ≥ 0. Therefore we
conclude that ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠBC1D ≥ ΠO1D if and only if γ¯3(θu) ≤ γ ≤ 1.
3. Supply Chain: From Figure D6 we see that (a) ∆
(O−BN)
SC = Π
O
1SC − ΠBN1M ≥ 0,
(b)∆
(BN−S)
SC = Π
BN
1SC − ΠS1M ≥ 0, and (c) ∆(S−BC)SC = ΠS1SC −ΠBC1SC ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 23. In order to show that higher w∗b implies lower w
∗
1 we observe
that ∆1 =
∂2ΠB
1M
∂wb∂w1
is always negative (see Figure D7(a)). On the other hand, higher w∗b
implies higher w¯∗1 because ∆2 =
∂2ΠB
1M
∂wb∂w¯1
is always positive (see Figure D7(b)) regardless
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FIGURE D4: (a) ∆
(S−O)
D ≥ 0, (b)∆(BC−O)D ≥ 0, (c)∆(BN−O)D ≥ 0
of θu and γ.
Proof of Proposition 24. We define the total sales as Ql =
∑
i(qin + q¯in) for
l = S,O,BN,BC. In Figure D8 the differences between total sales are plotted.
Proof of Theorem 25. Starting from γ = 0 and by incrementing γ with 0.01 we solve
∆BND (γ) = 0 for θu. And we obtain the line γ
BN
UB (θu) in Figure D9. We also verify our
calculation by using Maple 11’s implicitplot command that computes the two-dimensional
plot of an implicitly defined curve. From Figure D9 we deduce that ∆BND ≥ 0, and thus
channel conflict is resolved, only if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γBNUB (θu) where γBNUB (θu) is an increasing
function of θu. We find that at γ = 0, γ
BN
UB (θu)(θu = 0.783, γ = 0) = 0, and thus
γBNUB (θu) = 0 if and only if θu ≤ 0.783.
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FIGURE D5: (a) ∆
(BC−S)
D (b) ∆
(BN−S)
D (c)∆
(BN−BC)
D (d)Four regions from left to right
are (i) ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠBC1D , (ii) ΠS1D ≥ ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D , (iii)ΠBC1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D , (iv)
ΠBC1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠS1D
Proof of Proposition 26. Using a method similar to that in the Proof of Proposition
25, we characterize the region where both ∆BCD ≥ 0 and ∆BCR ≥ 0 and plot that region
in Figure 4.5. We find that ∆BCD = ∆
BC
R = 0 only at θu = 0.778 and γ = 0.739. Keeping
Figure 4.5 also in mind we deduce that if θu ≤ 0.778 then the channel conflict is not
resolved regardless of γ. Otherwise, the conflict is resolved if and only if γBCLB (θu) ≤ γ ≤
γBCUB (θu) where γ
BC
LB (θu) is decreasing in θu while γ
BC
UB (θu) is increasing in θu (see Figure
4.5). In addition we find that γBCLB (θu = 1) = 0.599 and thus channel conflict is never
resolved if γ ≤ 0.599.
Proof of Proposition 27. The plot of the manufacturer’s objective function under
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FIGURE D9: The area where channel conflict is resolved under buyback channel with
no price commitment is defined by γBNUB (θu)
buyback channel without price commitment, ΠBN1M , in Figure D10(a), shows the convexity
of ΠBN1M in γ. Besides, if θu ≤ 0.69047 then the manufacturer’s objective function is strictly
decreasing in γ from Figure D10(b).
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Proof of Proposition 28. We solve problem (P1) first using Maple 11’s solver tool
called NLPSolve. In order to verify the solutions from Maple we use a brute force method.
Since in Proposition 27 we show that the objective function is convex in γ, we know that
the optimal point will be on one of the boundaries of feasible region defined by ∆BND ≥ 0.
Therefore by comparing the objective function values at γ = 0 and γ = γBNUB and picking
the one that gives the maximum we obtain the optimal γ∗. Both methods give γ∗(θu) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 29. The plot of the manufacturer’s objective function under
buyback channel with price commitment, ΠBC1M , in Figure D11(a), shows the convexity of
ΠBC1M in γ. Besides, if θu ≤ 0.608 then the manufacturer’s objective function is strictly
decreasing in γ from Figure D11(b).
Proof of Proposition 30. We solve Problem (P2) with Maple 11’s optimization tool
NLPSolve and also with the alternative method explained in the proof of Proposition 28.
We plot the optimal γ∗ in Figure 4.6. We find that if 0.778 ≤ θu ≤ 0.825 then optimal
γ∗ is on the lower bound of the feasible region defined by ∆BCD ≥ 0 and ∆BCR ≥ 0,
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FIGURE D11: (a) Manufacturer’s objective function with respect to θu and γ under
buyback channel with price commitment (b) A cut of objective function for θu ≤ 0.608
i.e.γ∗(θu) = γ
BC
LB (θu). However, if θu ≥ 0.825 then the optimal γ∗ is on the upper bound
of the feasible region, i.e.γ∗(θu) = γ
BC
UB (θu). Finally, if θu ≤ 0.778 then the feasible region
is empty as stated in Proposition 26.
Proof of Proposition 31. We plot the expected optimal profit functions Eθu(Π
l
1j) for
j = (M,R,D) and l = (O, S,BN,BC) in the range of interest, i.e. 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 in Figure
4.7. In the rest of our discussion we drop the expectation operation and use Πl1j alone
for the sake of simplicity.
1. Manufacturer: From Figure 4.7(a), it is immediate that for the manufacturer the
ranking is ΠO1M ≥ ΠBN1M ≥ ΠS1M ≥ ΠBC1M .
2. Rental Agency: From Figure 4.7(b) we identify that there are four possibilities
for the rental agency’s profit ranking depending on γ. (i) If 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.549 then ΠO1R ≥
ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥ ΠBC1R . Also ΠBC1R (γ = 0.549) = ΠS1R(γ = 0.549). (ii) If 0.549 ≤ γ ≤ 0.572
then ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R. Also ΠBN1R (γ = 0.572) = ΠBC1R (γ = 0.572). (iii) If
0.572 ≤ γ ≤ 0.765 then ΠO1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R. Also ΠO1R(γ = 0.765) = ΠBC1R (γ =
0.765). (iv) If γ ≥ 0.765 then ΠBC1R ≥ ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R.
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3. Dealer: From Figure 4.7(c), it is immediate that for the dealer the ranking is
ΠBC1D ≥ ΠS1D ≥ ΠBN1D ≥ ΠO1D.
4. Supply Chain: From Figure 4.7(d), we see that depending on the value of γ, the
profit rankings may change as follows: (i) If 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.962 then ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R ≥
ΠBC1R . (ii) If 0.962 ≤ γ ≤ 0.964 then ΠO1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠS1R. (iii) If γ ≥ 0.964 then
ΠO1R ≥ ΠBC1R ≥ ΠBN1R ≥ ΠS1R.
Proof of Proposition 32. We plot the total sales Ql for each channel structure l
with respect to γ. From Figure 4.8, we observe that (i) If 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.915 then QO ≥
QBN ≥ QS ≥ QBC and QS(γ = 0.915) = QBC(γ = 0.915). (ii) If 0.915 ≤ γ ≤ 0.918 then
QO ≥ QBN ≥ QBC ≥ QS and QBN (γ = 0.918) = QBC(γ = 0.918). (iii) If γ ≥ 0.918 then
QO ≥ QBC ≥ QBN ≥ QS.
Proof of Proposition 33. We plot ∆BCR and ∆
BC
D in Figure 4.9(b). From the figure it
is immediate that it can never be the case where both ∆BCR ≥ 0 and ∆BCD ≥ 0 and thus
the conflict can never be resolved.
We plot ∆BNR and ∆
BN
D in Figure 4.9(c). We find that both ∆
BC
D ≥ 0 for all γ. On
the other hand, ∆BCR is positive only if 0.5485 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Therefore the buyback channel
with price commitment solves the channel conflict if and only if 0.5485 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
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